- Updated phone viewport test to check for new text related to SNS topics. - Enhanced audit log screen tests with new credential events and filters. - Modified mailbox form sheet tests to handle SNS Topic ARN correctly. - Introduced new tests for ticket form close date functionality, ensuring correct behavior for optional close dates. - Added support for organization timezone handling in tests, ensuring accurate date calculations based on user organization. - Improved unit tests for mailbox and organization date handling, ensuring proper behavior for various scenarios. - Implemented bulk close date functionality in ticket selection tests, verifying correct behavior for date selection and submission.
111 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown
111 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown
# The client portal and RLS
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The public endpoints: the invoice and estimate links emailed to customers,
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and the CSAT survey link, are the only anonymous, org-less requests that need
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to read org-scoped rows. That combination puts them at odds with RLS, and this
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note records where that stands.
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## What was wrong, and what is now fixed
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`RequireOrgContext.EXEMPT_PATHS` listed `/api/public/csat/` but not
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`/api/public/invoice/` or `/api/public/estimate/`. `_is_exempt` is a
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`startswith` check, so the CSAT entry did not cover its siblings, and the
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middleware returned
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```
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403 {"detail": "Organization context is required. Please login again."}
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```
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to every anonymous caller. That is, to every customer who clicked a link. The
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middleware runs before the view, so token validity never entered into it.
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**Fixed**: both prefixes are now exempt. Regression tests live in
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`invoices/tests/test_invoices_api.py::TestPublicPortalIsReachableAnonymously`
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and go through the full Django test client. That matters: the pre-existing
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view tests use `APIRequestFactory` and call the view directly, bypassing
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MIDDLEWARE, which is why they passed throughout the outage.
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## What is still open
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Reachability is not readability. `_set_org_context` returns early when
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`request.org is None`, so a public request runs with `app.current_org` empty,
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and the isolation policy built by `common.rls.get_enable_policy_sql` is
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```sql
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USING (org_id::text = (select NULLIF(current_setting('app.current_org', true), '')))
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```
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Empty context yields `NULL`, which matches nothing. `invoice`, `estimate` and
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`csat_survey` are all in `ORG_SCOPED_TABLES`.
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Measured directly as `crm_user` (non-superuser, no `BYPASSRLS`) with empty
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context:
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| table | rows visible |
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| ------------- | ------------ |
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| `invoice` | 0 |
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| `estimate` | 0 |
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| `csat_survey` | 0 |
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So on a correctly configured production database, these endpoints now return
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**404 instead of 403**. The customer still cannot see their invoice.
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This is masked in development, where `DBUSER=postgres`. A superuser, which
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bypasses RLS entirely, so every public endpoint appears to work. Do not take a
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green dev run as evidence.
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**This applies to CSAT too.** `cases/csat_views.py::_load_survey` does its
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initial `CsatSurvey.objects.filter(token_hash=...)` with no context set, and
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only calls `set_rls_context(survey.org_id)` afterwards. The lookup itself is
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subject to the same policy. CSAT should be re-tested against `crm_user` rather
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than assumed healthy.
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## The shape of the remaining fix
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The problem is a chicken-and-egg: you cannot set `app.current_org` until you
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know the org, and you cannot read the row that tells you the org until the
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context is set. Three ways out, in the order they should be considered:
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1. **An unscoped token→org lookup.** A small table (or an unscoped column on
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an existing unscoped table) mapping `token_hash` → `org_id`, deliberately
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*not* in `ORG_SCOPED_TABLES`. The view resolves the org, calls
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`set_rls_context(org_id)`, then queries normally under full RLS. This adds
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a surface rather than weakening one, and it leaks only the existence of a
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token to somebody who already holds it. Requires a migration.
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2. **A dedicated lookup role.** A Postgres role permitted to select
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`public_token`/`token_hash` and `org_id` and nothing else. Narrower than
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option 3, but it still means a second connection path and another role to
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keep correct.
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3. **A policy exception** allowing SELECT by token with empty context. Cheapest
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to write and the easiest to get wrong: it widens the isolation policy on
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the invoice and estimate tables themselves, which are exactly the tables
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whose isolation matters. Not to be done without an explicit decision.
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Do not reach for `BYPASSRLS` here. That role exists for the superadmin
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dashboard and every addition to its surface is a step toward the escalation
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path the threat model is built around.
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## The inbound email webhook uses the same lookup
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`POST /api/cases/inbound/<mailbox_id>/` had both defects at once until 1.13.0:
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`RequireOrgContext` answered 403 to every SNS delivery, and past that, the view
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read `inbound_mailbox` before it set any context and answered 404. The route is
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now exempt by URL name (`RequireOrgContext.EXEMPT_VIEW_NAMES`, deliberately not
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a prefix), and the view resolves the org from `portal_access_token` (resource
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type `inbound_mailbox`, key `sha256` of the canonical mailbox id) before it sets
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the context and reads the mailbox. Rows are registered on mailbox create and
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removed on delete (`cases/signals.py`); `common/0049` backfilled existing
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mailboxes org by org. Tests: `cases/tests/test_inbound_webhook_reachability.py`,
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including `postgres_only` cases that assert the empty context hides the mailbox
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before proving the delivery lands.
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## What must not be done
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- Do not make the app's DB user a superuser to "fix" the portal. That disables
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RLS for the entire application.
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- Do not broaden the exemption to `/api/public/` or `/api/`. The two prefixes
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are specific so that anything mounted there later has to opt in.
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- Do not test this with `APIRequestFactory`. The bug lived in middleware; a
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test that skips middleware cannot see it.
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