* fix: add rate limiting to email/password sign-in and sign-up endpoints
All four password authentication views (app sign-in, app sign-up, space
sign-in, space sign-up) extended django.views.View, so DRF's global
AnonRateThrottle never ran and the endpoints accepted unlimited credential
guesses with no friction (brute-force / credential stuffing, GHSA-349j).
Add authentication_throttle_allows(request) at the top of each post()
method — before any DB access — using the same AuthenticationThrottle
already guarding the magic-code views. On rejection the view redirects with
RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED, consistent with all other throttled auth endpoints.
Default limit remains 10/minute, overridable via AUTHENTICATION_RATE_LIMIT.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* refactor: consolidate auth throttle into a decorator + add tests
- Extract the repeated throttle-and-redirect block from the six redirect-flow
auth views (email + magic, app + space) into a single throttle_auth_redirect
decorator in rate_limit.py. Behaviour is unchanged: the throttle still runs
before any DB access; brute-force traffic is rejected without a DB hit.
- Add regression tests for the password sign-in/sign-up throttle on both app
and space endpoints, mirroring the existing magic-code throttle tests.
- Reset the shared AuthenticationThrottle bucket before every test in
test_authentication.py. All auth endpoints share one per-IP throttle scope,
so the newly-throttled password requests exhausted the budget mid-file and
caused unrelated tests to trip RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED.
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Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
Co-authored-by: sriramveeraghanta <veeraghanta.sriram@gmail.com>
* fix(api): rate-limit magic-code verification and bound per-token attempts
The magic-link sign-in / sign-up endpoints accept a 6-digit numeric code
(900k-value space, 600s TTL) but never increment a failure counter on a
wrong-code verify and extend django.views.View rather than DRF APIView,
so DRF's AuthenticationThrottle never runs against them. The space-side
generate endpoint also lacked throttle_classes. Combined, this allowed
an unauthenticated attacker who knew a victim's email to brute-force
the code within the TTL window and log in as the victim.
- Add MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS=5 in MagicCodeProvider.set_user_data: failed
comparisons now persist verify_attempts in Redis under the remaining
TTL and, on hitting the limit, delete the key and raise
EMAIL_CODE_ATTEMPT_EXHAUSTED. This is the load-bearing fix - it caps
total attempts per issued token regardless of request rate.
- Add authentication_throttle_allows() so plain Django Views can apply
AuthenticationThrottle without converting to APIView (would change
CSRF + request-parsing semantics for the redirect-flow endpoints).
- Apply the throttle to MagicSignIn/UpEndpoint and the space variants;
add throttle_classes to MagicGenerateSpaceEndpoint to match its app
sibling.
Refs GHSA-9pvm-fcf6-9234.
* fix(api): make verify-attempt increment atomic, expose throttle rate via env
Address PR review feedback:
- Replace the JSON read-modify-write of verify_attempts with a Lua
EVAL script that INCRs a dedicated counter key and EXPIREs it only
on the first increment. The previous round-trip was racy: parallel
wrong-code requests could read the same value and both write the
same incremented count, letting an attacker exceed MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS
under concurrency. Counter is now reset on each new token issuance
and cleared on successful verify / exhaustion.
- Make AuthenticationThrottle.rate configurable via the
AUTHENTICATION_RATE_LIMIT env var (default 10/minute, down from 30
to tighten the budget on unauth auth-adjacent endpoints). Document
it in deployments/aio and deployments/cli variables.env.
* test(api): cover magic-code attempt cap, counter reset, and auth throttle
Add the contract tests called out in the PR test plan:
- TestMagicSignInVerifyAttempts:
- test_exhausted_after_max_wrong_attempts: after MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS
wrong codes the next verify redirects with EMAIL_CODE_ATTEMPT_
EXHAUSTED_SIGN_IN and both Redis keys are deleted; a follow-up
verify reports EXPIRED.
- test_counter_increments_on_each_wrong_attempt: the dedicated
verify_attempts counter advances by exactly one per wrong POST,
matching the atomic Lua INCR.
- test_counter_resets_on_token_regeneration: regenerating the
magic-link clears the counter so the user isn't pre-locked-out by
a prior session's wrong attempts.
- TestMagicSignUpVerifyAttempts.test_signup_exhausted_after_max_wrong_attempts:
the sign-up endpoint returns EMAIL_CODE_ATTEMPT_EXHAUSTED_SIGN_UP on
the exhausting attempt.
- TestAuthenticationThrottle: exercises authentication_throttle_allows
on the plain-View redirect-flow endpoints by patching the rate down
and asserting RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED is appended to the redirect URL
once the per-IP budget is exceeded, for both magic-sign-in and
magic-sign-up.
Each new class clears Django cache (DRF throttle storage) and the
per-email Redis keys around every test so runs are independent.
* fix(api): clamp remaining_ttl to >=1 for verify-attempt counter EXPIRE
ri.ttl() returns 0 when the token has less than one second remaining
(Redis floors to whole seconds). The previous clamp only caught
None and < 0, so a sub-second TTL would pass through and the Lua
script's EXPIRE counter 0 would immediately delete the key — letting
an attacker bypass MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS during the final second of the
token's life. Switch the comparison to <= 0.
Narrow real-world impact (sub-second window, throttle still bounds
the rate) but the cap should hold regardless of timing.
* refactor: remove base_host retrieval from authentication views
* Removed unnecessary base_host retrieval from GitHub, GitLab, and Google callback endpoints.
* Updated MagicSignUpEndpoint to use get_safe_redirect_url for URL construction.
* Refactored MagicSignInSpaceEndpoint to streamline URL redirection logic.
* refactor: streamline URL redirection in MagicSignInSpaceEndpoint
* Removed redundant base_url retrieval from the exception handling in MagicSignInSpaceEndpoint.
* Enhanced the clarity of URL construction by directly using get_safe_redirect_url.
* refactor: replace validate_next_path with get_safe_redirect_url for safer URL redirection across authentication views
* refactor: use get_safe_redirect_url for improved URL redirection in SignInAuthSpaceEndpoint and SignUpAuthSpaceEndpoint
* fix: redirect paths
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Co-authored-by: sriram veeraghanta <veeraghanta.sriram@gmail.com>
