* [WEB-8103] fix: stop leaking webhook HMAC secret_key on reads (GHSA-83rj)
WebhookEndpoint list/retrieve/patch pass a fields= allowlist that excludes
secret_key, but DynamicBaseSerializer.__init__ discards the caller
allowlist (fields = self.expand). With WebhookSerializer using
fields="__all__" and secret_key only in read_only_fields (read-only is
still serialized), the HMAC signing secret leaked on every webhook read
(GHSA-83rj-4282-x39v; admin-only).
Rather than secret_key = CharField(write_only=True) — which would let a
client inject their own secret on create/patch and break the intended
one-time reveal — hide it by default and reveal only where intended:
- WebhookSerializer.to_representation drops secret_key unless the
show_secret_key context flag is set (secure by default). secret_key
stays server-generated (default=generate_token) and non-writable.
- POST create and WebhookSecretRegenerateEndpoint pass show_secret_key so
the secret is still returned once for the caller to configure their
receiver; list/retrieve/patch no longer emit it.
Add contract regression tests (fail-before verified). Follow-up: the
DynamicBaseSerializer.__init__ allowlist bug affects other serializers —
tracked separately.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8103] test: address review — patch network boundary + pin to_representation
Per review (@sriramveeraghanta):
- Patch the network boundary (validate_url) instead of the whole private
_validate_webhook_url method, so the domain/schema checks still run and
the test survives a rename of the private method.
- Add an assertion that an explicit fields=("secret_key",) request still
hides the key, pinning to_representation as the enforcement point so a
future DynamicBaseSerializer._filter_fields fix can't silently re-open
the leak.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8103] docs: spell out both levels of the dead fields= allowlist
The previous comment named only DynamicBaseSerializer.__init__ discarding the
caller's fields=, which is half the root cause. _filter_fields never removes
anything either: it builds `allowed` purely to attach expansion serializers for
names not already on the serializer, then returns self.fields unfiltered
(serializers/base.py:45-119).
So the fields= kwargs in views/webhook/base.py are no-ops on two independent
levels. Documented so a future `fields = fields or self.expand` fix isn't
assumed to re-activate the allowlists for confidentiality — _filter_fields has
to be made restrictive first. The show_secret_key context flag remains the sole
enforcement point.
Addresses @sriramveeraghanta's review on #9382. 6/6 contract tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(security): drop advisory identifiers from code comments
Explanations kept unchanged; only the IDs are removed.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ProjectJoinEndpoint.get() was AllowAny and used ProjectMemberInviteSerializer
(fields = "__all__"), leaking the invitee's email and token to anyone who
knew the workspace slug, project ID, and invite UUID (GHSA-2r58-hgv7-635q).
Introduce ProjectMemberInvitePublicSerializer with an explicit safe field list
that excludes `email` and `token`, and swap it in for the public GET endpoint.
The full serializer is retained for authenticated admin viewsets.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
GHSA-6qrq-f73q-r67j / GHSA-j9pv-f5wm-p4g2 — IssueCommentSerializer in
both app and api layers stored comment_html without sanitization. The app
layer had no validate() at all; the api layer only ran lxml structural
normalization which does not strip XSS payloads.
Fix: both serializers now call validate_html_content() (nh3-backed) in
their validate() methods, replacing the raw value with sanitized HTML.
GHSA-hh2r-3hwp-mvq3 — space/views/intake.py and api/views/intake.py
both used bare Issue.objects.create() with description_html taken
directly from request data, bypassing any serializer validation.
Fix: both paths now call validate_html_content() and pass the sanitized
value to Issue.objects.create(). Falls back to "<p></p>" if sanitizer
returns None (empty/invalid input).
The nh3 sanitizer (validate_html_content in content_validator.py) was
already present and used by IssueCreateSerializer — this change extends
coverage to the two remaining unsanitized comment and intake paths.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
- Add WorkSpaceMemberInvitePublicSerializer that excludes token and
invite_link; use it in WorkspaceJoinEndpoint.get() so an unauthenticated
caller cannot retrieve the acceptance token from the GET endpoint
(GHSA-86mg-259g-pwgg / GHSA-gf48-p6jp-cwc4).
- Require authentication and verify request.user.email matches the
invited email before accepting a workspace invitation so an attacker
who registers with the invited address cannot hijack the invite
(GHSA-4vj8-p63v-8p24).
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* fix(api): require at least one alphanumeric char in workspace name
Workspace name validation was enforced only on the frontend
(validateWorkspaceName), which gates the UI submit but is bypassable
via a direct API call. The backend WorkSpaceSerializer.validate_name
only rejected URLs, so a symbol-only name like "-_________-" could
still be saved via create or the rename (partial_update) path.
Add a Unicode-aware has_alphanumeric() helper and enforce it in both
the app and instance/license workspace serializers, mirroring the
frontend HAS_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEX (/[\p{L}\p{N}]/u) added in #9263.
International names (日本語, José, محمد) still pass since str.isalnum()
covers all scripts.
Adds unit tests covering symbol-only rejection and international
acceptance on both serializers.
Refs #9255
Signed-off-by: sriramveeraghanta <veeraghanta.sriram@gmail.com>
* fix(api): reject URLs in instance workspace name for parity
Address CodeRabbit review on #9278: the instance/license
WorkspaceSerializer.validate_name rejected symbol-only names but, unlike
the app-level WorkSpaceSerializer, still accepted names containing URLs.
Add the same contains_url() guard (imported from plane.utils.url, not
content_validator) so both workspace-create paths validate identically.
Add unit tests asserting URL-containing names are rejected on both
serializers.
Signed-off-by: sriramveeraghanta <veeraghanta.sriram@gmail.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: sriramveeraghanta <veeraghanta.sriram@gmail.com>
* fix: harden API token handling against rate-limit tampering and plaintext logging
- Make `allowed_rate_limit` read-only on APITokenSerializer so users can no
longer raise their own API token rate limit via PATCH (GHSA-xfgr-2x3f-g2cf).
- Stop persisting API keys in plaintext in APITokenLogMiddleware: store a
SHA-256 hash as the token identifier and redact sensitive request headers
(X-Api-Key, Authorization, Cookie) before logging (GHSA-r5p8-cj3q-38cc).
* refactor: remove MongoDB log sink and add per-log-type retention
Logs are now written to and cleared from PostgreSQL only; MongoDB is no
longer used as a log sink or archive.
- Drop the MongoDB write/archival paths from the API request logger, the
webhook log writer, and the cleanup tasks; Postgres is the sole sink.
- Cleanup tasks now hard-delete expired rows in batches via `all_objects`
(rows are removed immediately, not soft-deleted).
- Add env-backed, per-log-type retention settings: API activity logs
(API_ACTIVITY_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS, default 14), webhook logs
(WEBHOOK_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS, default 14), email logs
(EMAIL_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS, default 7). HARD_DELETE_AFTER_DAYS no longer
drives any log cleanup.
- Delete settings/mongo.py, remove MONGO_DB_* settings and the plane.mongo
loggers, and drop the pymongo dependency.
* chore: gitignore local advisories.md notes file
* fix: use keyed HMAC-SHA256 for API token log identifier
Address CodeQL "weak hashing of sensitive data" by hashing the API key with
a SECRET_KEY-keyed HMAC instead of a bare SHA-256. The identifier is a
non-reversible tokenization of a high-entropy key (not password storage);
keying it also prevents precomputing the digest from a known key value.
* chore: address review feedback on log cleanup and request logging
- process_logs accepts extra kwargs so jobs enqueued by an older release
(with a mongo_log arg) don't fail during a rolling deploy.
- Log-cleanup batch delete failures are logged and skipped rather than
aborting the run, so a single bad batch can't block the rest.
- Extend logger middleware test to assert Authorization and Cookie headers
are redacted; add a test that a failing cleanup batch is swallowed.
* fix: fall back to default when a log retention env value is invalid
Negative (or unparseable) retention values would compute a future cutoff and
delete every log row. The retention settings now fall back to their defaults
in that case via a shared `_retention_days` helper.
* fix: add WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS allowlist for internal webhook targets
The IP-based allowlist alone isn't practical for containerised deployments
where service IPs are dynamic. Adds a hostname-based bypass for trusted
internal services (e.g. Silo via docker-compose / k8s service DNS) and
makes the previously hardcoded ["plane.so"] domain blocklist configurable
via WEBHOOK_DISALLOWED_DOMAINS.
- validate_url accepts allowed_hosts (exact, case-insensitive match;
skips DNS lookup for trusted names)
- WebhookSerializer wires both settings through and lets allowlisted
hosts bypass the disallowed-domain check
- Exposes WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS in aio/cli deployment env files
* fix: default WEBHOOK_DISALLOWED_DOMAINS to empty for self-hosted
* fix: pass WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS to send-time webhook re-validation
* fix: replace IS_SELF_MANAGED toggle with explicit WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_IPS allowlist
Instead of blanket-allowing all private IPs on self-managed deployments,
webhook URL validation now blocks all private/internal IPs by default and
only permits specific networks listed in the WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_IPS env
variable (comma-separated IPs/CIDRs).
* fix: address PR review comments for webhook SSRF protection
- Sanitize error messages to avoid leaking internal details to clients
- Guard against TypeError with mixed IPv4/IPv6 allowlist networks
- Re-validate webhook URL at send time to prevent DNS-rebinding
- Add unit tests for mixed-version IP network allowlists
* chore: update ProjectSerializer to raise validation for special characters in name and identifier
* chore: update external endpoints
* fix: external api serializer validation
* update serializer to send error code
* fix: move the regex expression to Project model
- Modified the invite link to include a token for enhanced security.
- Updated the WorkspaceJoinEndpoint to validate the token instead of the email.
- Adjusted the workspace invitation task to generate links with the token.
- Refactored the frontend to handle token in the invitation process.
Co-authored-by: sriram veeraghanta <veeraghanta.sriram@gmail.com>
* refactor: rename IssueUserProperty to ProjectUserProperty and update related references across the codebase
* migrate: move issue user properties to project user properties and update related fields and constraints
* refactor: rename IssueUserPropertySerializer and IssueUserDisplayPropertyEndpoint to ProjectUserPropertySerializer and ProjectUserDisplayPropertyEndpoint, updating all related references
* fix: enhance ProjectUserDisplayPropertyEndpoint to handle missing properties by creating new entries and improve response handling
* fix: correct formatting in migration for ProjectUserProperty model options
* migrate: add migration to update existing non-service API tokens to remove workspace association
* migrate: refine migration to update existing non-service API tokens by excluding bot users from workspace removal
* chore: changed the project sort order in project user property
* chore: remove allowed_rate_limit from APIToken
* chore: updated user-properties endpoint for frontend
* chore: removed the extra projectuserproperty
* chore: updated the migration file
* chore: code refactor
* fix: type error
---------
Co-authored-by: NarayanBavisetti <narayan3119@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: sangeethailango <sangeethailango21@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: vamsikrishnamathala <matalav55@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Anmol Singh Bhatia <anmolsinghbhatia@plane.so>
* chore: traige state in intake
* chore: triage state changes
* feat: implement intake state dropdown component and integrate into issue properties
* chore: added the triage state validation
* chore: added triage state filter
* chore: added workspace filter
* fix: migration file
* chore: added triage group state check
* chore: updated the filters
* chore: updated the filters
* chore: added variables for intake state
* fix: import error
* refactor: improve project intake state retrieval logic and update TriageGroupIcon component
* chore: changed the intake validation logic
* refactor: update intake state types and clean up unused interfaces
* chore: changed the state color
* chore: changed the update serializer
* chore: updated with current instance
* chore: update TriageGroupIcon color to match new intake state group color
* chore: stringified value
* chore: added validation in serializer
* chore: added logger instead of print
* fix: correct component closing syntax in ActiveProjectItem
* chore: updated the migration file
* chore: added noop in migation
---------
Co-authored-by: b-saikrishnakanth <bsaikrishnakanth97@gmail.com>
* chore: update navigation_project_limit and navigation_control_preference
* chore: set default true for user specific widgets
* chore: use serializer in ProjectMemberPreferenceEndpoint
chore: use serializer in WorkspaceUserPropertiesEndpoint
"
* fix: validate preferences
* fix: status code
* fix: remove saving from validate
* fix: simply validate_preferences
* chore: create WorkspaceUserProperties if it doesn't exist
* fix: create WorksapceUserProperties it not exist
* fix: copy the instance
* Revert "fix: copy the instance"
This reverts commit ddb0384b6dfa0dc52929972c4e2cd7ce85c69667.
* chore: migrate WorkspaceUserPreference to set defaults
* fix: migration file name
* Revert "fix: migration file name"
This reverts commit 80a21dedf1a1245f22e45bfeaf20e8e9f91a1cbf.
* Revert "chore: migrate WorkspaceUserPreference to set defaults"
This reverts commit 25bc583a081ce79d52ec721f69cf8e61de3e8fb3.
* chore: update psycopg dependencies to version 3.2.9 in base requirements
* refactor: clean up unused imports across multiple files
* chore: update lxml dependency to version 6.0.0 in base requirements
* style: improve code readability by breaking long lines into multiple lines across several files
* style: enhance readability by breaking long lines in ModuleSerializer docstring
* fix: disbale project features on project create
* Implement migration 0105 to alter project cycle view fields to Boolean with default values
* Add project view settings in workspace seed task
* Add is_current_version_deprecated field to Instance model
Index user_id field in Session model
---------
Co-authored-by: pablohashescobar <nikhilschacko@gmail.com>
* added PageBinaryUpdateSerializer for binary data validation and update
* chore: added validation for description
* chore: removed the duplicated file
* Fixed coderabbit comments
- Improve content validation by consolidating patterns and enhancing recursion checks
- Updated `PageBinaryUpdateSerializer` to simplify assignment of validated data.
- Enhanced `content_validator.py` with consolidated dangerous patterns and added recursion depth checks to prevent stack overflow during validation.
- Improved readability and maintainability of validation functions by using constants for patterns.
---------
Co-authored-by: Dheeraj Kumar Ketireddy <dheeru0198@gmail.com>
* [WEB-4498] improvement: remove workspace details from workspace members list API
* refactor: update select_related usage in workspace invitation and member views
---------
Co-authored-by: Dheeraj Kumar Ketireddy <dheeru0198@gmail.com>
