jira/apps/api/plane/app/views/webhook/base.py
sriram veeraghanta 04622ce118
fix: harden webhook/link/OAuth-avatar SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C/E) (#9163)
* fix(api): harden webhook & link-unfurl SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C)

Resolves three overlapping SSRF advisory clusters around webhook delivery
and work-item link unfurling:

- Cluster A (private-IP validation + PATCH bypass): the webhook PATCH
  handler passed context={request: request} (the request object as the
  dict key) so the loopback/disallowed-domain guard silently no-op'd —
  now context={"request": request}. Hardened IP classification
  (is_blocked_ip) to also block multicast, unspecified, CGNAT
  (100.64.0.0/10), and IPv4 embedded in IPv6 transition addresses
  (IPv4-mapped, NAT64, 6to4, Teredo), robust across Python versions.

- Cluster B (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU): validators resolved DNS, then
  requests resolved it again at connect time. New pinned-IP client
  (plane/utils/url_security.py) resolves+validates once and connects to
  the validated IP literal so urllib3 performs no second lookup, while
  preserving Host header, TLS SNI and certificate verification against
  the real hostname.

- Cluster C (redirect SSRF): webhook delivery never follows redirects;
  the link crawler follows them manually, re-resolving + re-validating +
  re-pinning every hop.

Also: pin requests==2.33.0 in base.txt (imported directly; the pinning
adapter needs the >=2.32 get_connection_with_tls_context hook), and log
webhook URL-validation rejections to WebhookLog instead of swallowing
them.

Tests: new test_url_security.py (pinning, rebinding, redirect
re-validation, IP edge cases, TLS SNI) + updated link-task tests.
Full unit suite: 178 passed.

* fix(api): block OAuth avatar SSRF + add per-advisory SSRF regression tests

Verified every SSRF-class advisory against the current code. The webhook /
link / favicon reports — including the published CVE-2026-30242 and
CVE-2026-39843 and the newer "still bypassable" reports (DNS rebinding
GHSA-3856/-fgcv/-9292/-whh3/-4mjx/-6p39/-fv24/-8wvv, IP-classification gaps
GHSA-75fg, redirect GHSA-6v37/-jw6g/-mq87) — are resolved by the pinned-IP
client + hardened classifier in this branch.

The one SSRF family still unresolved was the OAuth avatar path:
download_and_upload_avatar() fetched the provider-supplied avatar_url with a
raw requests.get (no IP validation, default redirect following), so an
attacker-controlled avatar could reach internal addresses and be exfiltrated
via the static-asset endpoint (GHSA-cv9p-325g-wmv5, and the avatar hop of the
Gitea SSRF GHSA-hx79-5pj5-qh42). It now uses pinned_fetch_following_redirects,
which validates + pins every hop and blocks internal targets.

Adds test_ssrf_advisories.py: a per-advisory regression map covering webhook
IP validation, the PATCH context-key guard, webhook DNS rebinding, webhook
redirect, favicon redirect + rebinding, and OAuth avatar SSRF.

docker compose test: 199 unit tests pass.

* fix(api): address PR review feedback on the SSRF pinned client

- url_security: preserve URL-embedded credentials (user:pass@host) as Basic
  Auth instead of silently dropping them when rewriting to the IP literal
  (Copilot); bracket IPv6-literal hostnames in the Host header (Copilot);
  add stream=True support that keeps the session open until the response is
  closed, and release intermediate redirect hops.
- ip_address / work_item_link_task: treat UnicodeError (IDNA failures) from
  getaddrinfo as a resolution failure, not an uncaught exception (CodeRabbit).
- authentication/adapter/base: stream the avatar download so the size cap
  actually bounds memory, upload the size-bounded buffer (not response.content),
  and always close the response (CodeRabbit, major).
- tests: cover auth preservation, IPv6 Host bracketing, IDNA handling, and
  streamed session lifetime; drop an unused import.

docker compose test: 204 unit tests pass.
2026-05-31 00:12:23 +05:30

126 lines
4.6 KiB
Python

# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
# See the LICENSE file for details.
# Django imports
from django.db import IntegrityError
# Third party imports
from rest_framework import status
from rest_framework.response import Response
# Module imports
from plane.db.models import Webhook, WebhookLog, Workspace
from plane.db.models.webhook import generate_token
from ..base import BaseAPIView
from plane.app.permissions import allow_permission, ROLE
from plane.app.serializers import WebhookSerializer, WebhookLogSerializer
class WebhookEndpoint(BaseAPIView):
@allow_permission(allowed_roles=[ROLE.ADMIN], level="WORKSPACE")
def post(self, request, slug):
workspace = Workspace.objects.get(slug=slug)
try:
serializer = WebhookSerializer(data=request.data, context={"request": request})
if serializer.is_valid():
serializer.save(workspace_id=workspace.id)
return Response(serializer.data, status=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
return Response(serializer.errors, status=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST)
except IntegrityError as e:
if "already exists" in str(e):
return Response(
{"error": "URL already exists for the workspace"},
status=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT,
)
raise IntegrityError
@allow_permission(allowed_roles=[ROLE.ADMIN], level="WORKSPACE")
def get(self, request, slug, pk=None):
if pk is None:
webhooks = Webhook.objects.filter(workspace__slug=slug)
serializer = WebhookSerializer(
webhooks,
fields=(
"id",
"url",
"is_active",
"created_at",
"updated_at",
"project",
"issue",
"cycle",
"module",
"issue_comment",
),
many=True,
)
return Response(serializer.data, status=status.HTTP_200_OK)
else:
webhook = Webhook.objects.get(workspace__slug=slug, pk=pk)
serializer = WebhookSerializer(
webhook,
fields=(
"id",
"url",
"is_active",
"created_at",
"updated_at",
"project",
"issue",
"cycle",
"module",
"issue_comment",
),
)
return Response(serializer.data, status=status.HTTP_200_OK)
@allow_permission(allowed_roles=[ROLE.ADMIN], level="WORKSPACE")
def patch(self, request, slug, pk):
webhook = Webhook.objects.get(workspace__slug=slug, pk=pk)
serializer = WebhookSerializer(
webhook,
data=request.data,
context={"request": request},
partial=True,
fields=(
"id",
"url",
"is_active",
"created_at",
"updated_at",
"project",
"issue",
"cycle",
"module",
"issue_comment",
),
)
if serializer.is_valid():
serializer.save()
return Response(serializer.data, status=status.HTTP_200_OK)
return Response(serializer.errors, status=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST)
@allow_permission(allowed_roles=[ROLE.ADMIN], level="WORKSPACE")
def delete(self, request, slug, pk):
webhook = Webhook.objects.get(pk=pk, workspace__slug=slug)
webhook.delete()
return Response(status=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
class WebhookSecretRegenerateEndpoint(BaseAPIView):
@allow_permission(allowed_roles=[ROLE.ADMIN], level="WORKSPACE")
def post(self, request, slug, pk):
webhook = Webhook.objects.get(workspace__slug=slug, pk=pk)
webhook.secret_key = generate_token()
webhook.save()
serializer = WebhookSerializer(webhook)
return Response(serializer.data, status=status.HTTP_200_OK)
class WebhookLogsEndpoint(BaseAPIView):
@allow_permission(allowed_roles=[ROLE.ADMIN], level="WORKSPACE")
def get(self, request, slug, webhook_id):
webhook_logs = WebhookLog.objects.filter(workspace__slug=slug, webhook=webhook_id)
serializer = WebhookLogSerializer(webhook_logs, many=True)
return Response(serializer.data, status=status.HTTP_200_OK)