2026-01-27 08:24:22 +00:00
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# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
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# See the LICENSE file for details.
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fix(api): rate-limit magic-code verify, bound per-token attempts (GHSA-9pvm-fcf6-9234) (#9130)
* fix(api): rate-limit magic-code verification and bound per-token attempts
The magic-link sign-in / sign-up endpoints accept a 6-digit numeric code
(900k-value space, 600s TTL) but never increment a failure counter on a
wrong-code verify and extend django.views.View rather than DRF APIView,
so DRF's AuthenticationThrottle never runs against them. The space-side
generate endpoint also lacked throttle_classes. Combined, this allowed
an unauthenticated attacker who knew a victim's email to brute-force
the code within the TTL window and log in as the victim.
- Add MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS=5 in MagicCodeProvider.set_user_data: failed
comparisons now persist verify_attempts in Redis under the remaining
TTL and, on hitting the limit, delete the key and raise
EMAIL_CODE_ATTEMPT_EXHAUSTED. This is the load-bearing fix - it caps
total attempts per issued token regardless of request rate.
- Add authentication_throttle_allows() so plain Django Views can apply
AuthenticationThrottle without converting to APIView (would change
CSRF + request-parsing semantics for the redirect-flow endpoints).
- Apply the throttle to MagicSignIn/UpEndpoint and the space variants;
add throttle_classes to MagicGenerateSpaceEndpoint to match its app
sibling.
Refs GHSA-9pvm-fcf6-9234.
* fix(api): make verify-attempt increment atomic, expose throttle rate via env
Address PR review feedback:
- Replace the JSON read-modify-write of verify_attempts with a Lua
EVAL script that INCRs a dedicated counter key and EXPIREs it only
on the first increment. The previous round-trip was racy: parallel
wrong-code requests could read the same value and both write the
same incremented count, letting an attacker exceed MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS
under concurrency. Counter is now reset on each new token issuance
and cleared on successful verify / exhaustion.
- Make AuthenticationThrottle.rate configurable via the
AUTHENTICATION_RATE_LIMIT env var (default 10/minute, down from 30
to tighten the budget on unauth auth-adjacent endpoints). Document
it in deployments/aio and deployments/cli variables.env.
* test(api): cover magic-code attempt cap, counter reset, and auth throttle
Add the contract tests called out in the PR test plan:
- TestMagicSignInVerifyAttempts:
- test_exhausted_after_max_wrong_attempts: after MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS
wrong codes the next verify redirects with EMAIL_CODE_ATTEMPT_
EXHAUSTED_SIGN_IN and both Redis keys are deleted; a follow-up
verify reports EXPIRED.
- test_counter_increments_on_each_wrong_attempt: the dedicated
verify_attempts counter advances by exactly one per wrong POST,
matching the atomic Lua INCR.
- test_counter_resets_on_token_regeneration: regenerating the
magic-link clears the counter so the user isn't pre-locked-out by
a prior session's wrong attempts.
- TestMagicSignUpVerifyAttempts.test_signup_exhausted_after_max_wrong_attempts:
the sign-up endpoint returns EMAIL_CODE_ATTEMPT_EXHAUSTED_SIGN_UP on
the exhausting attempt.
- TestAuthenticationThrottle: exercises authentication_throttle_allows
on the plain-View redirect-flow endpoints by patching the rate down
and asserting RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED is appended to the redirect URL
once the per-IP budget is exceeded, for both magic-sign-in and
magic-sign-up.
Each new class clears Django cache (DRF throttle storage) and the
per-email Redis keys around every test so runs are independent.
* fix(api): clamp remaining_ttl to >=1 for verify-attempt counter EXPIRE
ri.ttl() returns 0 when the token has less than one second remaining
(Redis floors to whole seconds). The previous clamp only caught
None and < 0, so a sub-second TTL would pass through and the Lua
script's EXPIRE counter 0 would immediately delete the key — letting
an attacker bypass MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS during the final second of the
token's life. Switch the comparison to <= 0.
Narrow real-world impact (sub-second window, throttle still bounds
the rate) but the cap should hold regardless of timing.
2026-06-01 13:14:57 +00:00
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# Python imports
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import os
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[WEB-7946] fix: add rate limiting to email/password sign-in and sign-up endpoints (#9335)
* fix: add rate limiting to email/password sign-in and sign-up endpoints
All four password authentication views (app sign-in, app sign-up, space
sign-in, space sign-up) extended django.views.View, so DRF's global
AnonRateThrottle never ran and the endpoints accepted unlimited credential
guesses with no friction (brute-force / credential stuffing, GHSA-349j).
Add authentication_throttle_allows(request) at the top of each post()
method — before any DB access — using the same AuthenticationThrottle
already guarding the magic-code views. On rejection the view redirects with
RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED, consistent with all other throttled auth endpoints.
Default limit remains 10/minute, overridable via AUTHENTICATION_RATE_LIMIT.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* refactor: consolidate auth throttle into a decorator + add tests
- Extract the repeated throttle-and-redirect block from the six redirect-flow
auth views (email + magic, app + space) into a single throttle_auth_redirect
decorator in rate_limit.py. Behaviour is unchanged: the throttle still runs
before any DB access; brute-force traffic is rejected without a DB hit.
- Add regression tests for the password sign-in/sign-up throttle on both app
and space endpoints, mirroring the existing magic-code throttle tests.
- Reset the shared AuthenticationThrottle bucket before every test in
test_authentication.py. All auth endpoints share one per-IP throttle scope,
so the newly-throttled password requests exhausted the budget mid-file and
caused unrelated tests to trip RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED.
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
Co-authored-by: sriramveeraghanta <veeraghanta.sriram@gmail.com>
2026-08-27 18:43:58 +00:00
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from functools import wraps
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fix(api): rate-limit magic-code verify, bound per-token attempts (GHSA-9pvm-fcf6-9234) (#9130)
* fix(api): rate-limit magic-code verification and bound per-token attempts
The magic-link sign-in / sign-up endpoints accept a 6-digit numeric code
(900k-value space, 600s TTL) but never increment a failure counter on a
wrong-code verify and extend django.views.View rather than DRF APIView,
so DRF's AuthenticationThrottle never runs against them. The space-side
generate endpoint also lacked throttle_classes. Combined, this allowed
an unauthenticated attacker who knew a victim's email to brute-force
the code within the TTL window and log in as the victim.
- Add MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS=5 in MagicCodeProvider.set_user_data: failed
comparisons now persist verify_attempts in Redis under the remaining
TTL and, on hitting the limit, delete the key and raise
EMAIL_CODE_ATTEMPT_EXHAUSTED. This is the load-bearing fix - it caps
total attempts per issued token regardless of request rate.
- Add authentication_throttle_allows() so plain Django Views can apply
AuthenticationThrottle without converting to APIView (would change
CSRF + request-parsing semantics for the redirect-flow endpoints).
- Apply the throttle to MagicSignIn/UpEndpoint and the space variants;
add throttle_classes to MagicGenerateSpaceEndpoint to match its app
sibling.
Refs GHSA-9pvm-fcf6-9234.
* fix(api): make verify-attempt increment atomic, expose throttle rate via env
Address PR review feedback:
- Replace the JSON read-modify-write of verify_attempts with a Lua
EVAL script that INCRs a dedicated counter key and EXPIREs it only
on the first increment. The previous round-trip was racy: parallel
wrong-code requests could read the same value and both write the
same incremented count, letting an attacker exceed MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS
under concurrency. Counter is now reset on each new token issuance
and cleared on successful verify / exhaustion.
- Make AuthenticationThrottle.rate configurable via the
AUTHENTICATION_RATE_LIMIT env var (default 10/minute, down from 30
to tighten the budget on unauth auth-adjacent endpoints). Document
it in deployments/aio and deployments/cli variables.env.
* test(api): cover magic-code attempt cap, counter reset, and auth throttle
Add the contract tests called out in the PR test plan:
- TestMagicSignInVerifyAttempts:
- test_exhausted_after_max_wrong_attempts: after MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS
wrong codes the next verify redirects with EMAIL_CODE_ATTEMPT_
EXHAUSTED_SIGN_IN and both Redis keys are deleted; a follow-up
verify reports EXPIRED.
- test_counter_increments_on_each_wrong_attempt: the dedicated
verify_attempts counter advances by exactly one per wrong POST,
matching the atomic Lua INCR.
- test_counter_resets_on_token_regeneration: regenerating the
magic-link clears the counter so the user isn't pre-locked-out by
a prior session's wrong attempts.
- TestMagicSignUpVerifyAttempts.test_signup_exhausted_after_max_wrong_attempts:
the sign-up endpoint returns EMAIL_CODE_ATTEMPT_EXHAUSTED_SIGN_UP on
the exhausting attempt.
- TestAuthenticationThrottle: exercises authentication_throttle_allows
on the plain-View redirect-flow endpoints by patching the rate down
and asserting RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED is appended to the redirect URL
once the per-IP budget is exceeded, for both magic-sign-in and
magic-sign-up.
Each new class clears Django cache (DRF throttle storage) and the
per-email Redis keys around every test so runs are independent.
* fix(api): clamp remaining_ttl to >=1 for verify-attempt counter EXPIRE
ri.ttl() returns 0 when the token has less than one second remaining
(Redis floors to whole seconds). The previous clamp only caught
None and < 0, so a sub-second TTL would pass through and the Lua
script's EXPIRE counter 0 would immediately delete the key — letting
an attacker bypass MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS during the final second of the
token's life. Switch the comparison to <= 0.
Narrow real-world impact (sub-second window, throttle still bounds
the rate) but the cap should hold regardless of timing.
2026-06-01 13:14:57 +00:00
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2024-05-21 09:33:01 +00:00
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# Third party imports
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2025-11-24 15:51:52 +00:00
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from rest_framework.throttling import AnonRateThrottle, UserRateThrottle
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2024-05-21 09:33:01 +00:00
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from rest_framework import status
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from rest_framework.response import Response
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[WEB-7946] fix: add rate limiting to email/password sign-in and sign-up endpoints (#9335)
* fix: add rate limiting to email/password sign-in and sign-up endpoints
All four password authentication views (app sign-in, app sign-up, space
sign-in, space sign-up) extended django.views.View, so DRF's global
AnonRateThrottle never ran and the endpoints accepted unlimited credential
guesses with no friction (brute-force / credential stuffing, GHSA-349j).
Add authentication_throttle_allows(request) at the top of each post()
method — before any DB access — using the same AuthenticationThrottle
already guarding the magic-code views. On rejection the view redirects with
RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED, consistent with all other throttled auth endpoints.
Default limit remains 10/minute, overridable via AUTHENTICATION_RATE_LIMIT.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* refactor: consolidate auth throttle into a decorator + add tests
- Extract the repeated throttle-and-redirect block from the six redirect-flow
auth views (email + magic, app + space) into a single throttle_auth_redirect
decorator in rate_limit.py. Behaviour is unchanged: the throttle still runs
before any DB access; brute-force traffic is rejected without a DB hit.
- Add regression tests for the password sign-in/sign-up throttle on both app
and space endpoints, mirroring the existing magic-code throttle tests.
- Reset the shared AuthenticationThrottle bucket before every test in
test_authentication.py. All auth endpoints share one per-IP throttle scope,
so the newly-throttled password requests exhausted the budget mid-file and
caused unrelated tests to trip RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED.
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
Co-authored-by: sriramveeraghanta <veeraghanta.sriram@gmail.com>
2026-08-27 18:43:58 +00:00
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# Django imports
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from django.http import HttpResponseRedirect
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2024-05-21 09:33:01 +00:00
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# Module imports
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from plane.authentication.adapter.error import (
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AuthenticationException,
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AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES,
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)
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[WEB-7946] fix: add rate limiting to email/password sign-in and sign-up endpoints (#9335)
* fix: add rate limiting to email/password sign-in and sign-up endpoints
All four password authentication views (app sign-in, app sign-up, space
sign-in, space sign-up) extended django.views.View, so DRF's global
AnonRateThrottle never ran and the endpoints accepted unlimited credential
guesses with no friction (brute-force / credential stuffing, GHSA-349j).
Add authentication_throttle_allows(request) at the top of each post()
method — before any DB access — using the same AuthenticationThrottle
already guarding the magic-code views. On rejection the view redirects with
RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED, consistent with all other throttled auth endpoints.
Default limit remains 10/minute, overridable via AUTHENTICATION_RATE_LIMIT.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* refactor: consolidate auth throttle into a decorator + add tests
- Extract the repeated throttle-and-redirect block from the six redirect-flow
auth views (email + magic, app + space) into a single throttle_auth_redirect
decorator in rate_limit.py. Behaviour is unchanged: the throttle still runs
before any DB access; brute-force traffic is rejected without a DB hit.
- Add regression tests for the password sign-in/sign-up throttle on both app
and space endpoints, mirroring the existing magic-code throttle tests.
- Reset the shared AuthenticationThrottle bucket before every test in
test_authentication.py. All auth endpoints share one per-IP throttle scope,
so the newly-throttled password requests exhausted the budget mid-file and
caused unrelated tests to trip RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED.
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
Co-authored-by: sriramveeraghanta <veeraghanta.sriram@gmail.com>
2026-08-27 18:43:58 +00:00
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from plane.authentication.utils.host import base_host
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from plane.utils.path_validator import get_safe_redirect_url
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2024-05-21 09:33:01 +00:00
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class AuthenticationThrottle(AnonRateThrottle):
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fix(api): rate-limit magic-code verify, bound per-token attempts (GHSA-9pvm-fcf6-9234) (#9130)
* fix(api): rate-limit magic-code verification and bound per-token attempts
The magic-link sign-in / sign-up endpoints accept a 6-digit numeric code
(900k-value space, 600s TTL) but never increment a failure counter on a
wrong-code verify and extend django.views.View rather than DRF APIView,
so DRF's AuthenticationThrottle never runs against them. The space-side
generate endpoint also lacked throttle_classes. Combined, this allowed
an unauthenticated attacker who knew a victim's email to brute-force
the code within the TTL window and log in as the victim.
- Add MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS=5 in MagicCodeProvider.set_user_data: failed
comparisons now persist verify_attempts in Redis under the remaining
TTL and, on hitting the limit, delete the key and raise
EMAIL_CODE_ATTEMPT_EXHAUSTED. This is the load-bearing fix - it caps
total attempts per issued token regardless of request rate.
- Add authentication_throttle_allows() so plain Django Views can apply
AuthenticationThrottle without converting to APIView (would change
CSRF + request-parsing semantics for the redirect-flow endpoints).
- Apply the throttle to MagicSignIn/UpEndpoint and the space variants;
add throttle_classes to MagicGenerateSpaceEndpoint to match its app
sibling.
Refs GHSA-9pvm-fcf6-9234.
* fix(api): make verify-attempt increment atomic, expose throttle rate via env
Address PR review feedback:
- Replace the JSON read-modify-write of verify_attempts with a Lua
EVAL script that INCRs a dedicated counter key and EXPIREs it only
on the first increment. The previous round-trip was racy: parallel
wrong-code requests could read the same value and both write the
same incremented count, letting an attacker exceed MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS
under concurrency. Counter is now reset on each new token issuance
and cleared on successful verify / exhaustion.
- Make AuthenticationThrottle.rate configurable via the
AUTHENTICATION_RATE_LIMIT env var (default 10/minute, down from 30
to tighten the budget on unauth auth-adjacent endpoints). Document
it in deployments/aio and deployments/cli variables.env.
* test(api): cover magic-code attempt cap, counter reset, and auth throttle
Add the contract tests called out in the PR test plan:
- TestMagicSignInVerifyAttempts:
- test_exhausted_after_max_wrong_attempts: after MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS
wrong codes the next verify redirects with EMAIL_CODE_ATTEMPT_
EXHAUSTED_SIGN_IN and both Redis keys are deleted; a follow-up
verify reports EXPIRED.
- test_counter_increments_on_each_wrong_attempt: the dedicated
verify_attempts counter advances by exactly one per wrong POST,
matching the atomic Lua INCR.
- test_counter_resets_on_token_regeneration: regenerating the
magic-link clears the counter so the user isn't pre-locked-out by
a prior session's wrong attempts.
- TestMagicSignUpVerifyAttempts.test_signup_exhausted_after_max_wrong_attempts:
the sign-up endpoint returns EMAIL_CODE_ATTEMPT_EXHAUSTED_SIGN_UP on
the exhausting attempt.
- TestAuthenticationThrottle: exercises authentication_throttle_allows
on the plain-View redirect-flow endpoints by patching the rate down
and asserting RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED is appended to the redirect URL
once the per-IP budget is exceeded, for both magic-sign-in and
magic-sign-up.
Each new class clears Django cache (DRF throttle storage) and the
per-email Redis keys around every test so runs are independent.
* fix(api): clamp remaining_ttl to >=1 for verify-attempt counter EXPIRE
ri.ttl() returns 0 when the token has less than one second remaining
(Redis floors to whole seconds). The previous clamp only caught
None and < 0, so a sub-second TTL would pass through and the Lua
script's EXPIRE counter 0 would immediately delete the key — letting
an attacker bypass MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS during the final second of the
token's life. Switch the comparison to <= 0.
Narrow real-world impact (sub-second window, throttle still bounds
the rate) but the cap should hold regardless of timing.
2026-06-01 13:14:57 +00:00
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# Rate is configurable per-deployment via the AUTHENTICATION_RATE_LIMIT
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# env var (DRF format: "<num>/<period>" where period is second/minute/hour/day).
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rate = os.environ.get("AUTHENTICATION_RATE_LIMIT", "10/minute")
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2024-05-21 09:33:01 +00:00
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scope = "authentication"
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def throttle_failure_view(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
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try:
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raise AuthenticationException(
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error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"],
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error_message="RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED",
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)
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except AuthenticationException as e:
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2025-09-29 13:45:32 +00:00
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return Response(e.get_error_dict(), status=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS)
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2025-11-24 15:51:52 +00:00
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fix(api): rate-limit magic-code verify, bound per-token attempts (GHSA-9pvm-fcf6-9234) (#9130)
* fix(api): rate-limit magic-code verification and bound per-token attempts
The magic-link sign-in / sign-up endpoints accept a 6-digit numeric code
(900k-value space, 600s TTL) but never increment a failure counter on a
wrong-code verify and extend django.views.View rather than DRF APIView,
so DRF's AuthenticationThrottle never runs against them. The space-side
generate endpoint also lacked throttle_classes. Combined, this allowed
an unauthenticated attacker who knew a victim's email to brute-force
the code within the TTL window and log in as the victim.
- Add MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS=5 in MagicCodeProvider.set_user_data: failed
comparisons now persist verify_attempts in Redis under the remaining
TTL and, on hitting the limit, delete the key and raise
EMAIL_CODE_ATTEMPT_EXHAUSTED. This is the load-bearing fix - it caps
total attempts per issued token regardless of request rate.
- Add authentication_throttle_allows() so plain Django Views can apply
AuthenticationThrottle without converting to APIView (would change
CSRF + request-parsing semantics for the redirect-flow endpoints).
- Apply the throttle to MagicSignIn/UpEndpoint and the space variants;
add throttle_classes to MagicGenerateSpaceEndpoint to match its app
sibling.
Refs GHSA-9pvm-fcf6-9234.
* fix(api): make verify-attempt increment atomic, expose throttle rate via env
Address PR review feedback:
- Replace the JSON read-modify-write of verify_attempts with a Lua
EVAL script that INCRs a dedicated counter key and EXPIREs it only
on the first increment. The previous round-trip was racy: parallel
wrong-code requests could read the same value and both write the
same incremented count, letting an attacker exceed MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS
under concurrency. Counter is now reset on each new token issuance
and cleared on successful verify / exhaustion.
- Make AuthenticationThrottle.rate configurable via the
AUTHENTICATION_RATE_LIMIT env var (default 10/minute, down from 30
to tighten the budget on unauth auth-adjacent endpoints). Document
it in deployments/aio and deployments/cli variables.env.
* test(api): cover magic-code attempt cap, counter reset, and auth throttle
Add the contract tests called out in the PR test plan:
- TestMagicSignInVerifyAttempts:
- test_exhausted_after_max_wrong_attempts: after MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS
wrong codes the next verify redirects with EMAIL_CODE_ATTEMPT_
EXHAUSTED_SIGN_IN and both Redis keys are deleted; a follow-up
verify reports EXPIRED.
- test_counter_increments_on_each_wrong_attempt: the dedicated
verify_attempts counter advances by exactly one per wrong POST,
matching the atomic Lua INCR.
- test_counter_resets_on_token_regeneration: regenerating the
magic-link clears the counter so the user isn't pre-locked-out by
a prior session's wrong attempts.
- TestMagicSignUpVerifyAttempts.test_signup_exhausted_after_max_wrong_attempts:
the sign-up endpoint returns EMAIL_CODE_ATTEMPT_EXHAUSTED_SIGN_UP on
the exhausting attempt.
- TestAuthenticationThrottle: exercises authentication_throttle_allows
on the plain-View redirect-flow endpoints by patching the rate down
and asserting RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED is appended to the redirect URL
once the per-IP budget is exceeded, for both magic-sign-in and
magic-sign-up.
Each new class clears Django cache (DRF throttle storage) and the
per-email Redis keys around every test so runs are independent.
* fix(api): clamp remaining_ttl to >=1 for verify-attempt counter EXPIRE
ri.ttl() returns 0 when the token has less than one second remaining
(Redis floors to whole seconds). The previous clamp only caught
None and < 0, so a sub-second TTL would pass through and the Lua
script's EXPIRE counter 0 would immediately delete the key — letting
an attacker bypass MAX_VERIFY_ATTEMPTS during the final second of the
token's life. Switch the comparison to <= 0.
Narrow real-world impact (sub-second window, throttle still bounds
the rate) but the cap should hold regardless of timing.
2026-06-01 13:14:57 +00:00
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def authentication_throttle_allows(request):
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"""
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Apply AuthenticationThrottle to a plain django.views.View request.
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DRF's throttle_classes only run inside APIView.initial(); the magic
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sign-in / sign-up endpoints extend django.views.View to return
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HttpResponseRedirect from a form POST flow, so they need a manual
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throttle check. Returns True if the request is allowed through,
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False if it should be rejected with a RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED error.
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"""
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throttle = AuthenticationThrottle()
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# SimpleRateThrottle.allow_request only reads request.META and
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# request.user, both available on a plain Django HttpRequest.
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return throttle.allow_request(request, None)
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[WEB-7946] fix: add rate limiting to email/password sign-in and sign-up endpoints (#9335)
* fix: add rate limiting to email/password sign-in and sign-up endpoints
All four password authentication views (app sign-in, app sign-up, space
sign-in, space sign-up) extended django.views.View, so DRF's global
AnonRateThrottle never ran and the endpoints accepted unlimited credential
guesses with no friction (brute-force / credential stuffing, GHSA-349j).
Add authentication_throttle_allows(request) at the top of each post()
method — before any DB access — using the same AuthenticationThrottle
already guarding the magic-code views. On rejection the view redirects with
RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED, consistent with all other throttled auth endpoints.
Default limit remains 10/minute, overridable via AUTHENTICATION_RATE_LIMIT.
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
* refactor: consolidate auth throttle into a decorator + add tests
- Extract the repeated throttle-and-redirect block from the six redirect-flow
auth views (email + magic, app + space) into a single throttle_auth_redirect
decorator in rate_limit.py. Behaviour is unchanged: the throttle still runs
before any DB access; brute-force traffic is rejected without a DB hit.
- Add regression tests for the password sign-in/sign-up throttle on both app
and space endpoints, mirroring the existing magic-code throttle tests.
- Reset the shared AuthenticationThrottle bucket before every test in
test_authentication.py. All auth endpoints share one per-IP throttle scope,
so the newly-throttled password requests exhausted the budget mid-file and
caused unrelated tests to trip RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED.
---------
Co-authored-by: Plane AI <noreply@plane.so>
Co-authored-by: sriramveeraghanta <veeraghanta.sriram@gmail.com>
2026-08-27 18:43:58 +00:00
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def throttle_auth_redirect(*, is_app=False, is_space=False):
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"""
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Decorator for redirect-flow ``django.views.View`` POST handlers.
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Applies AuthenticationThrottle before the wrapped handler runs; when the
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per-IP budget is exceeded it short-circuits with a RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED
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redirect to the auth error page (the same behaviour every throttled auth
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endpoint uses). The throttle runs before any DB access in the handler, so
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brute-force traffic is rejected without touching the database.
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Pass ``is_app=True`` for /app auth views and ``is_space=True`` for /spaces
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auth views so the redirect targets the correct base host.
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"""
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def decorator(post_method):
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@wraps(post_method)
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def wrapper(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
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if not authentication_throttle_allows(request):
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exc = AuthenticationException(
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error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"],
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error_message="RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED",
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)
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url = get_safe_redirect_url(
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base_url=base_host(request=request, is_app=is_app, is_space=is_space),
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next_path=request.POST.get("next_path"),
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params=exc.get_error_dict(),
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)
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return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
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return post_method(self, request, *args, **kwargs)
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return wrapper
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return decorator
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2025-11-24 15:51:52 +00:00
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class EmailVerificationThrottle(UserRateThrottle):
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"""
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Throttle for email verification code generation.
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Limits to 3 requests per hour per user to prevent abuse.
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"""
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rate = "3/hour"
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scope = "email_verification"
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def throttle_failure_view(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
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try:
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raise AuthenticationException(
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error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"],
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error_message="RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED",
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)
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except AuthenticationException as e:
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return Response(e.get_error_dict(), status=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS)
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