* [WEB-8352] fix(security): scope SubIssuesEndpoint to the URL project (GHSA-gxhv-fw9x-2pg3)
SubIssuesEndpoint is guarded only by ProjectEntityPermission, which verifies
the caller belongs to the URL project_id but not that the path issue_id lives
in that project. Both handlers then resolved issues without a project scope:
- GET filtered sub-issues by parent_id + workspace__slug only, leaking the
names/priorities/assignees/dates of another project's sub-issues (read IDOR).
- POST loaded the parent by bare pk (no workspace/project scope) and filtered
the moved sub-issues by workspace__slug only, letting any project member
re-parent issues from other projects/workspaces (write IDOR).
Scope the parent lookup and both sub-issue querysets to the URL project_id
(and bind the parent to the workspace), returning 404 when the parent is not
in the caller's project. Adds 5 contract tests (3 security, 2 positive
controls); fail-before verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* [WEB-8352] fix: dispatch sub-issue activity only for project-scoped issues (CodeRabbit/Copilot #9466)
The DB update + response were scoped to the URL project, but the activity loop
still iterated the raw caller-supplied sub_issue_ids. A cross-project id
(excluded from the re-parent) would still fire issue_activity.delay, whose task
does an unscoped Issue.objects.get and bumps updated_at — touching a foreign
issue and creating a bogus activity row.
Dispatch from the project-scoped sub_issues (scoped_sub_issue_ids) instead.
Strengthened the test to assert the foreign issue is absent from the response
body (sub_issues / state_distribution) and that no activity is dispatched for it
(mock). Fail-before verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(security): drop advisory identifiers from code comments
Explanations kept unchanged; only the IDs are removed.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8110] fix: sanitize page list order_by against an allowlist (GHSA-2v48)
PageViewSet.get_queryset passed the raw order_by query param into
.order_by(). In Django 4.2 .order_by() resolves field names at call time,
so an unknown field (e.g. order_by=password) raises FieldError → 500 DoS,
and a valid relation path (e.g. order_by=owned_by__password) enables ORM
relational traversal (GHSA-2v48-qcjw-74ch).
Add PAGE_ORDER_BY_ALLOWLIST to utils/order_queryset.py and wrap the param
with the existing sanitize_order_by() before it reaches .order_by(),
matching the issue/project/view/notification endpoints. Unknown or
malformed values fall back to the safe -created_at default.
Covers only the app project-pages residual; the 3 external-REST-API sites
in the advisory are handled by PR #9348. EE Wiki counterpart: WEB-8111.
Add contract regression tests (fail-before verified).
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8110] fix: fold sanitized order_by into a single order_by() call (review)
Address CodeRabbit + Copilot on #9387: the sanitized .order_by(user) was
immediately overridden by a later .order_by("-is_favorite", "-created_at"),
so the order_by param had no effect on the result (dead code) and cost an
extra query-build step.
Merge them into one .order_by("-is_favorite", <sanitized>, "id") — matching
the EE project-pages viewset — so favourites stay pinned first, the
allowlisted user ordering actually applies as the secondary sort, and id is
a stable pagination tiebreak. The no-param default is unchanged
(-created_at). Add a test asserting order_by=name / -name actually reorders
the results.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* chore(security): drop advisory identifiers from code comments
Explanations kept unchanged; only the IDs are removed.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8103] fix: stop leaking webhook HMAC secret_key on reads (GHSA-83rj)
WebhookEndpoint list/retrieve/patch pass a fields= allowlist that excludes
secret_key, but DynamicBaseSerializer.__init__ discards the caller
allowlist (fields = self.expand). With WebhookSerializer using
fields="__all__" and secret_key only in read_only_fields (read-only is
still serialized), the HMAC signing secret leaked on every webhook read
(GHSA-83rj-4282-x39v; admin-only).
Rather than secret_key = CharField(write_only=True) — which would let a
client inject their own secret on create/patch and break the intended
one-time reveal — hide it by default and reveal only where intended:
- WebhookSerializer.to_representation drops secret_key unless the
show_secret_key context flag is set (secure by default). secret_key
stays server-generated (default=generate_token) and non-writable.
- POST create and WebhookSecretRegenerateEndpoint pass show_secret_key so
the secret is still returned once for the caller to configure their
receiver; list/retrieve/patch no longer emit it.
Add contract regression tests (fail-before verified). Follow-up: the
DynamicBaseSerializer.__init__ allowlist bug affects other serializers —
tracked separately.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8103] test: address review — patch network boundary + pin to_representation
Per review (@sriramveeraghanta):
- Patch the network boundary (validate_url) instead of the whole private
_validate_webhook_url method, so the domain/schema checks still run and
the test survives a rename of the private method.
- Add an assertion that an explicit fields=("secret_key",) request still
hides the key, pinning to_representation as the enforcement point so a
future DynamicBaseSerializer._filter_fields fix can't silently re-open
the leak.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8103] docs: spell out both levels of the dead fields= allowlist
The previous comment named only DynamicBaseSerializer.__init__ discarding the
caller's fields=, which is half the root cause. _filter_fields never removes
anything either: it builds `allowed` purely to attach expansion serializers for
names not already on the serializer, then returns self.fields unfiltered
(serializers/base.py:45-119).
So the fields= kwargs in views/webhook/base.py are no-ops on two independent
levels. Documented so a future `fields = fields or self.expand` fix isn't
assumed to re-activate the allowlists for confidentiality — _filter_fields has
to be made restrictive first. The show_secret_key context flag remains the sole
enforcement point.
Addresses @sriramveeraghanta's review on #9382. 6/6 contract tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(security): drop advisory identifiers from code comments
Explanations kept unchanged; only the IDs are removed.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: remove posthog integration and analytics scaffold
Removes the PostHog integration end to end, plus the inert autocapture
scaffold left behind by an earlier partial removal (d61b157929,
"chore: remove posthog events (#8465)").
Backend:
- delete bgtasks/event_tracking_task.py and utils/analytics_events.py
- drop all 6 track_event.delay call sites
- drop POSTHOG_API_KEY / POSTHOG_HOST settings
- stop returning posthog_api_key / posthog_host from GET /api/instances/
- drop the posthog==3.5.0 dependency
Frontend:
- delete packages/constants/src/event-tracker (all 40 exports were unused)
- remove 42 data-ph-element attributes across 36 files
- remove the dead shouldTrackEvents and trackerElements prop chains
- remove the Microsoft Clarity session-recording tag
Note: GET /api/instances/ no longer returns posthog_api_key/posthog_host.
Nothing in this repo read them and neither do plane-ee or plane-commercial,
but the endpoint is AllowAny and cached for 2h.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HD7dTidmtWWRRiFv3nmW3s
* chore: apply oxfmt formatting
Collapse JSX elements and import statements that were left multi-line
after the tracker props and specifiers were removed. Whitespace only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HD7dTidmtWWRRiFv3nmW3s
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Added an annotation to the WorkspaceModulesEndpoint to aggregate member IDs into an array, ensuring that only active members are included. This change improves the data structure returned by the API, allowing for better handling of member information in the frontend. Updated the corresponding utility function to handle potential null values for member IDs.
* [SECUR-242] fix(api): scope bulk-asset associate by uploader, not project_id
Regression from #9288 (WEB-7776, cross-project IDOR scoping): adding
project_id=project_id to ProjectBulkAssetEndpoint.post broke project creation —
the "enable features" step 404s because the freshly-uploaded cover/feature asset
still has project_id=NULL (this endpoint is what sets it). master had no such
filter.
Scope the lookup by created_by=request.user instead. This still closes the IDOR
(#9288) — a caller can only touch assets they uploaded, and @allow_permission
already scopes them to the project — and is stricter than the original master
code (which had no ownership check), while allowing not-yet-associated assets to
be linked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* [SECUR-242] fix: bound bulk-asset associate to unassociated-or-same-project (CodeRabbit)
Address CodeRabbit: created_by alone let a user move their own asset from another
project into this one via the PROJECT_COVER/ISSUE_DESCRIPTION update branches.
Add an unassociated-or-same-project bound (project_id=project_id OR project_id IS
NULL) alongside created_by, so freshly-uploaded (NULL) assets still link but
cross-project moves are rejected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* [WEB-8074] fix: scope IssueListEndpoint to guest created_by
IssueListEndpoint.get (/workspaces/<slug>/projects/<project_id>/issues/list/)
returned any issue whose id was passed in ?issues=, without the guest
created_by restriction its sibling IssueViewSet.list enforces. A project GUEST
(role=5) on a project with guest_view_all_features=False could read issues they
did not author by supplying their ids (GHSA-32c7-84jc-4w67).
Replicate the guest scope: when the requester is an active role=5 ProjectMember
and not project.guest_view_all_features, filter the queryset to
created_by=request.user. Applied to the base queryset so it flows through
filtering, annotation and grouping.
Contract regression tests cover the restricted guest (own-only), a full member
(sees all), and a guest with guest_view_all_features enabled (sees all);
fail-before verified.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* Potential fix for pull request finding
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
Co-authored-by: Dheeraj Kumar Ketireddy <dheeraj.ketireddy@plane.so>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* [WEB-8095] fix: scope page-version reads to the URL project (GHSA-g49r/ghcr)
ProjectPagePermission verified the caller was a member of the URL
project_id but then resolved the page by workspace + page_id only, and
PageVersionEndpoint filtered versions the same way. A member of one
project could read the page versions of a public page belonging to a
different project in the same workspace via that project's URL
(GHSA-g49r-p85q-qq2w / GHSA-ghcr-frqr-6pqr).
- Scope the page lookup in ProjectPagePermission to projects__id via the
ProjectPage M2M (both app/ and utils/ copies); deny when the page does
not belong to the URL project.
- Scope PageVersionEndpoint list/detail querysets to
page__projects__id=project_id (defense in depth); distinct() on the
list guards against active + soft-deleted ProjectPage duplicates.
- Add contract regression tests (fail-before verified).
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8095] fix: require active ProjectPage link when scoping pages to a project
Address CodeRabbit + Copilot review on #9380: projects__id=project_id
matched even soft-deleted ProjectPage links, so a page removed from the
project (link revoked) would still pass, and the version detail get()
could raise MultipleObjectsReturned on active + soft-deleted rows.
Put both conditions on the same project_pages relation in one filter so
they match a single ProjectPage row that is active:
project_pages__project_id=project_id + project_pages__deleted_at__isnull
=True. The partial-unique constraint (project, page WHERE deleted_at IS
NULL) then guarantees at most one row, so get() stays unambiguous and the
list needs no distinct(). Add a revoked-link regression test.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8095] fix: distinct() on page-version detail lookup as a MultipleObjectsReturned guard
Address CodeRabbit review on #9380. The active-link filter already keeps
the page__project_pages join to a single row via the partial-unique
constraint, but add distinct() to the detail get() as defense in depth so
the join can never surface MultipleObjectsReturned (a 500) even if that
invariant were ever violated.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
The SAFE_METHODS branch of ProjectMemberPermission filtered ProjectMember by
workspace only (no project_id), so any workspace user who was a member of *some*
project could pass the check for a project they were not in. Consumers then
returned project-scoped data:
- v1 ProjectMemberListCreateAPIEndpoint.get -> full project roster
(GHSA-w2vf-m9x9-mvmc)
- app DeployBoardViewSet.list -> project publish configuration (identical
app-copy sibling)
Add project_id=view.project_id to the SAFE_METHODS filter in both copies
(utils + app), mirroring the non-safe branch and ProjectEntityPermission. A
non-member now receives 403.
Contract regression tests cover both endpoints: a workspace user who is a
member of a different project is denied (403) on a foreign project, while an
active member of the target project is allowed. Fail-before verified (both
denied cases leak 200 without the fix).
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8068] fix: scope workspace cycles/modules listing to project membership
WorkspaceCyclesEndpoint and WorkspaceModulesEndpoint are guarded only by
WorkspaceViewerPermission (any active workspace member) and filtered by
workspace__slug alone, letting any workspace member enumerate cycle/module
metadata (names, dates, issue counts) of private projects they are not a
member of (GHSA-wcc5-qgfr-8g9c).
Restrict both querysets to projects the requesting user is an active member
of, mirroring WorkspaceStatesEndpoint / WorkspaceLabelsEndpoint:
project__project_projectmember__member=request.user
project__project_projectmember__is_active=True
project__archived_at__isnull=True
Add .distinct() to the Module query (the member join is to-many; Cycle already
had it).
Contract regression tests cover hidden cycles/modules for a non-project member,
the positive project-member path, and no row duplication; fail-before verified.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8068] refactor: drop unnecessary distinct() from module listing
Address Copilot review: the project-membership join is filtered to
request.user, and ProjectMember has a unique constraint on (project, member)
where deleted_at IS NULL, so the join yields at most one row per project and
cannot duplicate Module rows. distinct() was dead weight (and a planner cost
for large workspaces). Matches the reference WorkspaceStates/WorkspaceLabels
endpoints, which use no distinct().
Also drop the distinct-focused contract test: adding a *different* project
member never fans out the request.user-filtered join, so it would pass with or
without distinct() — misleading coverage.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8066] fix: scope workspace asset get/patch/delete to project membership
WorkspaceFileAssetEndpoint is authorized at the WORKSPACE level, so any
workspace member/guest could reach get/patch/delete for a project-bound
asset (issue attachment/description, comment description, page description)
of a project they are not a member of — an incomplete fix of the GHSA-qw87
asset-IDOR cluster (GHSA-h7mc-p9mm-2r4w / GHSA-cjph-cgm5-8pw8).
Add project_membership_denied(): for project-bound assets (project_id set)
require an active ProjectMember of the asset's project, else 403. Workspace-
level entity types (WORKSPACE_LOGO, USER_AVATAR, USER_COVER) have project_id
NULL and remain accessible to any workspace member. Mirrors ProjectAssetEndpoint
(level=PROJECT). Guard runs before the is_uploaded check / mutation so a
non-member gets a uniform 403 and cannot probe upload state.
Contract regression tests cover denied get/patch/delete for a non-project
member, the positive project-member path, and the workspace-level exemption;
fail-before verified.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8066] harden: scope asset project-membership check to the asset's workspace
Address Copilot review: filter ProjectMember by workspace_id=asset.workspace_id
in addition to project_id, mirroring allow_permission's PROJECT branch. Prevents
a member of the same project in a different workspace from passing the check if
an asset row is ever inconsistent (asset.workspace_id != project.workspace_id).
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8066] refactor: return bool from asset access helper, build Response in views
Address review (Saurabhkmr98): rename project_membership_denied ->
has_project_asset_access, returning a boolean (True = allowed) instead of a
Response. Each of get/patch/delete now builds the 403 Response based on the
returned value. Behaviour is unchanged (same 403 + message; workspace-level
assets with project_id=None still allowed).
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-7887] fix(security): prevent stored XSS via SVG attachment served inline (GHSA-ch8j-vr4r-qf6h)
Add SCRIPT_CAPABLE_MIME_TYPES frozenset (image/svg+xml, text/javascript,
application/javascript, text/html, application/xhtml+xml, text/xml,
application/xml) and enforce Content-Disposition: attachment on three
download endpoints that previously defaulted to inline serving:
- GenericAssetEndpoint.get (api/views/asset.py)
- StaticFileAssetEndpoint.get (app/views/asset/v2.py)
- EntityAssetEndpoint.get (space/views/asset.py)
ATTACHMENT_MIME_TYPES is unchanged — users can still upload SVG, JS, and
XML files. The fix closes the XSS vector by ensuring script-capable assets
are always downloaded rather than rendered in the application's origin.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-7887] fix: normalize MIME type before SCRIPT_CAPABLE_MIME_TYPES check
Strip MIME parameters and lowercase before the allowlist check so that
stored values like "image/svg+xml; charset=utf-8" or "Image/SVG+XML"
are correctly identified as script-capable and served as attachment.
Applies to all three download endpoints.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8060] fix(security): enforce authz on is_active member (de)activation
ProjectMemberViewSet.partial_update nested every authorization guard inside
`if "role" in request.data:`. Because ProjectMemberSerializer exposes is_active
through fields="__all__" with no read-only, a project GUEST could PATCH
{"is_active": false} while omitting "role" to deactivate any member — including
admins — and take over the project (GHSA-hpgm-9r34-c4x5 / GHSA-25gg-cxm8-g7h9).
Add an independent is_active guard, mirroring the role block and destroy(): only
a project admin (or workspace admin) may (de)activate a member, and never one
whose role is equal to or higher than the requester's own.
Adds contract regression tests covering guest/member deactivation attempts and
the legitimate project-admin path.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8060] test(security): cover workspace-admin is_active bypass
Address Copilot review on #9367: add a positive-control test asserting a
workspace admin holding only a project GUEST role can still deactivate a project
admin (the intended is_workspace_admin bypass), so future changes cannot silently
remove it.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8017] fix(security): sanitize order_by on external REST API list endpoints
Close a partial bypass of WEB-7813 (GHSA-2r95 / GHSA-w45q): the external
REST API project-list and work-item-list endpoints passed a raw order_by
query parameter to Django's .order_by(). Because Django resolves
__-separated relational paths, an attacker could order by sensitive
columns on related tables (created_by__password / token / email) to build
a blind ordering oracle, or crash the endpoint (HTTP 500) with an unknown
field.
Route both endpoints through the existing sanitize_order_by() helper with
the appropriate allowlist (PROJECT_ORDER_BY_ALLOWLIST, default sort_order;
ISSUE_ORDER_BY_ALLOWLIST, default -created_at), mirroring how
order_issue_queryset() already sanitizes. Non-allowlisted values collapse
to the safe default; legitimate orderings are unchanged.
Adds unit tests (allowlist neutralisation + passthrough) and contract
tests asserting both endpoints return 200 (not 500) for injected fields;
fail-before verified via git stash.
Advisory: GHSA-p885-6jpg-cr2p
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-8019] fix(security): scope CycleIssue reassignment lookup to workspace/project
CycleIssueViewSet.create looked up "issues already in another cycle" with
CycleIssue.objects.filter(~Q(cycle_id=cycle_id), issue_id__in=issues) —
without scoping to the caller's workspace/project. An ADMIN/MEMBER of their
own project could pass a work-item UUID from a different tenant and have that
foreign CycleIssue row reassigned to their cycle, silently evicting the
victim's work item from the victim's cycle (cross-tenant write / BOLA).
Scope the lookup to workspace__slug + project_id, mirroring the adjacent
create-path guard. Foreign-tenant rows are excluded from reassignment and
already dropped from the create path by the scoped new_issues query.
Adds a contract regression test proving a foreign-tenant CycleIssue row is
not reassigned (fail-before verified via git stash) plus a same-project
reassignment test to confirm the legitimate flow is unaffected.
Advisory: GHSA-4w5x-wc9w-f47x
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
The `create` handler validated the network (SECRET/PUBLIC) check against
a workspace-scoped queryset but then used the raw client-supplied
`project_ids` list in the subsequent bulk_create and update calls.
An attacker could include UUIDs of projects from other workspaces: those
are absent from the validation queryset (no network check performed),
yet get inserted as ProjectMember rows via bulk_create(ignore_conflicts=True),
granting cross-workspace project access.
Fix: derive `validated_project_ids` from the filtered queryset (projects
already scoped to the requested workspace and passed the SECRET check),
and use it exclusively for all subsequent DB writes.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* fix(security): enforce token + auth validation on project invite accept/reject
ProjectJoinEndpoint.post() only checked that the caller-supplied email matched
the invited email — no token required, no authentication required. Anyone who
knew the workspace slug, project ID, invite UUID, and invitee email could
accept or reject the invitation on the invitee's behalf (GHSA-g36h-p63v-g9c7).
Mirror WorkspaceJoinEndpoint.post() exactly:
- Validate `token` from request body against project_invite.token (→ 403 on mismatch)
- Require authenticated session (→ 401 if unauthenticated)
- Validate request.user.email against project_invite.email (→ 403 on mismatch)
- Remove the old request.data["email"] guard
- Use project_invite.email for downstream User lookup
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* fix(security): address CR review on project invite token validation
- Use request.user directly instead of re-querying User by exact
project_invite.email — avoids case-variant miss after the case-insensitive
email check already validated the authenticated user (CR comment 1)
- Validate `accepted` as a real boolean before saving — form-encoded
strings like "false" are truthy and could accidentally create memberships
(CR comment 2)
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
All three V2 issue attachment handlers (PATCH, DELETE, GET single) looked
up FileAsset by (pk, workspace, project_id) only — issue_id in the URL
was silently ignored. Any project member could target another user's
attachment UUID using their own issue_id, and PATCH would transfer
ownership via unconditional created_by = request.user.
Add issue_id=issue_id to all three FileAsset.objects.get() calls so the
lookup is correctly scoped to the attachment's owning issue. Remove the
created_by overwrite in PATCH — created_by is set at creation time and
must not be reassigned by a subsequent upload-confirm call.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
ProjectJoinEndpoint.get() was AllowAny and used ProjectMemberInviteSerializer
(fields = "__all__"), leaking the invitee's email and token to anyone who
knew the workspace slug, project ID, and invite UUID (GHSA-2r58-hgv7-635q).
Introduce ProjectMemberInvitePublicSerializer with an explicit safe field list
that excludes `email` and `token`, and swap it in for the public GET endpoint.
The full serializer is retained for authenticated admin viewsets.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* fix: enforce workspace membership on entity-search endpoint (GHSA-32q3-mqpc-3mhv)
SearchEndpoint required authentication but did not verify the requesting user
was a member of the queried workspace. Any authenticated Plane user could
enumerate members across workspaces they don't belong to by guessing slugs.
Add a WorkspaceMember guard at the top of get() — returns 403 if the user is
not an active member of the target workspace. Brings OSS to parity with EE,
which already had this protection via @can(WorkspacePermissions.VIEW).
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* refactor(security): replace inline WS membership check with WorkspaceUserPermission
Use the existing WorkspaceUserPermission permission class on SearchEndpoint
instead of a manual WorkspaceMember.objects.filter() guard inside the
method body. Enforcement behaviour is unchanged (GHSA-32q3-mqpc-3mhv).
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* [WEB-7776] fix(security): scope FileAsset queries to prevent cross-project IDOR (Cluster F)
Multiple asset endpoints were missing project-level scoping on FileAsset
queryset filters, allowing authenticated users to access, mark-uploaded,
or restore assets belonging to other projects/workspaces.
- ProjectBulkAssetEndpoint.post: add project_id= scope to asset filter
- EntityAssetEndpoint.get/patch: add project_id=deploy_board.project_id
- AssetRestoreEndpoint.post: add project_id=deploy_board.project_id
- FileAssetEndpoint (V1): add workspace membership check on get/post/delete
- FileAssetViewSet.restore (V1): add workspace membership check
- WorkspaceFileAssetEndpoint.post: gate WORKSPACE_LOGO on ADMIN role
- DuplicateAssetEndpoint.post: restrict source asset to same workspace
Fixes GHSA-r2hw, GHSA-jh4v, GHSA-8688, GHSA-3hrj and related advisories.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* refactor(security): replace inline membership checks with WorkspaceMemberPermission class
Add WorkspaceMemberPermission to workspace.py — resolves workspace by
'workspace_id' UUID or 'slug' kwarg, covering the mixed URL patterns on
FileAssetEndpoint. Apply to FileAssetEndpoint and FileAssetViewSet so
membership enforcement lives in the permission layer, not inside each
method handler.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* refactor: remove dead 404 guard in FileAssetEndpoint.post()
WorkspaceMemberPermission denies requests for non-existent slugs before
the view method runs, making the filter().first() + if not workspace
branch unreachable. Switch to .get() so any TOCTOU race still surfaces
as a 404 via ObjectDoesNotExist.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
GHSA-rmmf-rj2q-3rrg: save_user_data() was unconditionally setting
is_active=True on every login, silently reactivating any admin-deactivated
account. Fix: add an early guard in complete_login_or_signup() that raises
USER_ACCOUNT_DEACTIVATED (5019) before any session or save logic if the
existing user's is_active=False. Remove the is_active=True assignment and
the associated user_activation_email call from save_user_data(). Also
remove the now-unused user_activation_email and base_host imports.
GHSA-wjgv-cq7w-258v: WorkspaceOwnerPermission in both app/permissions/
and utils/permissions/ was filtering WorkspaceMember without is_active=True,
allowing a deactivated workspace owner/admin to retain API access. Add
is_active=True to both copies to match every other permission class.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* fix: prevent ORM order_by injection via user-supplied query params (GHSA-2r95, GHSA-w45q)
Add field-name allowlists and a sanitize_order_by() utility in order_queryset.py.
All allowlists are centralised there; each call site imports the named constant
so there are no inline sets scattered across view files.
- order_queryset.py: ISSUE_ORDER_BY_ALLOWLIST, INTAKE_ISSUE_ORDER_BY_ALLOWLIST,
ACTIVITY_ORDER_BY_ALLOWLIST, PROJECT_ORDER_BY_ALLOWLIST, VIEW_ORDER_BY_ALLOWLIST,
NOTIFICATION_ORDER_BY_ALLOWLIST + sanitize_order_by() utility; validation added
at the top of order_issue_queryset() — fixes all callers including the
unauthenticated ProjectIssuesPublicEndpoint (GHSA-w45q)
- api/views/cycle.py, api/views/module.py: cycle/module issue list endpoints
- api/views/issue.py: IssueActivity list and detail endpoints
- app/views/intake/base.py: IntakeIssue list
- app/views/view/base.py: saved-view list
- app/views/notification/base.py: notification paginator
- app/views/project/base.py: project list paginator
- app/views/user/base.py, app/views/workspace/user.py: activity paginators
Closes WEB-7813
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* fix: harden sanitize_order_by against multi-dash malformed inputs
lstrip("-") stripped all leading dashes, allowing "--created_at" to
pass the allowlist check unchanged and reach .order_by() as a malformed
token (causing FieldError). Now strips only one leading dash; any
remaining dash prefix is rejected to the safe default.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
GHSA-933r-rxg8-f3h2 — EstimatePointEndpoint.create trusted the
estimate_id URL parameter without verifying it belonged to the caller's
workspace and project. An authenticated user in project A could inject
estimate points into any other workspace's estimate by supplying a
foreign estimate_id.
Fix: added a workspace+project scoped Estimate ownership check before
EstimatePoint.objects.create().
GHSA-933r-rxg8-f3h2 (destroy) — old_estimate_point was fetched with
pk only (unscoped), allowing cross-tenant key disclosure and
manipulation during the key-rearrangement step.
Fix: scoped the old_estimate_point lookup to estimate_id + project_id +
workspace__slug; added 404 guard for missing/foreign points.
Note: BulkEstimatePointEndpoint.partial_update (GHSA-vm3j-5j49-gwrf)
was already correctly scoped at lines 116 and 125-130 — no change needed.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
GHSA-6qrq-f73q-r67j / GHSA-j9pv-f5wm-p4g2 — IssueCommentSerializer in
both app and api layers stored comment_html without sanitization. The app
layer had no validate() at all; the api layer only ran lxml structural
normalization which does not strip XSS payloads.
Fix: both serializers now call validate_html_content() (nh3-backed) in
their validate() methods, replacing the raw value with sanitized HTML.
GHSA-hh2r-3hwp-mvq3 — space/views/intake.py and api/views/intake.py
both used bare Issue.objects.create() with description_html taken
directly from request data, bypassing any serializer validation.
Fix: both paths now call validate_html_content() and pass the sanitized
value to Issue.objects.create(). Falls back to "<p></p>" if sanitizer
returns None (empty/invalid input).
The nh3 sanitizer (validate_html_content in content_validator.py) was
already present and used by IssueCreateSerializer — this change extends
coverage to the two remaining unsanitized comment and intake paths.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
- Add WorkSpaceMemberInvitePublicSerializer that excludes token and
invite_link; use it in WorkspaceJoinEndpoint.get() so an unauthenticated
caller cannot retrieve the acceptance token from the GET endpoint
(GHSA-86mg-259g-pwgg / GHSA-gf48-p6jp-cwc4).
- Require authentication and verify request.user.email matches the
invited email before accepting a workspace invitation so an attacker
who registers with the invited address cannot hijack the invite
(GHSA-4vj8-p63v-8p24).
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* fix: scope workspace user preference filter to current user
Without user=request.user on the PATCH filter, the ORM could match
another user's preference record in the same workspace, causing
pin/unpin state to leak across users or silently fail to persist.
Fixes#9260
Signed-off-by: okxint <cashmein.eth@gmail.com>
* test: add regression coverage for workspace user preference scoping (#9260)
Adds contract tests for the sidebar preference PATCH endpoint:
- test_patch_only_updates_requesting_users_preference: in a multi-member
workspace, a member's PATCH must update only their own preference row,
never another member's. Fails against the pre-fix code (the unscoped
.first() mutates the most-recently-created row regardless of user).
- test_patch_updates_own_preference: baseline that a member's PATCH
persists to their own row.
Verified RED on the unpatched view and GREEN with the user=request.user
filter from #9261.
* fix(api): wrap long line to satisfy ruff E501 in user preference view
---------
Signed-off-by: okxint <cashmein.eth@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: okxint <cashmein.eth@gmail.com>
* fix(api): require at least one alphanumeric char in workspace name
Workspace name validation was enforced only on the frontend
(validateWorkspaceName), which gates the UI submit but is bypassable
via a direct API call. The backend WorkSpaceSerializer.validate_name
only rejected URLs, so a symbol-only name like "-_________-" could
still be saved via create or the rename (partial_update) path.
Add a Unicode-aware has_alphanumeric() helper and enforce it in both
the app and instance/license workspace serializers, mirroring the
frontend HAS_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEX (/[\p{L}\p{N}]/u) added in #9263.
International names (日本語, José, محمد) still pass since str.isalnum()
covers all scripts.
Adds unit tests covering symbol-only rejection and international
acceptance on both serializers.
Refs #9255
Signed-off-by: sriramveeraghanta <veeraghanta.sriram@gmail.com>
* fix(api): reject URLs in instance workspace name for parity
Address CodeRabbit review on #9278: the instance/license
WorkspaceSerializer.validate_name rejected symbol-only names but, unlike
the app-level WorkSpaceSerializer, still accepted names containing URLs.
Add the same contains_url() guard (imported from plane.utils.url, not
content_validator) so both workspace-create paths validate identically.
Add unit tests asserting URL-containing names are rejected on both
serializers.
Signed-off-by: sriramveeraghanta <veeraghanta.sriram@gmail.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: sriramveeraghanta <veeraghanta.sriram@gmail.com>
* fix(security): scope issue ID validation to workspace/project in bulk endpoints
Prevents cross-tenant IDOR by filtering incoming issue IDs through
workspace+project scope before bulk_create/bulk_update in:
- CycleIssueListCreateAPIEndpoint: validate new_issues against workspace+project (GHSA-22g9-9xfv-q3fr)
- SubIssuesEndpoint: validate sub_issue_ids against workspace (GHSA-38vj-gf85-7q5x)
- IssueRelationListCreateAPIEndpoint: validate issues against workspace (GHSA-8cvv-8jh5-g6mj)
- ModuleIssueListCreateAPIEndpoint: already scoped at line 673, no change needed (GHSA-x5c5-hmvm-94v9)
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* fix(security): extend IDOR scope validation to app-layer endpoints
Same cross-tenant IDOR fix applied to the app/views/ counterparts
which are used by the web frontend (api/views/ covered in previous commit):
- app/views/cycle/issue.py: filter new_issues to workspace+project (GHSA-22g9-9xfv-q3fr)
- app/views/module/issue.py: filter issues to workspace+project before bulk_create (GHSA-x5c5-hmvm-94v9)
- app/views/issue/relation.py: filter issues to workspace before bulk_create (GHSA-8cvv-8jh5-g6mj)
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* chore: remove advisory ID references from code comments
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
Co-authored-by: sriramveeraghanta <veeraghanta.sriram@gmail.com>
* fix(security): scope cascade deletes to workspace in BulkDeleteIssuesEndpoint
CycleIssue and ModuleIssue cascade deletes used raw issue_ids from the
request instead of the already workspace+project scoped issues queryset,
allowing cross-workspace deletion of related records.
Fixes GHSA-6cw7-h92q-p9hg and GHSA-2rr4-rp7r-32p4.
GHSA-7q7r-mrr4-2wwx (sub-issue parent reassign) covered in WEB-7727.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* chore: remove advisory ID reference from code comment
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
Co-authored-by: sriramveeraghanta <veeraghanta.sriram@gmail.com>
The custom API key authentication only verified that the APIToken row was
active and unexpired; it never checked the owning user's is_active flag.
DRF's IsAuthenticated only checks user.is_authenticated (always True for a
real User), so a user whose account was deactivated could keep using a
previously issued API key indefinitely.
Add user__is_active=True to the validate_api_token() lookup so a token tied
to a disabled account is treated as invalid (a generic AuthenticationFailed,
avoiding account-state disclosure). Applied to both the external API
middleware (plane/api) and the identical, currently unused copy in
plane/app to prevent the gap from being reintroduced.
Adds unit coverage on validate_api_token and an end-to-end contract test
proving GET /api/v1/users/me/ is denied once the account is deactivated.
* fix(api): return HTTP response from dispatch() exception handler
BaseAPIView.dispatch() and BaseViewSet.dispatch() built the proper
error Response via handle_exception() but returned the raw exception
object instead, causing Django to raise
"TypeError: 'Exception' object is not a valid HTTP response".
Fix all six occurrences across the api, app, license and space view
bases, and add a regression test covering every affected base class.
Fixes#9157
* chore(api): add copyright header to tests/unit/views/__init__.py
The empty package init file was missing the AGPL copyright header,
failing the Copy Right Check CI (addlicense -check on all tracked
.py files).
* fix(api): harden webhook & link-unfurl SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C)
Resolves three overlapping SSRF advisory clusters around webhook delivery
and work-item link unfurling:
- Cluster A (private-IP validation + PATCH bypass): the webhook PATCH
handler passed context={request: request} (the request object as the
dict key) so the loopback/disallowed-domain guard silently no-op'd —
now context={"request": request}. Hardened IP classification
(is_blocked_ip) to also block multicast, unspecified, CGNAT
(100.64.0.0/10), and IPv4 embedded in IPv6 transition addresses
(IPv4-mapped, NAT64, 6to4, Teredo), robust across Python versions.
- Cluster B (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU): validators resolved DNS, then
requests resolved it again at connect time. New pinned-IP client
(plane/utils/url_security.py) resolves+validates once and connects to
the validated IP literal so urllib3 performs no second lookup, while
preserving Host header, TLS SNI and certificate verification against
the real hostname.
- Cluster C (redirect SSRF): webhook delivery never follows redirects;
the link crawler follows them manually, re-resolving + re-validating +
re-pinning every hop.
Also: pin requests==2.33.0 in base.txt (imported directly; the pinning
adapter needs the >=2.32 get_connection_with_tls_context hook), and log
webhook URL-validation rejections to WebhookLog instead of swallowing
them.
Tests: new test_url_security.py (pinning, rebinding, redirect
re-validation, IP edge cases, TLS SNI) + updated link-task tests.
Full unit suite: 178 passed.
* fix(api): block OAuth avatar SSRF + add per-advisory SSRF regression tests
Verified every SSRF-class advisory against the current code. The webhook /
link / favicon reports — including the published CVE-2026-30242 and
CVE-2026-39843 and the newer "still bypassable" reports (DNS rebinding
GHSA-3856/-fgcv/-9292/-whh3/-4mjx/-6p39/-fv24/-8wvv, IP-classification gaps
GHSA-75fg, redirect GHSA-6v37/-jw6g/-mq87) — are resolved by the pinned-IP
client + hardened classifier in this branch.
The one SSRF family still unresolved was the OAuth avatar path:
download_and_upload_avatar() fetched the provider-supplied avatar_url with a
raw requests.get (no IP validation, default redirect following), so an
attacker-controlled avatar could reach internal addresses and be exfiltrated
via the static-asset endpoint (GHSA-cv9p-325g-wmv5, and the avatar hop of the
Gitea SSRF GHSA-hx79-5pj5-qh42). It now uses pinned_fetch_following_redirects,
which validates + pins every hop and blocks internal targets.
Adds test_ssrf_advisories.py: a per-advisory regression map covering webhook
IP validation, the PATCH context-key guard, webhook DNS rebinding, webhook
redirect, favicon redirect + rebinding, and OAuth avatar SSRF.
docker compose test: 199 unit tests pass.
* fix(api): address PR review feedback on the SSRF pinned client
- url_security: preserve URL-embedded credentials (user:pass@host) as Basic
Auth instead of silently dropping them when rewriting to the IP literal
(Copilot); bracket IPv6-literal hostnames in the Host header (Copilot);
add stream=True support that keeps the session open until the response is
closed, and release intermediate redirect hops.
- ip_address / work_item_link_task: treat UnicodeError (IDNA failures) from
getaddrinfo as a resolution failure, not an uncaught exception (CodeRabbit).
- authentication/adapter/base: stream the avatar download so the size cap
actually bounds memory, upload the size-bounded buffer (not response.content),
and always close the response (CodeRabbit, major).
- tests: cover auth preservation, IPv6 Host bracketing, IDNA handling, and
streamed session lifetime; drop an unused import.
docker compose test: 204 unit tests pass.
* fix: harden API token handling against rate-limit tampering and plaintext logging
- Make `allowed_rate_limit` read-only on APITokenSerializer so users can no
longer raise their own API token rate limit via PATCH (GHSA-xfgr-2x3f-g2cf).
- Stop persisting API keys in plaintext in APITokenLogMiddleware: store a
SHA-256 hash as the token identifier and redact sensitive request headers
(X-Api-Key, Authorization, Cookie) before logging (GHSA-r5p8-cj3q-38cc).
* refactor: remove MongoDB log sink and add per-log-type retention
Logs are now written to and cleared from PostgreSQL only; MongoDB is no
longer used as a log sink or archive.
- Drop the MongoDB write/archival paths from the API request logger, the
webhook log writer, and the cleanup tasks; Postgres is the sole sink.
- Cleanup tasks now hard-delete expired rows in batches via `all_objects`
(rows are removed immediately, not soft-deleted).
- Add env-backed, per-log-type retention settings: API activity logs
(API_ACTIVITY_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS, default 14), webhook logs
(WEBHOOK_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS, default 14), email logs
(EMAIL_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS, default 7). HARD_DELETE_AFTER_DAYS no longer
drives any log cleanup.
- Delete settings/mongo.py, remove MONGO_DB_* settings and the plane.mongo
loggers, and drop the pymongo dependency.
* chore: gitignore local advisories.md notes file
* fix: use keyed HMAC-SHA256 for API token log identifier
Address CodeQL "weak hashing of sensitive data" by hashing the API key with
a SECRET_KEY-keyed HMAC instead of a bare SHA-256. The identifier is a
non-reversible tokenization of a high-entropy key (not password storage);
keying it also prevents precomputing the digest from a known key value.
* chore: address review feedback on log cleanup and request logging
- process_logs accepts extra kwargs so jobs enqueued by an older release
(with a mongo_log arg) don't fail during a rolling deploy.
- Log-cleanup batch delete failures are logged and skipped rather than
aborting the run, so a single bad batch can't block the rest.
- Extend logger middleware test to assert Authorization and Cookie headers
are redacted; add a test that a failing cleanup batch is swallowed.
* fix: fall back to default when a log retention env value is invalid
Negative (or unparseable) retention values would compute a future cutoff and
delete every log row. The retention settings now fall back to their defaults
in that case via a shared `_retention_days` helper.
* chore(api): add docker compose test runner
Adds docker-compose-test.yml at the repo root that boots an isolated
postgres / valkey / rabbitmq / minio stack with health checks and tmpfs
data dirs, then runs pytest against it and exits. Includes a usage doc
under apps/api/tests/RUNNING_TESTS.md and a pointer in AGENTS.md.
Prereq: ./setup.sh (generates apps/api/.env).
Usage:
docker compose -f docker-compose-test.yml up --build \
--abort-on-container-exit --exit-code-from api-tests
docker compose -f docker-compose-test.yml down -v
* fix(api): correct bugs surfaced by the pytest suite
Five small bugs caught by enabling the pytest contract suite end-to-end.
Each is independently justifiable:
- api/serializers/cycle.py + api/views/cycle.py: CycleCreateSerializer.validate
required project_id in the request body, but the view only ever passes
it through the URL kwarg. Cycle create/update via the public API was
returning 400 "Project ID is required". Read project_id from
serializer context (passed by the view) in addition to body/instance.
- app/views/api.py: ApiTokenEndpoint.get(pk) and patch(pk) did not filter
out is_service=True tokens, so a user could read and modify service
tokens through the user token endpoint. The list mode and delete
already filter is_service=False; aligned the other two.
- bgtasks/work_item_link_task.py: validate_url_ip checked hostname before
scheme, so file:///etc/passwd raised "No hostname found" instead of
the documented "Only HTTP and HTTPS" error. Swapped the order so the
scheme guard matches the docstring intent.
- utils/path_validator.py: get_allowed_hosts used `WEB_URL or APP_BASE_URL`
so when both are configured to different hosts (the standard local
setup: WEB_URL=:8000, APP_BASE_URL=:3000), only one was added to the
allow-list. Redirects to APP_BASE_URL then had their next_path stripped
because the host wasn't allowed. Include every configured base URL.
* chore(api): align pytest tests with current behavior, clear warnings
Test-side fixes paired with the product fixes in the previous commit, plus
deprecation cleanup that drops the test run from 104 warnings to 0.
Tests:
- tests/contract/api/test_cycles.py: project fixture sets cycle_view=True;
the Project model defaults the flag to False, so cycle create/update
always tripped "Cycles are not enabled for this project".
- tests/contract/app/test_authentication.py: next_path uses "/workspaces"
(validate_next_path rejects values without a leading slash and returns
empty, which dropped the path from the redirect URL).
- tests/unit/bg_tasks/test_copy_s3_objects.py: mocked sync_with_external_service
now returns description_json; the task unconditionally writes the value
back to the Issue, and Issue.description_json is NOT NULL on UPDATE.
- tests/unit/utils/test_url.py: three length-limit tests placed the URL at
char 970+ on a single line, which contains_url truncates away as ReDoS
defense (500-char per-line cap). Restructured to keep test intent intact
while staying inside the per-line window.
Warning cleanup (104 → 0):
- settings/common.py: removed USE_L10N=True (deprecated in Django 4.0,
removed in 5.0; default is True).
- celery.py, settings/local.py, settings/production.py: pythonjsonlogger
moved jsonlogger → json; update the import / formatter path.
* fix: add WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS allowlist for internal webhook targets
The IP-based allowlist alone isn't practical for containerised deployments
where service IPs are dynamic. Adds a hostname-based bypass for trusted
internal services (e.g. Silo via docker-compose / k8s service DNS) and
makes the previously hardcoded ["plane.so"] domain blocklist configurable
via WEBHOOK_DISALLOWED_DOMAINS.
- validate_url accepts allowed_hosts (exact, case-insensitive match;
skips DNS lookup for trusted names)
- WebhookSerializer wires both settings through and lets allowlisted
hosts bypass the disallowed-domain check
- Exposes WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS in aio/cli deployment env files
* fix: default WEBHOOK_DISALLOWED_DOMAINS to empty for self-hosted
* fix: pass WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS to send-time webhook re-validation
is_workspace_admin in ProjectMemberViewSet.partial_update was derived
from the target member's workspace role, not the requester's. When the
target happened to be a workspace admin, all three project-role guards
(L231/238/247) were bypassed regardless of who was making the request,
allowing a non-admin requester to re-role a workspace admin's project
membership. Compute is_workspace_admin from the requester instead and
keep the target's workspace role under a distinct name for the existing
new-role-vs-workspace-role cap.
`ProjectViewSet.partial_update`, `BulkEstimatePointEndpoint.partial_update`,
and `WorkspaceUserProfileEndpoint.get` previously fetched objects by primary
key alone after a workspace-scoped permission check, allowing an authenticated
caller to act on resources belonging to other workspaces by supplying a
foreign UUID with their own workspace slug in the URL.
- Project partial_update: scope `Project.objects.get` by `workspace__slug`,
matching the existing pattern in `destroy`.
- Bulk estimate partial_update: scope `Estimate.objects.get` by
`workspace__slug` and `project_id`, matching `retrieve` and `destroy`.
- Workspace user profile: require the target `user_id` to be an active
member of the requested workspace before returning email and other PII.
* fix: filter out soft-deleted states from API endpoints
- Add deleted_at__isnull=True filter to StateListCreateAPIEndpoint.get_queryset()
- Add deleted_at__isnull=True filter to StateDetailAPIEndpoint.get_queryset()
- Prevents soft-deleted states from reappearing in UI after navigation
- Fixes#8829
* Fix: exclude issues linked to soft-deleted states
* fix: sanitize filenames in upload paths to prevent path traversal (GHSA-v57h-5999-w7xp)
Add server-side filename sanitization across all file upload endpoints
to prevent path traversal sequences (../) in user-supplied filenames
from being incorporated into S3 object keys. While S3 keys are flat
strings and not vulnerable to filesystem traversal, this adds
defense-in-depth and prevents S3 key pollution.
Changes:
- Add sanitize_filename() utility in path_validator.py
- Sanitize filenames in get_upload_path() for FileAsset and IssueAttachment models
- Sanitize name parameter in all upload view endpoints
* fix: address PR review feedback on filename sanitization
- Remove unused `import re`
- Normalize backslashes to forward slashes before os.path.basename()
so Windows-style paths (e.g. ..\..\..\evil.txt) are handled on POSIX
- Strip whitespace before removing leading dots so " .env" is caught
- Return None instead of "unnamed" for empty input so existing
`if not name` validation guards remain effective
- Add `or "unnamed"` fallback at call sites that lack a name guard
* fix: use random hex name as fallback in get_upload_path instead of "unnamed"
* fix: resolve ruff E501 line too long in DuplicateAssetEndpoint
* fix: replace IS_SELF_MANAGED toggle with explicit WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_IPS allowlist
Instead of blanket-allowing all private IPs on self-managed deployments,
webhook URL validation now blocks all private/internal IPs by default and
only permits specific networks listed in the WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_IPS env
variable (comma-separated IPs/CIDRs).
* fix: address PR review comments for webhook SSRF protection
- Sanitize error messages to avoid leaking internal details to clients
- Guard against TypeError with mixed IPv4/IPv6 allowlist networks
- Re-validate webhook URL at send time to prevent DNS-rebinding
- Add unit tests for mixed-version IP network allowlists
WorkspaceFileAssetEndpoint had no authorization checks beyond
authentication, allowing any logged-in user to create, read, patch,
and delete assets in any workspace by slug. DuplicateAssetEndpoint
only authorized the destination workspace, letting users copy assets
from workspaces they don't belong to.
Add @allow_permission decorators to all WorkspaceFileAssetEndpoint
methods and scope DuplicateAssetEndpoint's source asset lookup to
workspaces where the caller is an active member.
Ref: GHSA-qw87-v5w3-6vxx
