jira/apps/api/plane/bgtasks/work_item_link_task.py

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# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
# See the LICENSE file for details.
# Python imports
import logging
import socket
# Third party imports
from celery import shared_task
import requests
from bs4 import BeautifulSoup
from urllib.parse import urlparse, urljoin
import base64
import ipaddress
from typing import Dict, Any, Tuple
from typing import Optional
from plane.db.models import IssueLink
from plane.utils.exception_logger import log_exception
fix: harden webhook/link/OAuth-avatar SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C/E) (#9163) * fix(api): harden webhook & link-unfurl SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C) Resolves three overlapping SSRF advisory clusters around webhook delivery and work-item link unfurling: - Cluster A (private-IP validation + PATCH bypass): the webhook PATCH handler passed context={request: request} (the request object as the dict key) so the loopback/disallowed-domain guard silently no-op'd — now context={"request": request}. Hardened IP classification (is_blocked_ip) to also block multicast, unspecified, CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10), and IPv4 embedded in IPv6 transition addresses (IPv4-mapped, NAT64, 6to4, Teredo), robust across Python versions. - Cluster B (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU): validators resolved DNS, then requests resolved it again at connect time. New pinned-IP client (plane/utils/url_security.py) resolves+validates once and connects to the validated IP literal so urllib3 performs no second lookup, while preserving Host header, TLS SNI and certificate verification against the real hostname. - Cluster C (redirect SSRF): webhook delivery never follows redirects; the link crawler follows them manually, re-resolving + re-validating + re-pinning every hop. Also: pin requests==2.33.0 in base.txt (imported directly; the pinning adapter needs the >=2.32 get_connection_with_tls_context hook), and log webhook URL-validation rejections to WebhookLog instead of swallowing them. Tests: new test_url_security.py (pinning, rebinding, redirect re-validation, IP edge cases, TLS SNI) + updated link-task tests. Full unit suite: 178 passed. * fix(api): block OAuth avatar SSRF + add per-advisory SSRF regression tests Verified every SSRF-class advisory against the current code. The webhook / link / favicon reports — including the published CVE-2026-30242 and CVE-2026-39843 and the newer "still bypassable" reports (DNS rebinding GHSA-3856/-fgcv/-9292/-whh3/-4mjx/-6p39/-fv24/-8wvv, IP-classification gaps GHSA-75fg, redirect GHSA-6v37/-jw6g/-mq87) — are resolved by the pinned-IP client + hardened classifier in this branch. The one SSRF family still unresolved was the OAuth avatar path: download_and_upload_avatar() fetched the provider-supplied avatar_url with a raw requests.get (no IP validation, default redirect following), so an attacker-controlled avatar could reach internal addresses and be exfiltrated via the static-asset endpoint (GHSA-cv9p-325g-wmv5, and the avatar hop of the Gitea SSRF GHSA-hx79-5pj5-qh42). It now uses pinned_fetch_following_redirects, which validates + pins every hop and blocks internal targets. Adds test_ssrf_advisories.py: a per-advisory regression map covering webhook IP validation, the PATCH context-key guard, webhook DNS rebinding, webhook redirect, favicon redirect + rebinding, and OAuth avatar SSRF. docker compose test: 199 unit tests pass. * fix(api): address PR review feedback on the SSRF pinned client - url_security: preserve URL-embedded credentials (user:pass@host) as Basic Auth instead of silently dropping them when rewriting to the IP literal (Copilot); bracket IPv6-literal hostnames in the Host header (Copilot); add stream=True support that keeps the session open until the response is closed, and release intermediate redirect hops. - ip_address / work_item_link_task: treat UnicodeError (IDNA failures) from getaddrinfo as a resolution failure, not an uncaught exception (CodeRabbit). - authentication/adapter/base: stream the avatar download so the size cap actually bounds memory, upload the size-bounded buffer (not response.content), and always close the response (CodeRabbit, major). - tests: cover auth preservation, IPv6 Host bracketing, IDNA handling, and streamed session lifetime; drop an unused import. docker compose test: 204 unit tests pass.
2026-05-30 18:42:23 +00:00
from plane.utils.ip_address import is_blocked_ip
from plane.utils.url_security import pinned_fetch, pinned_fetch_following_redirects
logger = logging.getLogger("plane.worker")
DEFAULT_FAVICON = "PHN2ZyB4bWxucz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcvMjAwMC9zdmciIHdpZHRoPSIyNCIgaGVpZ2h0PSIyNCIgdmlld0JveD0iMCAwIDI0IDI0IiBmaWxsPSJub25lIiBzdHJva2U9ImN1cnJlbnRDb2xvciIgc3Ryb2tlLXdpZHRoPSIyIiBzdHJva2UtbGluZWNhcD0icm91bmQiIHN0cm9rZS1saW5lam9pbj0icm91bmQiIGNsYXNzPSJsdWNpZGUgbHVjaWRlLWxpbmstaWNvbiBsdWNpZGUtbGluayI+PHBhdGggZD0iTTEwIDEzYTUgNSAwIDAgMCA3LjU0LjU0bDMtM2E1IDUgMCAwIDAtNy4wNy03LjA3bC0xLjcyIDEuNzEiLz48cGF0aCBkPSJNMTQgMTFhNSA1IDAgMCAwLTcuNTQtLjU0bC0zIDNhNSA1IDAgMCAwIDcuMDcgNy4wN2wxLjcxLTEuNzEiLz48L3N2Zz4=" # noqa: E501
def validate_url_ip(url: str) -> None:
"""
Validate that a URL doesn't point to a private/internal IP address.
Resolves hostnames to IPs before checking.
Args:
url: The URL to validate
Raises:
ValueError: If the URL points to a private/internal IP
"""
parsed = urlparse(url)
# Only allow HTTP and HTTPS to prevent file://, gopher://, etc.
if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
raise ValueError("Invalid URL scheme. Only HTTP and HTTPS are allowed")
fix: Add docker pytest runner and fix bugs the suite surfaced (#9138) * chore(api): add docker compose test runner Adds docker-compose-test.yml at the repo root that boots an isolated postgres / valkey / rabbitmq / minio stack with health checks and tmpfs data dirs, then runs pytest against it and exits. Includes a usage doc under apps/api/tests/RUNNING_TESTS.md and a pointer in AGENTS.md. Prereq: ./setup.sh (generates apps/api/.env). Usage: docker compose -f docker-compose-test.yml up --build \ --abort-on-container-exit --exit-code-from api-tests docker compose -f docker-compose-test.yml down -v * fix(api): correct bugs surfaced by the pytest suite Five small bugs caught by enabling the pytest contract suite end-to-end. Each is independently justifiable: - api/serializers/cycle.py + api/views/cycle.py: CycleCreateSerializer.validate required project_id in the request body, but the view only ever passes it through the URL kwarg. Cycle create/update via the public API was returning 400 "Project ID is required". Read project_id from serializer context (passed by the view) in addition to body/instance. - app/views/api.py: ApiTokenEndpoint.get(pk) and patch(pk) did not filter out is_service=True tokens, so a user could read and modify service tokens through the user token endpoint. The list mode and delete already filter is_service=False; aligned the other two. - bgtasks/work_item_link_task.py: validate_url_ip checked hostname before scheme, so file:///etc/passwd raised "No hostname found" instead of the documented "Only HTTP and HTTPS" error. Swapped the order so the scheme guard matches the docstring intent. - utils/path_validator.py: get_allowed_hosts used `WEB_URL or APP_BASE_URL` so when both are configured to different hosts (the standard local setup: WEB_URL=:8000, APP_BASE_URL=:3000), only one was added to the allow-list. Redirects to APP_BASE_URL then had their next_path stripped because the host wasn't allowed. Include every configured base URL. * chore(api): align pytest tests with current behavior, clear warnings Test-side fixes paired with the product fixes in the previous commit, plus deprecation cleanup that drops the test run from 104 warnings to 0. Tests: - tests/contract/api/test_cycles.py: project fixture sets cycle_view=True; the Project model defaults the flag to False, so cycle create/update always tripped "Cycles are not enabled for this project". - tests/contract/app/test_authentication.py: next_path uses "/workspaces" (validate_next_path rejects values without a leading slash and returns empty, which dropped the path from the redirect URL). - tests/unit/bg_tasks/test_copy_s3_objects.py: mocked sync_with_external_service now returns description_json; the task unconditionally writes the value back to the Issue, and Issue.description_json is NOT NULL on UPDATE. - tests/unit/utils/test_url.py: three length-limit tests placed the URL at char 970+ on a single line, which contains_url truncates away as ReDoS defense (500-char per-line cap). Restructured to keep test intent intact while staying inside the per-line window. Warning cleanup (104 → 0): - settings/common.py: removed USE_L10N=True (deprecated in Django 4.0, removed in 5.0; default is True). - celery.py, settings/local.py, settings/production.py: pythonjsonlogger moved jsonlogger → json; update the import / formatter path.
2026-05-25 19:51:37 +00:00
hostname = parsed.hostname
if not hostname:
raise ValueError("Invalid URL: No hostname found")
# Resolve hostname to IP addresses — this catches domain names that
# point to internal IPs (e.g. attacker.com -> 169.254.169.254)
try:
addr_info = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None)
fix: harden webhook/link/OAuth-avatar SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C/E) (#9163) * fix(api): harden webhook & link-unfurl SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C) Resolves three overlapping SSRF advisory clusters around webhook delivery and work-item link unfurling: - Cluster A (private-IP validation + PATCH bypass): the webhook PATCH handler passed context={request: request} (the request object as the dict key) so the loopback/disallowed-domain guard silently no-op'd — now context={"request": request}. Hardened IP classification (is_blocked_ip) to also block multicast, unspecified, CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10), and IPv4 embedded in IPv6 transition addresses (IPv4-mapped, NAT64, 6to4, Teredo), robust across Python versions. - Cluster B (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU): validators resolved DNS, then requests resolved it again at connect time. New pinned-IP client (plane/utils/url_security.py) resolves+validates once and connects to the validated IP literal so urllib3 performs no second lookup, while preserving Host header, TLS SNI and certificate verification against the real hostname. - Cluster C (redirect SSRF): webhook delivery never follows redirects; the link crawler follows them manually, re-resolving + re-validating + re-pinning every hop. Also: pin requests==2.33.0 in base.txt (imported directly; the pinning adapter needs the >=2.32 get_connection_with_tls_context hook), and log webhook URL-validation rejections to WebhookLog instead of swallowing them. Tests: new test_url_security.py (pinning, rebinding, redirect re-validation, IP edge cases, TLS SNI) + updated link-task tests. Full unit suite: 178 passed. * fix(api): block OAuth avatar SSRF + add per-advisory SSRF regression tests Verified every SSRF-class advisory against the current code. The webhook / link / favicon reports — including the published CVE-2026-30242 and CVE-2026-39843 and the newer "still bypassable" reports (DNS rebinding GHSA-3856/-fgcv/-9292/-whh3/-4mjx/-6p39/-fv24/-8wvv, IP-classification gaps GHSA-75fg, redirect GHSA-6v37/-jw6g/-mq87) — are resolved by the pinned-IP client + hardened classifier in this branch. The one SSRF family still unresolved was the OAuth avatar path: download_and_upload_avatar() fetched the provider-supplied avatar_url with a raw requests.get (no IP validation, default redirect following), so an attacker-controlled avatar could reach internal addresses and be exfiltrated via the static-asset endpoint (GHSA-cv9p-325g-wmv5, and the avatar hop of the Gitea SSRF GHSA-hx79-5pj5-qh42). It now uses pinned_fetch_following_redirects, which validates + pins every hop and blocks internal targets. Adds test_ssrf_advisories.py: a per-advisory regression map covering webhook IP validation, the PATCH context-key guard, webhook DNS rebinding, webhook redirect, favicon redirect + rebinding, and OAuth avatar SSRF. docker compose test: 199 unit tests pass. * fix(api): address PR review feedback on the SSRF pinned client - url_security: preserve URL-embedded credentials (user:pass@host) as Basic Auth instead of silently dropping them when rewriting to the IP literal (Copilot); bracket IPv6-literal hostnames in the Host header (Copilot); add stream=True support that keeps the session open until the response is closed, and release intermediate redirect hops. - ip_address / work_item_link_task: treat UnicodeError (IDNA failures) from getaddrinfo as a resolution failure, not an uncaught exception (CodeRabbit). - authentication/adapter/base: stream the avatar download so the size cap actually bounds memory, upload the size-bounded buffer (not response.content), and always close the response (CodeRabbit, major). - tests: cover auth preservation, IPv6 Host bracketing, IDNA handling, and streamed session lifetime; drop an unused import. docker compose test: 204 unit tests pass.
2026-05-30 18:42:23 +00:00
except (socket.gaierror, UnicodeError):
# UnicodeError covers IDNA failures raised before the address lookup.
raise ValueError("Hostname could not be resolved")
if not addr_info:
raise ValueError("No IP addresses found for the hostname")
fix: harden webhook/link/OAuth-avatar SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C/E) (#9163) * fix(api): harden webhook & link-unfurl SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C) Resolves three overlapping SSRF advisory clusters around webhook delivery and work-item link unfurling: - Cluster A (private-IP validation + PATCH bypass): the webhook PATCH handler passed context={request: request} (the request object as the dict key) so the loopback/disallowed-domain guard silently no-op'd — now context={"request": request}. Hardened IP classification (is_blocked_ip) to also block multicast, unspecified, CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10), and IPv4 embedded in IPv6 transition addresses (IPv4-mapped, NAT64, 6to4, Teredo), robust across Python versions. - Cluster B (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU): validators resolved DNS, then requests resolved it again at connect time. New pinned-IP client (plane/utils/url_security.py) resolves+validates once and connects to the validated IP literal so urllib3 performs no second lookup, while preserving Host header, TLS SNI and certificate verification against the real hostname. - Cluster C (redirect SSRF): webhook delivery never follows redirects; the link crawler follows them manually, re-resolving + re-validating + re-pinning every hop. Also: pin requests==2.33.0 in base.txt (imported directly; the pinning adapter needs the >=2.32 get_connection_with_tls_context hook), and log webhook URL-validation rejections to WebhookLog instead of swallowing them. Tests: new test_url_security.py (pinning, rebinding, redirect re-validation, IP edge cases, TLS SNI) + updated link-task tests. Full unit suite: 178 passed. * fix(api): block OAuth avatar SSRF + add per-advisory SSRF regression tests Verified every SSRF-class advisory against the current code. The webhook / link / favicon reports — including the published CVE-2026-30242 and CVE-2026-39843 and the newer "still bypassable" reports (DNS rebinding GHSA-3856/-fgcv/-9292/-whh3/-4mjx/-6p39/-fv24/-8wvv, IP-classification gaps GHSA-75fg, redirect GHSA-6v37/-jw6g/-mq87) — are resolved by the pinned-IP client + hardened classifier in this branch. The one SSRF family still unresolved was the OAuth avatar path: download_and_upload_avatar() fetched the provider-supplied avatar_url with a raw requests.get (no IP validation, default redirect following), so an attacker-controlled avatar could reach internal addresses and be exfiltrated via the static-asset endpoint (GHSA-cv9p-325g-wmv5, and the avatar hop of the Gitea SSRF GHSA-hx79-5pj5-qh42). It now uses pinned_fetch_following_redirects, which validates + pins every hop and blocks internal targets. Adds test_ssrf_advisories.py: a per-advisory regression map covering webhook IP validation, the PATCH context-key guard, webhook DNS rebinding, webhook redirect, favicon redirect + rebinding, and OAuth avatar SSRF. docker compose test: 199 unit tests pass. * fix(api): address PR review feedback on the SSRF pinned client - url_security: preserve URL-embedded credentials (user:pass@host) as Basic Auth instead of silently dropping them when rewriting to the IP literal (Copilot); bracket IPv6-literal hostnames in the Host header (Copilot); add stream=True support that keeps the session open until the response is closed, and release intermediate redirect hops. - ip_address / work_item_link_task: treat UnicodeError (IDNA failures) from getaddrinfo as a resolution failure, not an uncaught exception (CodeRabbit). - authentication/adapter/base: stream the avatar download so the size cap actually bounds memory, upload the size-bounded buffer (not response.content), and always close the response (CodeRabbit, major). - tests: cover auth preservation, IPv6 Host bracketing, IDNA handling, and streamed session lifetime; drop an unused import. docker compose test: 204 unit tests pass.
2026-05-30 18:42:23 +00:00
# Check every resolved IP against blocked ranges to prevent SSRF. The
# actual fetch is pinned to the validated IP (see safe_get), so this acts
# as an early, fail-closed pre-filter.
for addr in addr_info:
fix: harden webhook/link/OAuth-avatar SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C/E) (#9163) * fix(api): harden webhook & link-unfurl SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C) Resolves three overlapping SSRF advisory clusters around webhook delivery and work-item link unfurling: - Cluster A (private-IP validation + PATCH bypass): the webhook PATCH handler passed context={request: request} (the request object as the dict key) so the loopback/disallowed-domain guard silently no-op'd — now context={"request": request}. Hardened IP classification (is_blocked_ip) to also block multicast, unspecified, CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10), and IPv4 embedded in IPv6 transition addresses (IPv4-mapped, NAT64, 6to4, Teredo), robust across Python versions. - Cluster B (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU): validators resolved DNS, then requests resolved it again at connect time. New pinned-IP client (plane/utils/url_security.py) resolves+validates once and connects to the validated IP literal so urllib3 performs no second lookup, while preserving Host header, TLS SNI and certificate verification against the real hostname. - Cluster C (redirect SSRF): webhook delivery never follows redirects; the link crawler follows them manually, re-resolving + re-validating + re-pinning every hop. Also: pin requests==2.33.0 in base.txt (imported directly; the pinning adapter needs the >=2.32 get_connection_with_tls_context hook), and log webhook URL-validation rejections to WebhookLog instead of swallowing them. Tests: new test_url_security.py (pinning, rebinding, redirect re-validation, IP edge cases, TLS SNI) + updated link-task tests. Full unit suite: 178 passed. * fix(api): block OAuth avatar SSRF + add per-advisory SSRF regression tests Verified every SSRF-class advisory against the current code. The webhook / link / favicon reports — including the published CVE-2026-30242 and CVE-2026-39843 and the newer "still bypassable" reports (DNS rebinding GHSA-3856/-fgcv/-9292/-whh3/-4mjx/-6p39/-fv24/-8wvv, IP-classification gaps GHSA-75fg, redirect GHSA-6v37/-jw6g/-mq87) — are resolved by the pinned-IP client + hardened classifier in this branch. The one SSRF family still unresolved was the OAuth avatar path: download_and_upload_avatar() fetched the provider-supplied avatar_url with a raw requests.get (no IP validation, default redirect following), so an attacker-controlled avatar could reach internal addresses and be exfiltrated via the static-asset endpoint (GHSA-cv9p-325g-wmv5, and the avatar hop of the Gitea SSRF GHSA-hx79-5pj5-qh42). It now uses pinned_fetch_following_redirects, which validates + pins every hop and blocks internal targets. Adds test_ssrf_advisories.py: a per-advisory regression map covering webhook IP validation, the PATCH context-key guard, webhook DNS rebinding, webhook redirect, favicon redirect + rebinding, and OAuth avatar SSRF. docker compose test: 199 unit tests pass. * fix(api): address PR review feedback on the SSRF pinned client - url_security: preserve URL-embedded credentials (user:pass@host) as Basic Auth instead of silently dropping them when rewriting to the IP literal (Copilot); bracket IPv6-literal hostnames in the Host header (Copilot); add stream=True support that keeps the session open until the response is closed, and release intermediate redirect hops. - ip_address / work_item_link_task: treat UnicodeError (IDNA failures) from getaddrinfo as a resolution failure, not an uncaught exception (CodeRabbit). - authentication/adapter/base: stream the avatar download so the size cap actually bounds memory, upload the size-bounded buffer (not response.content), and always close the response (CodeRabbit, major). - tests: cover auth preservation, IPv6 Host bracketing, IDNA handling, and streamed session lifetime; drop an unused import. docker compose test: 204 unit tests pass.
2026-05-30 18:42:23 +00:00
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(addr[4][0].split("%")[0])
if is_blocked_ip(ip):
raise ValueError("Access to private/internal networks is not allowed")
MAX_REDIRECTS = 5
def safe_get(
url: str,
headers: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None,
timeout: int = 1,
) -> Tuple[requests.Response, str]:
"""
fix: harden webhook/link/OAuth-avatar SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C/E) (#9163) * fix(api): harden webhook & link-unfurl SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C) Resolves three overlapping SSRF advisory clusters around webhook delivery and work-item link unfurling: - Cluster A (private-IP validation + PATCH bypass): the webhook PATCH handler passed context={request: request} (the request object as the dict key) so the loopback/disallowed-domain guard silently no-op'd — now context={"request": request}. Hardened IP classification (is_blocked_ip) to also block multicast, unspecified, CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10), and IPv4 embedded in IPv6 transition addresses (IPv4-mapped, NAT64, 6to4, Teredo), robust across Python versions. - Cluster B (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU): validators resolved DNS, then requests resolved it again at connect time. New pinned-IP client (plane/utils/url_security.py) resolves+validates once and connects to the validated IP literal so urllib3 performs no second lookup, while preserving Host header, TLS SNI and certificate verification against the real hostname. - Cluster C (redirect SSRF): webhook delivery never follows redirects; the link crawler follows them manually, re-resolving + re-validating + re-pinning every hop. Also: pin requests==2.33.0 in base.txt (imported directly; the pinning adapter needs the >=2.32 get_connection_with_tls_context hook), and log webhook URL-validation rejections to WebhookLog instead of swallowing them. Tests: new test_url_security.py (pinning, rebinding, redirect re-validation, IP edge cases, TLS SNI) + updated link-task tests. Full unit suite: 178 passed. * fix(api): block OAuth avatar SSRF + add per-advisory SSRF regression tests Verified every SSRF-class advisory against the current code. The webhook / link / favicon reports — including the published CVE-2026-30242 and CVE-2026-39843 and the newer "still bypassable" reports (DNS rebinding GHSA-3856/-fgcv/-9292/-whh3/-4mjx/-6p39/-fv24/-8wvv, IP-classification gaps GHSA-75fg, redirect GHSA-6v37/-jw6g/-mq87) — are resolved by the pinned-IP client + hardened classifier in this branch. The one SSRF family still unresolved was the OAuth avatar path: download_and_upload_avatar() fetched the provider-supplied avatar_url with a raw requests.get (no IP validation, default redirect following), so an attacker-controlled avatar could reach internal addresses and be exfiltrated via the static-asset endpoint (GHSA-cv9p-325g-wmv5, and the avatar hop of the Gitea SSRF GHSA-hx79-5pj5-qh42). It now uses pinned_fetch_following_redirects, which validates + pins every hop and blocks internal targets. Adds test_ssrf_advisories.py: a per-advisory regression map covering webhook IP validation, the PATCH context-key guard, webhook DNS rebinding, webhook redirect, favicon redirect + rebinding, and OAuth avatar SSRF. docker compose test: 199 unit tests pass. * fix(api): address PR review feedback on the SSRF pinned client - url_security: preserve URL-embedded credentials (user:pass@host) as Basic Auth instead of silently dropping them when rewriting to the IP literal (Copilot); bracket IPv6-literal hostnames in the Host header (Copilot); add stream=True support that keeps the session open until the response is closed, and release intermediate redirect hops. - ip_address / work_item_link_task: treat UnicodeError (IDNA failures) from getaddrinfo as a resolution failure, not an uncaught exception (CodeRabbit). - authentication/adapter/base: stream the avatar download so the size cap actually bounds memory, upload the size-bounded buffer (not response.content), and always close the response (CodeRabbit, major). - tests: cover auth preservation, IPv6 Host bracketing, IDNA handling, and streamed session lifetime; drop an unused import. docker compose test: 204 unit tests pass.
2026-05-30 18:42:23 +00:00
Perform a GET request that resolves, validates and pins every hop to its
validated IP. Prevents SSRF via private/internal targets, DNS rebinding
(TOCTOU) and redirects that bounce to internal addresses.
Args:
url: The URL to fetch
headers: Optional request headers
timeout: Request timeout in seconds
Returns:
A tuple of (final Response object, final URL after redirects)
Raises:
ValueError: If any URL in the redirect chain points to a private IP
fix: harden webhook/link/OAuth-avatar SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C/E) (#9163) * fix(api): harden webhook & link-unfurl SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C) Resolves three overlapping SSRF advisory clusters around webhook delivery and work-item link unfurling: - Cluster A (private-IP validation + PATCH bypass): the webhook PATCH handler passed context={request: request} (the request object as the dict key) so the loopback/disallowed-domain guard silently no-op'd — now context={"request": request}. Hardened IP classification (is_blocked_ip) to also block multicast, unspecified, CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10), and IPv4 embedded in IPv6 transition addresses (IPv4-mapped, NAT64, 6to4, Teredo), robust across Python versions. - Cluster B (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU): validators resolved DNS, then requests resolved it again at connect time. New pinned-IP client (plane/utils/url_security.py) resolves+validates once and connects to the validated IP literal so urllib3 performs no second lookup, while preserving Host header, TLS SNI and certificate verification against the real hostname. - Cluster C (redirect SSRF): webhook delivery never follows redirects; the link crawler follows them manually, re-resolving + re-validating + re-pinning every hop. Also: pin requests==2.33.0 in base.txt (imported directly; the pinning adapter needs the >=2.32 get_connection_with_tls_context hook), and log webhook URL-validation rejections to WebhookLog instead of swallowing them. Tests: new test_url_security.py (pinning, rebinding, redirect re-validation, IP edge cases, TLS SNI) + updated link-task tests. Full unit suite: 178 passed. * fix(api): block OAuth avatar SSRF + add per-advisory SSRF regression tests Verified every SSRF-class advisory against the current code. The webhook / link / favicon reports — including the published CVE-2026-30242 and CVE-2026-39843 and the newer "still bypassable" reports (DNS rebinding GHSA-3856/-fgcv/-9292/-whh3/-4mjx/-6p39/-fv24/-8wvv, IP-classification gaps GHSA-75fg, redirect GHSA-6v37/-jw6g/-mq87) — are resolved by the pinned-IP client + hardened classifier in this branch. The one SSRF family still unresolved was the OAuth avatar path: download_and_upload_avatar() fetched the provider-supplied avatar_url with a raw requests.get (no IP validation, default redirect following), so an attacker-controlled avatar could reach internal addresses and be exfiltrated via the static-asset endpoint (GHSA-cv9p-325g-wmv5, and the avatar hop of the Gitea SSRF GHSA-hx79-5pj5-qh42). It now uses pinned_fetch_following_redirects, which validates + pins every hop and blocks internal targets. Adds test_ssrf_advisories.py: a per-advisory regression map covering webhook IP validation, the PATCH context-key guard, webhook DNS rebinding, webhook redirect, favicon redirect + rebinding, and OAuth avatar SSRF. docker compose test: 199 unit tests pass. * fix(api): address PR review feedback on the SSRF pinned client - url_security: preserve URL-embedded credentials (user:pass@host) as Basic Auth instead of silently dropping them when rewriting to the IP literal (Copilot); bracket IPv6-literal hostnames in the Host header (Copilot); add stream=True support that keeps the session open until the response is closed, and release intermediate redirect hops. - ip_address / work_item_link_task: treat UnicodeError (IDNA failures) from getaddrinfo as a resolution failure, not an uncaught exception (CodeRabbit). - authentication/adapter/base: stream the avatar download so the size cap actually bounds memory, upload the size-bounded buffer (not response.content), and always close the response (CodeRabbit, major). - tests: cover auth preservation, IPv6 Host bracketing, IDNA handling, and streamed session lifetime; drop an unused import. docker compose test: 204 unit tests pass.
2026-05-30 18:42:23 +00:00
requests.RequestException: On network errors (incl. TooManyRedirects)
"""
fix: harden webhook/link/OAuth-avatar SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C/E) (#9163) * fix(api): harden webhook & link-unfurl SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C) Resolves three overlapping SSRF advisory clusters around webhook delivery and work-item link unfurling: - Cluster A (private-IP validation + PATCH bypass): the webhook PATCH handler passed context={request: request} (the request object as the dict key) so the loopback/disallowed-domain guard silently no-op'd — now context={"request": request}. Hardened IP classification (is_blocked_ip) to also block multicast, unspecified, CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10), and IPv4 embedded in IPv6 transition addresses (IPv4-mapped, NAT64, 6to4, Teredo), robust across Python versions. - Cluster B (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU): validators resolved DNS, then requests resolved it again at connect time. New pinned-IP client (plane/utils/url_security.py) resolves+validates once and connects to the validated IP literal so urllib3 performs no second lookup, while preserving Host header, TLS SNI and certificate verification against the real hostname. - Cluster C (redirect SSRF): webhook delivery never follows redirects; the link crawler follows them manually, re-resolving + re-validating + re-pinning every hop. Also: pin requests==2.33.0 in base.txt (imported directly; the pinning adapter needs the >=2.32 get_connection_with_tls_context hook), and log webhook URL-validation rejections to WebhookLog instead of swallowing them. Tests: new test_url_security.py (pinning, rebinding, redirect re-validation, IP edge cases, TLS SNI) + updated link-task tests. Full unit suite: 178 passed. * fix(api): block OAuth avatar SSRF + add per-advisory SSRF regression tests Verified every SSRF-class advisory against the current code. The webhook / link / favicon reports — including the published CVE-2026-30242 and CVE-2026-39843 and the newer "still bypassable" reports (DNS rebinding GHSA-3856/-fgcv/-9292/-whh3/-4mjx/-6p39/-fv24/-8wvv, IP-classification gaps GHSA-75fg, redirect GHSA-6v37/-jw6g/-mq87) — are resolved by the pinned-IP client + hardened classifier in this branch. The one SSRF family still unresolved was the OAuth avatar path: download_and_upload_avatar() fetched the provider-supplied avatar_url with a raw requests.get (no IP validation, default redirect following), so an attacker-controlled avatar could reach internal addresses and be exfiltrated via the static-asset endpoint (GHSA-cv9p-325g-wmv5, and the avatar hop of the Gitea SSRF GHSA-hx79-5pj5-qh42). It now uses pinned_fetch_following_redirects, which validates + pins every hop and blocks internal targets. Adds test_ssrf_advisories.py: a per-advisory regression map covering webhook IP validation, the PATCH context-key guard, webhook DNS rebinding, webhook redirect, favicon redirect + rebinding, and OAuth avatar SSRF. docker compose test: 199 unit tests pass. * fix(api): address PR review feedback on the SSRF pinned client - url_security: preserve URL-embedded credentials (user:pass@host) as Basic Auth instead of silently dropping them when rewriting to the IP literal (Copilot); bracket IPv6-literal hostnames in the Host header (Copilot); add stream=True support that keeps the session open until the response is closed, and release intermediate redirect hops. - ip_address / work_item_link_task: treat UnicodeError (IDNA failures) from getaddrinfo as a resolution failure, not an uncaught exception (CodeRabbit). - authentication/adapter/base: stream the avatar download so the size cap actually bounds memory, upload the size-bounded buffer (not response.content), and always close the response (CodeRabbit, major). - tests: cover auth preservation, IPv6 Host bracketing, IDNA handling, and streamed session lifetime; drop an unused import. docker compose test: 204 unit tests pass.
2026-05-30 18:42:23 +00:00
return pinned_fetch_following_redirects(
"GET",
url,
headers=headers,
timeout=timeout,
max_redirects=MAX_REDIRECTS,
)
def crawl_work_item_link_title_and_favicon(url: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""
Crawls a URL to extract the title and favicon.
Args:
url (str): The URL to crawl
Returns:
str: JSON string containing title and base64-encoded favicon
"""
try:
# Set up headers to mimic a real browser
headers = {
"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4472.124 Safari/537.36" # noqa: E501
}
soup = None
title = None
final_url = url
try:
response, final_url = safe_get(url, headers=headers)
soup = BeautifulSoup(response.content, "html.parser")
title_tag = soup.find("title")
title = title_tag.get_text().strip() if title_tag else None
except requests.RequestException as e:
logger.warning(f"Failed to fetch HTML for title: {str(e)}")
except (ValueError, RuntimeError) as e:
logger.warning(f"URL validation failed: {str(e)}")
# Fetch and encode favicon using final URL (after redirects) for correct relative href resolution
favicon_base64 = fetch_and_encode_favicon(headers, soup, final_url)
# Prepare result
result = {
"title": title,
"favicon": favicon_base64["favicon_base64"],
"url": url,
"favicon_url": favicon_base64["favicon_url"],
}
return result
except Exception as e:
log_exception(e)
return {
"error": f"Unexpected error: {str(e)}",
"title": None,
"favicon": None,
"url": url,
}
def find_favicon_url(soup: Optional[BeautifulSoup], base_url: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""
Find the favicon URL from HTML soup.
Args:
soup: BeautifulSoup object
base_url: Base URL for resolving relative paths
Returns:
str: Absolute URL to favicon or None
"""
if soup is not None:
# Look for various favicon link tags
favicon_selectors = [
'link[rel="icon"]',
'link[rel="shortcut icon"]',
'link[rel="apple-touch-icon"]',
'link[rel="apple-touch-icon-precomposed"]',
]
for selector in favicon_selectors:
favicon_tag = soup.select_one(selector)
if favicon_tag and favicon_tag.get("href"):
favicon_href = urljoin(base_url, favicon_tag["href"])
validate_url_ip(favicon_href)
return favicon_href
# Fallback to /favicon.ico
parsed_url = urlparse(base_url)
fallback_url = f"{parsed_url.scheme}://{parsed_url.netloc}/favicon.ico"
fix: harden webhook/link/OAuth-avatar SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C/E) (#9163) * fix(api): harden webhook & link-unfurl SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C) Resolves three overlapping SSRF advisory clusters around webhook delivery and work-item link unfurling: - Cluster A (private-IP validation + PATCH bypass): the webhook PATCH handler passed context={request: request} (the request object as the dict key) so the loopback/disallowed-domain guard silently no-op'd — now context={"request": request}. Hardened IP classification (is_blocked_ip) to also block multicast, unspecified, CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10), and IPv4 embedded in IPv6 transition addresses (IPv4-mapped, NAT64, 6to4, Teredo), robust across Python versions. - Cluster B (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU): validators resolved DNS, then requests resolved it again at connect time. New pinned-IP client (plane/utils/url_security.py) resolves+validates once and connects to the validated IP literal so urllib3 performs no second lookup, while preserving Host header, TLS SNI and certificate verification against the real hostname. - Cluster C (redirect SSRF): webhook delivery never follows redirects; the link crawler follows them manually, re-resolving + re-validating + re-pinning every hop. Also: pin requests==2.33.0 in base.txt (imported directly; the pinning adapter needs the >=2.32 get_connection_with_tls_context hook), and log webhook URL-validation rejections to WebhookLog instead of swallowing them. Tests: new test_url_security.py (pinning, rebinding, redirect re-validation, IP edge cases, TLS SNI) + updated link-task tests. Full unit suite: 178 passed. * fix(api): block OAuth avatar SSRF + add per-advisory SSRF regression tests Verified every SSRF-class advisory against the current code. The webhook / link / favicon reports — including the published CVE-2026-30242 and CVE-2026-39843 and the newer "still bypassable" reports (DNS rebinding GHSA-3856/-fgcv/-9292/-whh3/-4mjx/-6p39/-fv24/-8wvv, IP-classification gaps GHSA-75fg, redirect GHSA-6v37/-jw6g/-mq87) — are resolved by the pinned-IP client + hardened classifier in this branch. The one SSRF family still unresolved was the OAuth avatar path: download_and_upload_avatar() fetched the provider-supplied avatar_url with a raw requests.get (no IP validation, default redirect following), so an attacker-controlled avatar could reach internal addresses and be exfiltrated via the static-asset endpoint (GHSA-cv9p-325g-wmv5, and the avatar hop of the Gitea SSRF GHSA-hx79-5pj5-qh42). It now uses pinned_fetch_following_redirects, which validates + pins every hop and blocks internal targets. Adds test_ssrf_advisories.py: a per-advisory regression map covering webhook IP validation, the PATCH context-key guard, webhook DNS rebinding, webhook redirect, favicon redirect + rebinding, and OAuth avatar SSRF. docker compose test: 199 unit tests pass. * fix(api): address PR review feedback on the SSRF pinned client - url_security: preserve URL-embedded credentials (user:pass@host) as Basic Auth instead of silently dropping them when rewriting to the IP literal (Copilot); bracket IPv6-literal hostnames in the Host header (Copilot); add stream=True support that keeps the session open until the response is closed, and release intermediate redirect hops. - ip_address / work_item_link_task: treat UnicodeError (IDNA failures) from getaddrinfo as a resolution failure, not an uncaught exception (CodeRabbit). - authentication/adapter/base: stream the avatar download so the size cap actually bounds memory, upload the size-bounded buffer (not response.content), and always close the response (CodeRabbit, major). - tests: cover auth preservation, IPv6 Host bracketing, IDNA handling, and streamed session lifetime; drop an unused import. docker compose test: 204 unit tests pass.
2026-05-30 18:42:23 +00:00
# Check if fallback exists (pinned to the validated IP).
try:
fix: harden webhook/link/OAuth-avatar SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C/E) (#9163) * fix(api): harden webhook & link-unfurl SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C) Resolves three overlapping SSRF advisory clusters around webhook delivery and work-item link unfurling: - Cluster A (private-IP validation + PATCH bypass): the webhook PATCH handler passed context={request: request} (the request object as the dict key) so the loopback/disallowed-domain guard silently no-op'd — now context={"request": request}. Hardened IP classification (is_blocked_ip) to also block multicast, unspecified, CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10), and IPv4 embedded in IPv6 transition addresses (IPv4-mapped, NAT64, 6to4, Teredo), robust across Python versions. - Cluster B (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU): validators resolved DNS, then requests resolved it again at connect time. New pinned-IP client (plane/utils/url_security.py) resolves+validates once and connects to the validated IP literal so urllib3 performs no second lookup, while preserving Host header, TLS SNI and certificate verification against the real hostname. - Cluster C (redirect SSRF): webhook delivery never follows redirects; the link crawler follows them manually, re-resolving + re-validating + re-pinning every hop. Also: pin requests==2.33.0 in base.txt (imported directly; the pinning adapter needs the >=2.32 get_connection_with_tls_context hook), and log webhook URL-validation rejections to WebhookLog instead of swallowing them. Tests: new test_url_security.py (pinning, rebinding, redirect re-validation, IP edge cases, TLS SNI) + updated link-task tests. Full unit suite: 178 passed. * fix(api): block OAuth avatar SSRF + add per-advisory SSRF regression tests Verified every SSRF-class advisory against the current code. The webhook / link / favicon reports — including the published CVE-2026-30242 and CVE-2026-39843 and the newer "still bypassable" reports (DNS rebinding GHSA-3856/-fgcv/-9292/-whh3/-4mjx/-6p39/-fv24/-8wvv, IP-classification gaps GHSA-75fg, redirect GHSA-6v37/-jw6g/-mq87) — are resolved by the pinned-IP client + hardened classifier in this branch. The one SSRF family still unresolved was the OAuth avatar path: download_and_upload_avatar() fetched the provider-supplied avatar_url with a raw requests.get (no IP validation, default redirect following), so an attacker-controlled avatar could reach internal addresses and be exfiltrated via the static-asset endpoint (GHSA-cv9p-325g-wmv5, and the avatar hop of the Gitea SSRF GHSA-hx79-5pj5-qh42). It now uses pinned_fetch_following_redirects, which validates + pins every hop and blocks internal targets. Adds test_ssrf_advisories.py: a per-advisory regression map covering webhook IP validation, the PATCH context-key guard, webhook DNS rebinding, webhook redirect, favicon redirect + rebinding, and OAuth avatar SSRF. docker compose test: 199 unit tests pass. * fix(api): address PR review feedback on the SSRF pinned client - url_security: preserve URL-embedded credentials (user:pass@host) as Basic Auth instead of silently dropping them when rewriting to the IP literal (Copilot); bracket IPv6-literal hostnames in the Host header (Copilot); add stream=True support that keeps the session open until the response is closed, and release intermediate redirect hops. - ip_address / work_item_link_task: treat UnicodeError (IDNA failures) from getaddrinfo as a resolution failure, not an uncaught exception (CodeRabbit). - authentication/adapter/base: stream the avatar download so the size cap actually bounds memory, upload the size-bounded buffer (not response.content), and always close the response (CodeRabbit, major). - tests: cover auth preservation, IPv6 Host bracketing, IDNA handling, and streamed session lifetime; drop an unused import. docker compose test: 204 unit tests pass.
2026-05-30 18:42:23 +00:00
response = pinned_fetch("HEAD", fallback_url, timeout=2)
if response.status_code == 200:
return fallback_url
fix: harden webhook/link/OAuth-avatar SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C/E) (#9163) * fix(api): harden webhook & link-unfurl SSRF (advisory clusters A/B/C) Resolves three overlapping SSRF advisory clusters around webhook delivery and work-item link unfurling: - Cluster A (private-IP validation + PATCH bypass): the webhook PATCH handler passed context={request: request} (the request object as the dict key) so the loopback/disallowed-domain guard silently no-op'd — now context={"request": request}. Hardened IP classification (is_blocked_ip) to also block multicast, unspecified, CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10), and IPv4 embedded in IPv6 transition addresses (IPv4-mapped, NAT64, 6to4, Teredo), robust across Python versions. - Cluster B (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU): validators resolved DNS, then requests resolved it again at connect time. New pinned-IP client (plane/utils/url_security.py) resolves+validates once and connects to the validated IP literal so urllib3 performs no second lookup, while preserving Host header, TLS SNI and certificate verification against the real hostname. - Cluster C (redirect SSRF): webhook delivery never follows redirects; the link crawler follows them manually, re-resolving + re-validating + re-pinning every hop. Also: pin requests==2.33.0 in base.txt (imported directly; the pinning adapter needs the >=2.32 get_connection_with_tls_context hook), and log webhook URL-validation rejections to WebhookLog instead of swallowing them. Tests: new test_url_security.py (pinning, rebinding, redirect re-validation, IP edge cases, TLS SNI) + updated link-task tests. Full unit suite: 178 passed. * fix(api): block OAuth avatar SSRF + add per-advisory SSRF regression tests Verified every SSRF-class advisory against the current code. The webhook / link / favicon reports — including the published CVE-2026-30242 and CVE-2026-39843 and the newer "still bypassable" reports (DNS rebinding GHSA-3856/-fgcv/-9292/-whh3/-4mjx/-6p39/-fv24/-8wvv, IP-classification gaps GHSA-75fg, redirect GHSA-6v37/-jw6g/-mq87) — are resolved by the pinned-IP client + hardened classifier in this branch. The one SSRF family still unresolved was the OAuth avatar path: download_and_upload_avatar() fetched the provider-supplied avatar_url with a raw requests.get (no IP validation, default redirect following), so an attacker-controlled avatar could reach internal addresses and be exfiltrated via the static-asset endpoint (GHSA-cv9p-325g-wmv5, and the avatar hop of the Gitea SSRF GHSA-hx79-5pj5-qh42). It now uses pinned_fetch_following_redirects, which validates + pins every hop and blocks internal targets. Adds test_ssrf_advisories.py: a per-advisory regression map covering webhook IP validation, the PATCH context-key guard, webhook DNS rebinding, webhook redirect, favicon redirect + rebinding, and OAuth avatar SSRF. docker compose test: 199 unit tests pass. * fix(api): address PR review feedback on the SSRF pinned client - url_security: preserve URL-embedded credentials (user:pass@host) as Basic Auth instead of silently dropping them when rewriting to the IP literal (Copilot); bracket IPv6-literal hostnames in the Host header (Copilot); add stream=True support that keeps the session open until the response is closed, and release intermediate redirect hops. - ip_address / work_item_link_task: treat UnicodeError (IDNA failures) from getaddrinfo as a resolution failure, not an uncaught exception (CodeRabbit). - authentication/adapter/base: stream the avatar download so the size cap actually bounds memory, upload the size-bounded buffer (not response.content), and always close the response (CodeRabbit, major). - tests: cover auth preservation, IPv6 Host bracketing, IDNA handling, and streamed session lifetime; drop an unused import. docker compose test: 204 unit tests pass.
2026-05-30 18:42:23 +00:00
except (requests.RequestException, ValueError) as e:
log_exception(e, warning=True)
return None
return None
def fetch_and_encode_favicon(
headers: Dict[str, str], soup: Optional[BeautifulSoup], url: str
) -> Dict[str, Optional[str]]:
"""
Fetch favicon and encode it as base64.
Args:
favicon_url: URL to the favicon
headers: Request headers
Returns:
str: Base64 encoded favicon with data URI prefix or None
"""
try:
favicon_url = find_favicon_url(soup, url)
if favicon_url is None:
return {
"favicon_url": None,
"favicon_base64": f"data:image/svg+xml;base64,{DEFAULT_FAVICON}",
}
response, _ = safe_get(favicon_url, headers=headers)
# Get content type
content_type = response.headers.get("content-type", "image/x-icon")
# Convert to base64
favicon_base64 = base64.b64encode(response.content).decode("utf-8")
# Return as data URI
return {
"favicon_url": favicon_url,
"favicon_base64": f"data:{content_type};base64,{favicon_base64}",
}
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"Failed to fetch favicon: {e}")
return {
"favicon_url": None,
"favicon_base64": f"data:image/svg+xml;base64,{DEFAULT_FAVICON}",
}
@shared_task
def crawl_work_item_link_title(id: str, url: str) -> None:
meta_data = crawl_work_item_link_title_and_favicon(url)
try:
issue_link = IssueLink.objects.get(id=id)
except IssueLink.DoesNotExist:
logger.warning(f"IssueLink not found for the id {id} and the url {url}")
return
issue_link.metadata = meta_data
issue_link.save()