* [WEB-8103] fix: stop leaking webhook HMAC secret_key on reads (GHSA-83rj)
WebhookEndpoint list/retrieve/patch pass a fields= allowlist that excludes
secret_key, but DynamicBaseSerializer.__init__ discards the caller
allowlist (fields = self.expand). With WebhookSerializer using
fields="__all__" and secret_key only in read_only_fields (read-only is
still serialized), the HMAC signing secret leaked on every webhook read
(GHSA-83rj-4282-x39v; admin-only).
Rather than secret_key = CharField(write_only=True) — which would let a
client inject their own secret on create/patch and break the intended
one-time reveal — hide it by default and reveal only where intended:
- WebhookSerializer.to_representation drops secret_key unless the
show_secret_key context flag is set (secure by default). secret_key
stays server-generated (default=generate_token) and non-writable.
- POST create and WebhookSecretRegenerateEndpoint pass show_secret_key so
the secret is still returned once for the caller to configure their
receiver; list/retrieve/patch no longer emit it.
Add contract regression tests (fail-before verified). Follow-up: the
DynamicBaseSerializer.__init__ allowlist bug affects other serializers —
tracked separately.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8103] test: address review — patch network boundary + pin to_representation
Per review (@sriramveeraghanta):
- Patch the network boundary (validate_url) instead of the whole private
_validate_webhook_url method, so the domain/schema checks still run and
the test survives a rename of the private method.
- Add an assertion that an explicit fields=("secret_key",) request still
hides the key, pinning to_representation as the enforcement point so a
future DynamicBaseSerializer._filter_fields fix can't silently re-open
the leak.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8103] docs: spell out both levels of the dead fields= allowlist
The previous comment named only DynamicBaseSerializer.__init__ discarding the
caller's fields=, which is half the root cause. _filter_fields never removes
anything either: it builds `allowed` purely to attach expansion serializers for
names not already on the serializer, then returns self.fields unfiltered
(serializers/base.py:45-119).
So the fields= kwargs in views/webhook/base.py are no-ops on two independent
levels. Documented so a future `fields = fields or self.expand` fix isn't
assumed to re-activate the allowlists for confidentiality — _filter_fields has
to be made restrictive first. The show_secret_key context flag remains the sole
enforcement point.
Addresses @sriramveeraghanta's review on #9382. 6/6 contract tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(security): drop advisory identifiers from code comments
Explanations kept unchanged; only the IDs are removed.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
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Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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