Refactor comments for clarity and consistency across multiple screens and services

- Updated comments in LeadsListScreen, MoreScreen, TaskDetailScreen, TaskFormScreen, TasksListScreen, TicketAnalyticsScreen, TicketDetailScreen, TicketsListScreen, ApiService, AuthService, CrashReporting, DealCard, TicketCard, MultiSelectSheet, KanbanColumn, StageStepper, TicketApprovalPanel, TicketPropertiesCard, and TicketTimePanel to improve readability and maintain a consistent style.
- Adjusted punctuation and phrasing for better flow and understanding.

.env.docker

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ POSTGRES_PASSWORD=postgres_password
 CELERY_BROKER_URL=redis://redis:6379/0
 CELERY_RESULT_BACKEND=redis://redis:6379/0
 
-# Email (console backend in dev — emails print to stdout)
+# Email (console backend in dev: emails print to stdout)
 DEFAULT_FROM_EMAIL=noreply@localhost
 ADMIN_EMAIL=admin@localhost
 ADMIN_PASSWORD=admin

.github/workflows/tests.yml

@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ jobs:
       # These two tests skip when mkdocs is absent, so the backend-tests job
       # (which installs no docs group) cannot run them. Without this step the
       # "no internal artifacts published" guard would silently never execute
-      # in CI — a skip reads as a pass.
+      # in CI. A skip reads as a pass.
       - name: Check docs build guards
         working-directory: backend
         env:

.readthedocs.yaml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Read the Docs build configuration.
 # The docs dependencies live in backend/pyproject.toml's `docs` group so the
-# site builds with uv, exactly as CI does — one dependency source, one lockfile.
+# site builds with uv, exactly as CI does, one dependency source, one lockfile.
 version: 2
 
 build:

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -10,20 +10,20 @@ Thank you for helping improve BottleCRM. Contributions of all sizes are welcome,
 
 ## Development Setup
 
-Full instructions — cloning, Docker, the backend (`uv`), the frontend (`pnpm`), running the mobile app, adding dependencies, and running tests — live in the documentation site under Contributing:
+Full instructions (cloning, Docker, the backend (`uv`), the frontend (`pnpm`), running the mobile app, adding dependencies, and running tests) live in the documentation site under Contributing:
 
-- [Development setup](docs/contributing/development-setup.md) — get all three projects running locally.
+- [Development setup](docs/contributing/development-setup.md). Get all three projects running locally.
-- [Testing](docs/contributing/testing.md) — running the suite, markers, and what CI runs.
+- [Testing](docs/contributing/testing.md), running the suite, markers, and what CI runs.
-- [Code style](docs/contributing/code-style.md) — Python, frontend, and Flutter conventions, and what CI does and doesn't enforce.
+- [Code style](docs/contributing/code-style.md), Python, frontend, and Flutter conventions, and what CI does and doesn't enforce.
-- [Repository layout](docs/contributing/repo-layout.md) — where each part of the codebase lives.
+- [Repository layout](docs/contributing/repo-layout.md), where each part of the codebase lives.
-- [Security rules](docs/contributing/security-rules.md) — the rules this codebase treats as non-negotiable.
+- [Security rules](docs/contributing/security-rules.md). The rules this codebase treats as non-negotiable.
-- [Adding an org-scoped model](docs/contributing/adding-an-org-scoped-model.md) — what a new multi-tenant model needs, including its RLS policy.
+- [Adding an org-scoped model](docs/contributing/adding-an-org-scoped-model.md). What a new multi-tenant model needs, including its RLS policy.
 
 ## Submitting a Pull Request
 
 1. Create a branch from `master` with a descriptive name.
 2. Make focused changes and include tests where appropriate.
-3. Run the relevant development checks — see [Testing](docs/contributing/testing.md) and [Code style](docs/contributing/code-style.md).
+3. Run the relevant development checks. See [Testing](docs/contributing/testing.md) and [Code style](docs/contributing/code-style.md).
 4. Update documentation when behavior, setup, or public APIs change.
 5. Push your branch and open a pull request against `master`.
 

README.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# BottleCRM — Open Source Django CRM for Startups & Enterprises
+# BottleCRM: Open Source Django CRM for Startups & Enterprises
 
 A free, self-hosted, multi-tenant CRM built with Django REST Framework, SvelteKit and Flutter.
 
@@ -11,31 +11,31 @@ A free, self-hosted, multi-tenant CRM built with Django REST Framework, SvelteKi
 ![Coverage](./coverage-badge.svg)
 
 **BottleCRM is an open source CRM you run on your own infrastructure.** It covers the full
-customer lifecycle — leads, accounts, contacts, opportunities, support tickets, tasks and
+customer lifecycle: leads, accounts, contacts, opportunities, support tickets, tasks and
-invoices — through a SvelteKit web app, a native Flutter mobile app, and a documented REST API
+invoices: through a SvelteKit web app, a native Flutter mobile app, and a documented REST API
 sharing one Django backend. PostgreSQL Row-Level Security isolates each organization's data at
 the database layer, so a single deployment serves one startup or hundreds of tenants.
 
-No per-seat pricing, no user caps, no feature paywall. MIT licensed — fork it, self-host it, own
+No per-seat pricing, no user caps, no feature paywall. MIT licensed: fork it, self-host it, own
 your data.
 
 **[Try it free →](https://bottlecrm.io/)** · [Features](https://bottlecrm.io/features) · [Product docs](https://bottlecrm.io/docs) · [Pricing](https://bottlecrm.io/pricing) · [Migrate from Salesforce or HubSpot](https://bottlecrm.io/migration)
 
-(That's the marketing site's product documentation. For the technical documentation — self-hosting, architecture, the API, contributing — see [Documentation](#documentation) below.)
+(That's the marketing site's product documentation. For the technical documentation (self-hosting, architecture, the API, contributing) see [Documentation](#documentation) below.)
 
 ## Why BottleCRM
 
-- **Free forever, MIT licensed** — unlimited users and records, no subscription. A genuinely
+- **Free forever, MIT licensed**: unlimited users and records, no subscription. A genuinely
   self-hosted CRM alternative to Salesforce, HubSpot and Pipedrive.
-- **Multi-tenant by design** — PostgreSQL Row-Level Security enforces tenant isolation in the
+- **Multi-tenant by design**: PostgreSQL Row-Level Security enforces tenant isolation in the
   database, not just in application code. Run it for a single company or as a SaaS for many.
-- **AI agents built in (MCP)** — connect Claude, Cursor, Codex, Gemini or any MCP client and let
+- **AI agents built in (MCP)**: connect Claude, Cursor, Codex, Gemini or any MCP client and let
   it search, create and update records *as you*, inheriting your role, org and permissions.
-- **Web, native mobile and API** — one Django REST backend behind a Svelte 5 web app and a
+- **Web, native mobile and API**: one Django REST backend behind a Svelte 5 web app and a
   Flutter app for iOS and Android.
-- **A stack you can actually hack on** — Django 6 / DRF and Svelte 5, not a bespoke in-house
+- **A stack you can actually hack on**: Django 6 / DRF and Svelte 5, not a bespoke in-house
   framework. If your team writes Python, it can extend this on day one.
-- **Real support tooling** — a full helpdesk with SLA timers, approvals, escalations, macros and
+- **Real support tooling**: a full helpdesk with SLA timers, approvals, escalations, macros and
   a knowledge base, not a bolted-on ticket list.
 
 ## How it compares
@@ -44,9 +44,9 @@ your data.
 |---|---|---|---|
 | **Cost** | Free, unlimited users | Per seat, per month | Free core, often paid tiers |
 | **Hosting** | Self-hosted (managed hosting available) | Vendor cloud only | Self-hosted |
-| **Data ownership** | Total — it is your database | Vendor-controlled | Total |
+| **Data ownership** | Total. It is your database | Vendor-controlled | Total |
 | **Multi-tenancy** | Database-level RLS | Not applicable | Uncommon |
-| **Native mobile app** | Yes — Flutter, iOS + Android | Yes | Uncommon |
+| **Native mobile app** | Yes, Flutter, iOS + Android | Yes | Uncommon |
 | **AI agent access** | Built-in MCP server | Proprietary add-ons | Uncommon |
 | **Stack** | Django REST + SvelteKit | Closed source | Varies |
 | **License** | MIT | Proprietary | Varies, often GPL/AGPL |
@@ -65,14 +65,14 @@ login, loading demo data, and what each service does.
 
 ## Documentation
 
-The full documentation — setup, self-hosting, architecture, the REST API, and contributing — is
+The full documentation (setup, self-hosting, architecture, the REST API, and contributing) is
 built from this repository's [`docs/`](docs/) with MkDocs Material and publishes to Read the Docs
 at <https://bottlecrm.readthedocs.io/>. Four starting points:
 
-- **[Getting started](docs/getting-started/docker-quick-start.md)** — Docker and manual setup, first sign-in, demo data.
+- **[Getting started](docs/getting-started/docker-quick-start.md)**: Docker and manual setup, first sign-in, demo data.
-- **[Self-hosting](docs/self-hosting/requirements.md)** — requirements, production deployment, PostgreSQL and Row-Level Security, backups, security hardening.
+- **[Self-hosting](docs/self-hosting/requirements.md)**: requirements, production deployment, PostgreSQL and Row-Level Security, backups, security hardening.
-- **[API reference](docs/api/conventions.md)** — authentication, conventions, and every documented endpoint.
+- **[API reference](docs/api/conventions.md)**: authentication, conventions, and every documented endpoint.
-- **[Contributing](docs/contributing/development-setup.md)** — local development setup, testing, code style, and how to open a pull request.
+- **[Contributing](docs/contributing/development-setup.md)**: local development setup, testing, code style, and how to open a pull request.
 
 ## Contributing
 

RLS_SETUP.md

@@ -13,5 +13,5 @@ misconfigured role (empty admin lists, data visible across organizations, and mo
 
 This file is kept only so existing links to `RLS_SETUP.md` keep resolving; it is not maintained
 as a setup guide in its own right. Notably, the number of RLS-protected tables cited in earlier
-versions of this file (24) was out of date — the current, verified count is documented on the
+versions of this file (24) was out of date. The current, verified count is documented on the
 linked page rather than repeated here, precisely so this file can't drift out of sync again.

backend/.env.example

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ SENTRY_DSN=""
 CELERY_BROKER_URL="redis://localhost:6379/0"
 CELERY_RESULT_BACKEND="redis://localhost:6379/0"
 
-# Google OAuth (optional — leave blank to disable)
+# Google OAuth (optional: leave blank to disable)
 GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID=""
 GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=""
 

backend/README.md

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ The backend for BottleCRM, a multi-tenant CRM platform built with Django REST Fr
 - **Python 3.10+** (uv installs a matching Python automatically if needed)
 - **PostgreSQL**
 - **Redis** (for Celery)
-- **[uv](https://docs.astral.sh/uv/)** — Python package & venv manager (replaces pip + virtualenv)
+- **[uv](https://docs.astral.sh/uv/)**: Python package & venv manager (replaces pip + virtualenv)
 
 ## Installation
 
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ cd backend
 uv sync
 ```
 
-> Run any backend command with `uv run <cmd>` (e.g. `uv run python manage.py migrate`). uv resolves binaries from `.venv/bin/` automatically — no manual `source .venv/bin/activate` needed (though that still works if you prefer it).
+> Run any backend command with `uv run <cmd>` (e.g. `uv run python manage.py migrate`). uv resolves binaries from `.venv/bin/` automatically, no manual `source .venv/bin/activate` needed (though that still works if you prefer it).
 
 ### 3. Install PDF generation system dependencies
 
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ Every request operates within an organization context:
 - **Organization (Org)**: Top-level tenant container
 - **Users**: Regular members with USER role
 - **Admins**: Organization administrators with ADMIN role
-- **Super Admin**: Users with `is_superuser` set on the user record have platform-wide access. Grant it deliberately (`manage.py createsuperuser` or the Django admin) — it is never inferred from the email address
+- **Super Admin**: Users with `is_superuser` set on the user record have platform-wide access. Grant it deliberately (`manage.py createsuperuser` or the Django admin). It is never inferred from the email address
 
 ### Authentication
 

backend/accounts/migrations/0008_account_is_sample.py

@@ -13,6 +13,6 @@ class Migration(migrations.Migration):
         migrations.AddField(
             model_name='account',
             name='is_sample',
-            field=models.BooleanField(default=False, help_text='True only for demo rows created by common.packs.applier._apply_sample_data. Server-set exclusively — never expose this as a writable field on any serializer. It is the sole key common.packs.applier.clear_sample_data uses to decide what to delete, so a client-writable path here would let a user mark an arbitrary real record as sample and have it deleted.'),
+            field=models.BooleanField(default=False, help_text='True only for demo rows created by common.packs.applier._apply_sample_data. Server-set exclusively, never expose this as a writable field on any serializer. It is the sole key common.packs.applier.clear_sample_data uses to decide what to delete, so a client-writable path here would let a user mark an arbitrary real record as sample and have it deleted.'),
         ),
     ]

backend/accounts/serializer.py

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ class AccountSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
         """What this account is worth, owes and is complaining about.
 
         Computed by `accounts.views.annotate_rollups`, which is applied on the
-        list and detail endpoints. It is deliberately absent — `null` — rather
+        list and detail endpoints. It is deliberately absent, `null`, rather
         than zero-filled anywhere else: a page that was never given the numbers
         should say nothing, not quietly claim every total is zero.
         """
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ class AccountCreateSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
         """Reject negative revenue here rather than letting the database do it.
 
         `Account` carries a `account_revenue_non_negative` CheckConstraint, so
-        the value could never be stored — but with nothing in front of it the
+        the value could never be stored, but with nothing in front of it the
         constraint surfaced as an IntegrityError, i.e. a 500, with no indication
         of which field was at fault. `number_of_employees` is a
         PositiveIntegerField and DRF derives `min_value=0` from it for free,

backend/accounts/tests/test_account_access_and_rollups.py

@@ -4,26 +4,26 @@ Written while wiring `/v2/accounts` to the real API. Every case here failed
 against the code as it stood, or pins a behaviour that was one edit away from
 breaking:
 
-1. `get`, `put`, `patch` and comment `post` compared `request.profile` — a
+1. `get`, `put`, `patch` and comment `post` compared `request.profile`, a
-   Profile — against `account.created_by`, a FK to `User`. Never equal, so the
+   Profile: against `account.created_by`, a FK to `User`. Never equal, so the
    creator branch was unreachable. `delete()` and the list filter compared
    correctly, which is how you can tell: the same non-admin could see an
    account in their own list, be refused permission to open it, and delete it
    anyway.
 2. `users_mention` read `created_by.user.email`. `created_by` *is* the User, so
-   that was an AttributeError — a 500 for every non-admin assignee who opened
+   that was an AttributeError, a 500 for every non-admin assignee who opened
    an account they were legitimately assigned.
 3. Commenting on an id that does not exist raised `DoesNotExist` (500) where
    `get` on the same id answered 404.
 4. `AccountAttachmentView.delete` looked its row up by primary key with no org
    filter. `Attachments` is one generic table shared by every module, so that
-   endpoint deleted any attachment in the database — any org, any parent record.
+   endpoint deleted any attachment in the database, any org, any parent record.
 5. A negative `annual_revenue` reached the CheckConstraint and came back as an
    IntegrityError, i.e. a 500 naming no field.
 6. The account page's money had no source at all. `won_amount`, `open_pipeline`,
    `overdue_amount` and the counts beside them are now annotated in SQL, and
-   the interesting case is an account with several deals *and* several invoices
+   the interesting case is an account with several deals *and* several invoices,
-   — a single `.annotate(Sum(...), Sum(...))` multiplies those together.
+   a single `.annotate(Sum(...), Sum(...))` multiplies those together.
 """
 
 import datetime
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ def _created_by(account, user):
     """Stage a creator.
 
     `BaseModel.save()` overwrites `created_by` from the crum thread-local, so
-    passing it to `create()` does not stick — the row comes back with whoever
+    passing it to `create()` does not stick. The row comes back with whoever
     the request belongs to, or None. `.update()` skips `save()` and is the only
     way to set it. Getting this wrong makes every creator test a false negative:
     the branch under test is simply never entered.
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ class TestAccountVerbsAgree:
     ):
         """`delete` was the verb that was already correct.
 
-        It stays correct — the point of the fix was to bring the other four up
+        It stays correct. The point of the fix was to bring the other four up
         to it, not to take this one away.
         """
         _created_by(account, user_profile.user)
@@ -212,8 +212,8 @@ class TestAccountVerbsAgree:
         """A stranger with a malformed body is still a stranger.
 
         The access check used to sit inside `is_valid()`, so an unauthorised
-        caller was told their payload was bad — a free validity oracle on
+        caller was told their payload was bad, a free validity oracle on
-        somebody else's record — before being refused.
+        somebody else's record, before being refused.
         """
         _created_by(account, admin_user)
         response = user_client.put(
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ class TestMalformedIds:
         """`acc-northwind` is what the v2 fixtures used for ids.
 
         The URL pattern is `<str:pk>`, so the text reaches `UUIDField` and
-        `to_python` raises `ValidationError` — which `get_object_or_404` does
+        `to_python` raises `ValidationError`, which `get_object_or_404` does
         not catch, so every typo and every old link answered 500.
         """
         response = admin_client.get("/api/accounts/acc-northwind/")
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ class TestAccountRollups:
     def test_nothing_is_zero_not_null(self, admin_client, account):
         """An account with no deals, invoices or tickets.
 
-        Each subquery returns no rows at all, and an empty subquery is NULL —
+        Each subquery returns no rows at all, and an empty subquery is NULL,
         so without the Coalesce every figure on a brand new account renders as
         blank rather than zero.
         """
@@ -462,8 +462,8 @@ class TestAccountRollups:
     ):
         """`status == "Overdue"` is a nightly task's opinion, and it lags.
 
-        Keying off the status alone hides money on any day the task has not run
+        Keying off the status alone hides money on any day the task has not run,
-        — which on the seeded database is most of them.
+        which on the seeded database is most of them.
         """
         _invoice(org_a, account, "LATE-1", Decimal("400"), datetime.date(2020, 1, 1))
 

backend/accounts/views.py

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ from tasks.serializer import TaskSerializer
 # worth, what is still in play, what it owes, and what is on fire.
 #
 # These are annotations, never stored columns. A stored total is a total that
-# can be wrong — it goes stale the moment a deal moves or an invoice is paid,
+# can be wrong. It goes stale the moment a deal moves or an invoice is paid,
 # and then the header disagrees with the very rows printed underneath it.
 ROLLUP_FIELDS = (
     "won_amount",
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ def _per_account(model, aggregate, output_field, **filters):
 
     `.values("account").annotate(...)` groups inside the subquery so it yields
     at most one row. When an account has no matching rows it yields *none*, and
-    an empty subquery is NULL rather than zero — which is why every caller
+    an empty subquery is NULL rather than zero, which is why every caller
     wraps this in a `Coalesce`. Zero and "no invoices at all" look identical to
     a reader of the page, and should.
     """
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ def annotate_rollups(queryset):
     }
 
     return queryset.annotate(
-        # Booked revenue — deals actually won. Not cash collected; the invoices
+        # Booked revenue: deals actually won. Not cash collected; the invoices
         # tell that story and are counted separately below.
         won_amount=Coalesce(
             _per_account(Opportunity, Sum("amount"), MONEY, **won), zero
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ def annotate_rollups(queryset):
         ),
         # Past due and still owed. The due date is the fact; the "Overdue"
         # status is a nightly task's opinion about that fact, and can be a day
-        # behind it — see UNPAID_STATUSES.
+        # behind it. See UNPAID_STATUSES.
         overdue_amount=Coalesce(
             _per_account(Invoice, Sum("amount_due"), MONEY, **past_due), zero
         ),
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ class AccountDetailView(APIView):
     def get_object(self, pk):
         # A malformed id is 404, not 500. The URL pattern is `<str:pk>`, so an
         # old bookmark or a typo reaches the UUID field as text, and
-        # `UUIDField.to_python` raises `ValidationError` — which
+        # `UUIDField.to_python` raises `ValidationError`, which
         # `get_object_or_404` does not catch, because it only knows about
         # `DoesNotExist`. "That is not an id" and "no such account" are the
         # same answer to whoever asked.
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ class AccountDetailView(APIView):
         """Admins, the person who created it, and anyone assigned. Else 403.
 
         One check, because there were four and they disagreed. `get`, `put`,
-        `patch` and comment `post` each compared `request.profile` — a Profile —
+        `patch` and comment `post` each compared `request.profile`, a Profile,
         against `account.created_by`, which is a FK to `User`. Those are never
         equal, so the creator branch could not fire and creators were locked out
         of their own accounts.
@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ class AccountDetailView(APIView):
         elif self.request.profile.user_id != self.account.created_by_id:
             # `created_by` IS the User. Reading `created_by.user.email` raised
             # AttributeError and returned a 500 to every non-admin assignee who
-            # opened an account — and the branch was reached every time, because
+            # opened an account, and the branch was reached every time, because
             # the Profile-vs-User comparison above it was never equal.
             #
             # The key is `user__email`, matching the admin branch. It used to be
@@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ class AccountDetailView(APIView):
     def post(self, request, pk, **kwargs):
         data = request.data
         context = {}
-        # `Account.objects.get()` raised DoesNotExist — a 500 — for an id that
+        # `Account.objects.get()` raised DoesNotExist, a 500, for an id that
         # simply is not there, while GET on the same id answered 404. Commenting
         # on a deleted account is a normal race, not a server fault.
         self.account_obj = self.get_object(pk=pk)
@@ -976,7 +976,7 @@ class AccountAttachmentView(APIView):
     @extend_schema(tags=["Accounts"], parameters=swagger_params.organization_params)
     def delete(self, request, pk, format=None):
         # Scoped to the caller's org. `Attachments` is one generic table shared
-        # by every module, and this looked the row up by primary key alone — so
+        # by every module, and this looked the row up by primary key alone, so
         # the endpoint would delete any attachment in the database, belonging to
         # any organisation, hanging off any kind of record. RLS is the only
         # thing that stood between that and a cross-tenant delete, and RLS is
@@ -1027,7 +1027,7 @@ class AccountCreateMailView(APIView):
         # Org-scoped: unscoped, this would let anyone send mail recorded as
         # coming *from* another organisation's account.
         #
-        # Note this endpoint cannot currently succeed at all — `EmailSerializer`
+        # Note this endpoint cannot currently succeed at all; `EmailSerializer`
         # does not accept the `request_obj` kwarg the line below passes it, so
         # every request dies with a TypeError before reaching any of this. The
         # scoping is here so it is not missing when somebody revives the

backend/business_hours/calendar.py

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ def add_business_hours(start_dt: datetime, hours: float, calendar) -> datetime:
     ``calendar`` is a ``BusinessCalendar`` instance, or ``None`` to fall back
     to 24/7 wall-clock arithmetic. Holidays attached to the calendar are
     skipped (full days off, in the calendar's timezone). The result preserves
-    the input timezone — a UTC ``start_dt`` returns a UTC-aware datetime even
+    the input timezone. A UTC ``start_dt`` returns a UTC-aware datetime even
     if the calendar lives in another zone.
     """
     if hours is None:

backend/business_hours/models.py

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ class BusinessHoliday(BaseModel):
     """A single full-day off on a calendar (national holiday, company day off).
 
     Holidays are date-based and apply for the entire day in the calendar's
-    timezone — partial-day holidays are out of scope for v1.
+    timezone. Partial-day holidays are out of scope for v1.
     """
 
     calendar = models.ForeignKey(

backend/business_hours/tests/test_api.py

@@ -196,6 +196,6 @@ class TestOrgContextRequired:
         request = APIRequestFactory().get(CALENDAR_URL)
         force_authenticate(request, user=admin_user)
         # This direct-call path skips the middleware that sets request.profile,
-        # so the request has no org context — exactly what HasOrgContext guards.
+        # so the request has no org context, exactly what HasOrgContext guards.
         response = BusinessCalendarView.as_view()(request)
         assert response.status_code == 403

backend/business_hours/tests/test_calendar.py

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ class TestAddBusinessHours:
         assert result == datetime(2026, 5, 11, 11, 0, tzinfo=_UTC)
 
     def test_skip_holiday(self, calendar_a, holiday_factory):
-        # Make Mon 5/11 a holiday — Mon's 8 hours move to Tue
+        # Make Mon 5/11 a holiday, Mon's 8 hours move to Tue
         holiday_factory(calendar_a, date=date(2026, 5, 11), name="Founders Day")
         start = datetime(2026, 5, 11, 10, 0, tzinfo=_UTC)
         result = add_business_hours(start, 4, calendar_a)

backend/business_hours/views.py

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
 """REST endpoints for the business-hours settings page.
 
 Routes (all under /api/business-hours/):
-    GET  /calendar/                       — fetch (and create-on-demand) the
+    GET  /calendar/: fetch (and create-on-demand) the
                                             org's default calendar with its
                                             holidays.
-    PUT  /calendar/<pk>/                  — admin update of weekday hours,
+    PUT  /calendar/<pk>/: admin update of weekday hours,
                                             timezone, name. Holidays are
                                             managed via the nested endpoints
                                             below to keep payloads small.
-    POST /calendar/<pk>/holidays/         — add a single holiday.
+    POST /calendar/<pk>/holidays/: add a single holiday.
-    DELETE /calendar/<pk>/holidays/<hid>/ — remove a single holiday.
+    DELETE /calendar/<pk>/holidays/<hid>/, remove a single holiday.
 """
 
 from datetime import time

backend/cases/access.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-"""Who may do what to a case — one place, three rules.
+"""Who may do what to a case, one place, three rules.
 
 Before this module the question was answered in five places and had drifted
 into three different answers:
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ into three different answers:
 * `CaseListView` and `watcher_views._visible_cases_qs` said **admin, creator,
   assignee or watcher**.
 * `CaseDetailView.get` / `.put` / `.patch` / `.post` and
-  `CaseActivityListView` said **admin, creator or assignee** — no watcher.
+  `CaseActivityListView` said **admin, creator or assignee**, no watcher.
-* `CaseDetailView.delete` said **admin or creator** — no assignee either.
+* `CaseDetailView.delete` said **admin or creator**, no assignee either.
 
 The visible consequence was a queue that lied. A watcher's ticket list showed
 the one case they follow; opening it answered 403. That is the same shape of
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ deleting are three rules on three lines, deliberately not one:
     write   admin · creator · assignee
     delete  admin · creator
 
-Watching is subscribing to a ticket, not being handed the keys to it — so the
+Watching is subscribing to a ticket, not being handed the keys to it, so the
 watcher clause that was missing from reads is not quietly added to writes.
 """
 
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ def is_org_admin(profile):
 
 
 def visible_cases_qs(profile):
-    """Cases ``profile`` is allowed to open — the queryset form of `read`.
+    """Cases ``profile`` is allowed to open. The queryset form of `read`.
 
     The watcher clause is what lets somebody keep following a ticket after
     they are unassigned, and it is the clause the detail view was missing.
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ def get_case_or_404(profile, pk):
     """Fetch a case in the requester's org, or raise ``Http404``.
 
     ``Case.id`` is a UUID column, so ``filter(id="nobody")`` raises Django's
-    ``ValidationError`` rather than returning nothing — which surfaced as a
+    ``ValidationError`` rather than returning nothing, which surfaced as a
     500 on every verb for any id that was not a well-formed UUID. A bad id is
     a request for a case that does not exist; that is a 404.
     """

backend/cases/analytics.py

@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ def case_ids_for_metric(
         )
 
     if metric == "backlog":
-        # Bucket is a YYYY-MM-DD date — return cases open at end of that day.
+        # Bucket is a YYYY-MM-DD date. Return cases open at end of that day.
         if not bucket:
             raise ValueError("backlog drilldown requires a bucket=YYYY-MM-DD")
         target = date.fromisoformat(bucket)
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ def case_ids_for_metric(
 # whole "service health" page in one admin-only call so the frontend does not
 # fan out five requests. Elapsed times are wall-clock, consistent with the
 # compute_* functions above (business hours inform SLA *deadlines*, not the
-# elapsed math here — the same caveat the rest of this module already lives
+# elapsed math here, the same caveat the rest of this module already lives
 # with). The caller admin-gates this, so `qs` is the full org queryset with no
 # per-user visibility narrowing.
 
@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ def _business_hours_state(org_id) -> tuple[Optional[str], bool]:
 
     Mirrors the SLA engine's own fallback (`business_hours.calendar`): no
     calendar, or a calendar with no open weekday window, means 24/7
-    wall-clock — reported here as not-applied with a null name.
+    wall-clock, reported here as not-applied with a null name.
     """
     from business_hours.calendar import get_default_calendar
 
@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ def _first_response_by_priority(created_rows, now) -> list[dict]:
     for _id, created_at, first_response_at, sla_hours, priority, _ctype in created_rows:
         bucket = per.get(priority)
         if bucket is None:
-            # Unknown priority string — skip rather than invent a column.
+            # Unknown priority string: skip rather than invent a column.
             continue
         _accumulate_frt(bucket, created_at, first_response_at, sla_hours, now)
 
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ def _agent_table(qs, from_dt, to_dt, now) -> list[dict]:
         if pid is not None:
             _accumulate_frt(bucket(pid), created_at, fra, sla_hours, now)
 
-    # Unassigned bucket — explicit isnull filters (see docstring).
+    # Unassigned bucket: explicit isnull filters (see docstring).
     un = {"open": 0, "closed_this_week": 0, "frt_minutes": [], "breached": 0, "met": 0}
     un["open"] = open_qs.filter(assigned_to__isnull=True).count()
     un["closed_this_week"] = closed_week_qs.filter(assigned_to__isnull=True).count()

backend/cases/analytics_views.py

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ def _filtered_qs(request) -> tuple[object, datetime, datetime]:
     """Build the org-scoped Case queryset + (from, to) window from query params.
 
     Visibility: admins see every case; non-admins see only those they
-    created, are assigned to, or watch — mirrors `CaseListView.get_queryset`.
+    created, are assigned to, or watch. Mirrors `CaseListView.get_queryset`.
     """
     profile = request.profile
     params = request.query_params
@@ -140,8 +140,8 @@ class AnalyticsServiceView(_AnalyticsBaseView):
 
     Returns org-wide service KPIs (totals, per-day volume, first-response
     attainment by priority, case-type mix, per-agent table). Unlike the
-    per-metric endpoints above — which narrow a non-admin to their own cases
+    per-metric endpoints above, which narrow a non-admin to their own cases
-    and would therefore show a personal slice under org-wide headings — this
+    and would therefore show a personal slice under org-wide headings. This
     view is an org-aggregate management surface, so it 403s non-admins outright
     (mirrors the invoices/reports policy for whole-org figures).
     """
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ class AnalyticsDrilldownView(_AnalyticsBaseView):
         return Response({"count": len(data), "results": data})
 
 
-# CSV columns kept tight on purpose — analyst pivots externally.
+# CSV columns kept tight on purpose: analyst pivots externally.
 _CSV_COLUMNS = (
     ("id", "ID"),
     ("name", "Name"),

backend/cases/approval_views.py

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Two flavors of endpoint live here:
 Each transition writes a ``common.Activity`` row using the verbs registered in
 ``common/models.Activity.ACTION_CHOICES`` (``APPROVAL_REQUESTED``,
 ``APPROVED``, ``REJECTED``, ``APPROVAL_CANCELLED``). Two approvers cannot
-double-approve the same row — every transition takes a row lock first.
+double-approve the same row. Every transition takes a row lock first.
 """
 
 from __future__ import annotations
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ class ApprovalRuleDetailView(APIView):
                 {"error": True, "errors": "Rule not found"},
                 status=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
             )
-        # Hard delete is fine — Approval.rule is on_delete=PROTECT, so any
+        # Hard delete is fine. Approval.rule is on_delete=PROTECT, so any
         # historical request keeps the rule alive automatically.
         if rule.requests.exists():
             # Soft-disable instead of hard-delete when there is history.
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ class ApprovalRuleDetailView(APIView):
 
 
 class CaseRequestApprovalView(APIView):
-    """``POST /api/cases/<pk>/request-approval/`` — agent fires a new request."""
+    """``POST /api/cases/<pk>/request-approval/``, agent fires a new request."""
 
     permission_classes = (IsAuthenticated, HasOrgContext)
 
@@ -280,11 +280,11 @@ class CaseRequestApprovalView(APIView):
 
 
 class ApprovalInboxView(APIView):
-    """``GET /api/cases/approvals/`` — list approvals.
+    """``GET /api/cases/approvals/``, list approvals.
 
     Query params:
-      * ``state`` (default ``pending``) — filter by state, or ``all`` to drop the filter.
+      * ``state`` (default ``pending``): filter by state, or ``all`` to drop the filter.
-      * ``mine`` (``true``/``false``) — when true, restrict to approvals the
+      * ``mine`` (``true``/``false``), when true, restrict to approvals the
         caller can act on (in rule.approvers OR matches rule.approver_role).
     """
 
@@ -322,8 +322,8 @@ class ApprovalInboxView(APIView):
         )
         rows = list(qs)
         if mine:
-            # "Mine" = rows I can act on right now, which — like the approve
+            # "Mine" = rows I can act on right now, which, like the approve
-            # endpoint — excludes requests I filed myself (separation of duties).
+            # endpoint, excludes requests I filed myself (separation of duties).
             profile = request.profile
             rows = [
                 a

backend/cases/approvals.py

@@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ Tier 3 approval workflows.
 
 Two org-scoped models live here:
 
-* ``ApprovalRule`` — admin-configurable predicate. When an active rule matches
+* ``ApprovalRule``: admin-configurable predicate. When an active rule matches
   a case (priority + case_type + team filters), the close transition is gated
   until an ``Approval`` row in state ``approved`` exists.
-* ``Approval`` — one row per request. State machine:
+* ``Approval``: one row per request. State machine:
   ``pending`` -> ``approved`` | ``rejected`` | ``cancelled``.
 
 Both models follow ``COORDINATION_DECISIONS.md`` D2: inherit ``BaseModel`` and
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ from common.utils import CASE_TYPE, PRIORITY_CHOICE
 
 
 # Approver roles. Mirrors the spec's ``ADMIN``/``MANAGER`` choices even though
-# the project's ``Profile.role`` only knows ``ADMIN``/``USER`` today — keeping
+# the project's ``Profile.role`` only knows ``ADMIN``/``USER`` today, keeping
 # ``MANAGER`` as a reserved value avoids a future schema change when the role
 # model expands. Today, MANAGER simply matches no profiles.
 APPROVER_ROLE_CHOICES = (

backend/cases/bulk_views.py

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ class BulkDeleteCasesView(APIView):
             )
         org = request.profile.org
         # Snapshot the cases so we can emit Activity rows after the bulk update
-        # — queryset.update() bypasses signals.
+        #; queryset.update() bypasses signals.
         qs = Case.objects.filter(pk__in=ids, org=org, is_active=True)
         target_cases = list(qs.values("id", "name"))
         deleted_count = qs.update(is_active=False)

backend/cases/csat_views.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-"""CSAT endpoints — public (token-scoped) + internal (aggregate).
+"""CSAT endpoints, public (token-scoped) + internal (aggregate).
 
 The public GET/POST pair is hit anonymously from a customer's email link.
 There is no agent JWT, no portal session, and we deliberately do not
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ class PublicCsatView(APIView):
             window_close = survey.responded_at + timedelta(hours=EDIT_WINDOW_HOURS)
             if timezone.now() >= window_close:
                 return Response(
-                    {"error": "Survey is locked — edit window has closed."},
+                    {"error": "Survey is locked. Edit window has closed."},
                     status=drf_status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT,
                 )
 

backend/cases/escalation_views.py

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ def _breach_counts_last_30d(org):
     """Count SLA breaches per priority among cases OPENED in the last 30 days.
 
     The escalation page shows these under each priority's policy AND, crucially,
-    keeps showing them when the policy is dead (off, or no recipient) — that is
+    keeps showing them when the policy is dead (off, or no recipient). That is
     the entire point of the screen ("breaches told nobody"). So this cannot be
     sourced from the ``ESCALATED`` Activity log: ``scan_for_breached_cases``
     records an activity only when a policy actually acts (active + a target set),
@@ -63,12 +63,12 @@ def _breach_counts_last_30d(org):
 
     Anchored on ``created_at`` (a standard SLA cohort framing) so the scan stays
     bounded and index-friendly. Not captured: a case opened before the window
-    whose deadline slipped inside it via a long Pending pause — rare; noted, not
+    whose deadline slipped inside it via a long Pending pause, rare; noted, not
     counted.
     """
     now = timezone.now()
     cutoff = now - timedelta(days=BREACH_WINDOW_DAYS)
-    # One calendar for the whole org — resolved once, not per case.
+    # One calendar for the whole org: resolved once, not per case.
     calendar = get_default_calendar(org.id)
     counts = {}
     qs = Case.objects.filter(org=org, is_active=True, created_at__gte=cutoff)
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ class EscalationPolicyDetailView(APIView):
                 {"error": True, "errors": "Escalation policy not found"},
                 status=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
             )
-        # `priority` is the natural key — disallow changing it post-create
+        # `priority` is the natural key. Disallow changing it post-create
         # (would collide with the (org, priority) unique constraint anyway).
         data = {k: v for k, v in request.data.items() if k != "priority"}
         serializer = EscalationPolicySerializer(

backend/cases/inbound/parser.py

@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ def _extract_bodies(msg: StdlibEmailMessage) -> tuple[str, str]:
                 continue
             try:
                 content = part.get_content()
-            except Exception:  # pragma: no cover — corrupted MIME
+            except Exception:  # pragma: no cover, corrupted MIME
                 continue
             if not isinstance(content, str):
                 continue

backend/cases/inbound/pipeline.py

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Given a parsed email and the mailbox it arrived on, decide:
   2. Does it belong to an existing Case (threading match)?
   3. Otherwise: who's the contact, and we create a new Case.
 
-Always records exactly one `EmailMessage` row — even drops — so admins have a
+Always records exactly one `EmailMessage` row, even drops, so admins have a
 forensic trail.
 """
 
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ def ingest(parsed: ParsedEmail, mailbox: InboundMailbox) -> IngestResult:
 
     Wraps DB writes in a transaction so a partial run leaves no half-written
     Case behind. Webhooks should ack with 200 even when this returns
-    `dropped=True` — the provider already accepted the message and a 4xx
+    `dropped=True`: the provider already accepted the message and a 4xx
     would just trigger pointless retries.
     """
     drop, reason = should_drop(parsed)
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ def ingest(parsed: ParsedEmail, mailbox: InboundMailbox) -> IngestResult:
         )
 
     if not parsed.message_id:
-        # Treat a missing Message-ID as an auto_submitted-style drop — without
+        # Treat a missing Message-ID as an auto_submitted-style drop. Without
         # one we can't thread or de-dupe, and legitimate human-sent mail always
         # has it. Fabricate a synthetic id for the audit row.
         synthetic_id = f"missing-msgid-{mailbox.id}-{parsed.received_at.isoformat()}"

backend/cases/inbound/sns.py

@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ Three controls keep that pinning honest (CodeQL `py/full-ssrf` #27/#28):
   fetch; following a 3xx would land us somewhere never checked. `_OPENER`
   surfaces the redirect as an error instead of chasing it.
 * **Strict TLS.** The fetch uses an explicit default-verifying SSL context, so
-  transport trust is anchored to the CA store and can't silently degrade. This
+  transport trust is anchored to the CA store and can't silently degrade. This,
-  — not the signing cert's own issuer chain — is what proves the PEM really
+  not the signing cert's own issuer chain, is what proves the PEM really
   came from AWS.
 * **Certificate validation.** The fetched cert must be inside its validity
   window and carry a subject CN in the same SNS host family, so a stale or
@@ -147,8 +147,8 @@ def _fetch_signing_cert(url: str, *, timeout: float = 5.0) -> bytes:
     if not parsed.path.endswith(".pem"):
         raise SNSVerificationError(f"SigningCertURL must end in .pem: {url!r}")
     # `_OPENER` refuses redirects, so the host checked above is the host we talk
-    # to — the pinning cannot be sidestepped by a 3xx.
+    # to. The pinning cannot be sidestepped by a 3xx.
-    with _OPENER.open(url, timeout=timeout) as response:  # noqa: S310 — host pinned
+    with _OPENER.open(url, timeout=timeout) as response:  # noqa: S310. Host pinned
         return response.read()
 
 
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ def verify_sns_message(
     try:
         cert = load_pem_x509_certificate(cert_bytes)
     except ValueError as exc:
-        # Malformed PEM is an attacker-shaped input, not a server fault — a 403
+        # Malformed PEM is an attacker-shaped input, not a server fault. A 403
         # from the caller beats a 500.
         raise SNSVerificationError(
             f"Signing certificate is not valid PEM: {exc}"
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ def verify_sns_message(
         )
     except InvalidSignature as exc:
         raise SNSVerificationError("Signature does not match") from exc
-    except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover — non-RSA cert is impossible in practice
+    except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover. Non-RSA cert is impossible in practice
         raise SNSVerificationError(f"Verification failed: {exc}") from exc
 
 
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ def confirm_subscription(payload: dict, *, fetch=None, timeout: float = 5.0) ->
     # stays the single place redirect policy is decided.
     fetch = fetch or _OPENER.open
     try:
-        with fetch(url, timeout=timeout) as response:  # noqa: S310 — host pinned
+        with fetch(url, timeout=timeout) as response:  # noqa: S310. Host pinned
             response.read()
     except Exception:
         logger.exception("Failed to confirm SNS subscription at %s", url)

backend/cases/inbound/threading.py

@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ def find_existing_case(parsed: ParsedEmail, org) -> Optional[Case]:
     return None
 
 
-# A tiny helper used by the pipeline when a brand-new Case is created — the
+# A tiny helper used by the pipeline when a brand-new Case is created. The
 # Case.external_thread_id should be the Message-ID of the email that birthed it.
 def short_case_id(case: Case) -> str:
     """8-char prefix used in subject-line fallback threading."""

backend/cases/inbound_views.py

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 """Inbound email webhook + admin mailbox CRUD endpoints.
 
 The webhook is intentionally public (no auth). Trust rests on two checks, and
-it takes both — the signature alone is not enough:
+it takes both. The signature alone is not enough:
 
 1. `verify_sns_message` proves the payload was signed by AWS SNS. That rules
    out arbitrary JSON posted at the URL, but note what it does *not* prove:
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ it takes both — the signature alone is not enough:
    says the message came from *some* topic in *some* account.
 2. The TopicArn pin (`InboundMailbox.topic_arn`) proves it came from *this
    mailbox's* topic. Without it, anyone who learned a mailbox UUID could point
-   their own SNS topic here and have AWS sign forged mail for them — which,
+   their own SNS topic here and have AWS sign forged mail for them, which,
    because the pipeline threads replies onto existing cases, means injecting
    messages into live customer conversations, not just spam tickets.
 
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ def _mailbox_analytics(org):
       at the address for an older case is not a new ticket, so we anchor on the
       case's ``created_at``).
     - ``last_received_at`` per mailbox = the newest inbound message's
-      ``received_at`` (any message, including dropped ones — the address still
+      ``received_at`` (any message, including dropped ones, the address still
       received mail).
     - org ``cases_last_30d`` = distinct such cases across all mailboxes (not a
       sum, so a case cross-posted to two addresses is not double counted).
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ def _admin_required():
 
 
 def _topic_rejected():
-    """Deliberately as opaque as the signature failure — a caller probing the
+    """Deliberately as opaque as the signature failure. A caller probing the
     webhook shouldn't learn whether a mailbox is pinned or to what."""
     return Response(
         {"error": True, "errors": "Signature verification failed"},
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ class InboundMailboxWebhookView(APIView):
     """Public endpoint where AWS SNS POSTs for one configured mailbox.
 
     URL: `/api/cases/inbound/<mailbox_id>/`. The mailbox lookup also acts as
-    the org boundary — the URL embeds the per-mailbox UUID so the webhook
+    the org boundary, the URL embeds the per-mailbox UUID so the webhook
     can't be confused for one belonging to a different tenant.
     """
 
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ class InboundMailboxWebhookView(APIView):
                 status=status.HTTP_501_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
             )
 
-        # SNS posts the JSON body in `request.body` — DRF may have parsed it.
+        # SNS posts the JSON body in `request.body`. DRF may have parsed it.
         try:
             payload = (
                 request.data
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ class InboundMailboxWebhookView(APIView):
                 )
             return Response({"ok": True, "subscribed": True})
 
-        if msg_type == "UnsubscribeConfirmation":  # pragma: no cover — informational
+        if msg_type == "UnsubscribeConfirmation":  # pragma: no cover: informational
             logger.info("SNS unsubscribe for mailbox=%s", mailbox.id)
             return Response({"ok": True, "unsubscribed": True})
 

backend/cases/kb_access.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-"""Who may do what to a knowledge-base article — three rules, beside the
+"""Who may do what to a knowledge-base article, three rules, beside the
 three in `cases.access` and for the same reason.
 
 Before this module the Solution endpoints had **no authorization at all**.
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ profile: `PATCH` a colleague's article 200, `POST .../publish/` 200,
     delete    author · admin
 
 **Why `release` is narrower than `write`.** The model already carries a review
-workflow — draft → reviewed → approved, plus a separate `is_published` — and
+workflow (draft → reviewed → approved, plus a separate `is_published`), and
 the whole point of it is that somebody other than the writer says the answer is
 right before customers are shown it. If the author can approve their own
 article the workflow is theatre; the rules, the states and the UI would all
@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ hypothetical shape of bug for this codebase.
 
 `read` is deliberately absent: every member of the org may read every article.
 A knowledge base whose articles are hidden from the agents answering the
-tickets is not a knowledge base. `is_published` is not an access rule either —
+tickets is not a knowledge base. `is_published` is not an access rule either.
-it is the customer-visibility switch, and the customer-facing site it gates was
+It is the customer-visibility switch, and the customer-facing site it gates was
 explicitly cut (see `kb_views`), so today it gates the agent suggester only.
 """
 
@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ def get_solution_or_404(profile, pk):
 
     ``Solution.id`` is a UUID column, so ``filter(pk="nobody")`` raises
     Django's ``ValidationError`` instead of returning nothing. The views
-    caught ``Solution.DoesNotExist`` and nothing else, so every verb — read,
+    caught ``Solution.DoesNotExist`` and nothing else, so every verb. Read,
-    update, delete, publish, unpublish — answered 500 for any id that was not
+    update, delete, publish, unpublish. Answered 500 for any id that was not
     a well-formed UUID. A bad id names an article that does not exist.
     """
     try:

backend/cases/kb_views.py

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 """Agent-facing knowledge-base helpers.
 
 The full kb-frontend spec calls for a customer-facing KB site too. We
-ship only the agent-side suggester here — see
+ship only the agent-side suggester here. See
 docs/cases/tier2/IMPLEMENTATION_STATUS.md "kb-frontend" section for the
 deliberate cut. The endpoint feeds the comment composer's typeahead.
 """
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ class SolutionSuggestionsView(APIView):
     """`GET /api/cases/<pk>/solution-suggestions/?q=&limit=`.
 
     Returns the top N published solutions in the same org whose title or
-    description matches the search term. `?q=` is optional — when blank,
+    description matches the search term. `?q=` is optional, when blank,
     the case's own name + description seed the search so the panel is
     useful on first focus.
     """
@@ -93,8 +93,8 @@ class SolutionSuggestionsView(APIView):
         else:
             # Seed from the case so the panel is useful on first focus. If
             # there are no seed terms, or the seed-term filter produces zero
-            # matches, fall back to the most-recent published solutions —
+            # matches, fall back to the most-recent published solutions.
-            # the agent should always see *something* on first focus.
+            # The agent should always see *something* on first focus.
             terms = _seed_terms(case)
             results = []
             if terms:

backend/cases/migrations/0018_case_resolved_idx.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Resolution-window scans for MTTR / SLA breach aggregations — see
+# Resolution-window scans for MTTR / SLA breach aggregations. See
 # docs/cases/tier2/reporting.md "Data model changes". The existing
 # (org, -created_at) index doesn't cover queries that filter by resolved_at.
 

backend/cases/migrations/0026_case_is_sample.py

@@ -13,6 +13,6 @@ class Migration(migrations.Migration):
         migrations.AddField(
             model_name='case',
             name='is_sample',
-            field=models.BooleanField(default=False, help_text='True only for demo rows created by common.packs.applier._apply_sample_data. Server-set exclusively — never expose this as a writable field on any serializer. It is the sole key common.packs.applier.clear_sample_data uses to decide what to delete, so a client-writable path here would let a user mark an arbitrary real record as sample and have it deleted.'),
+            field=models.BooleanField(default=False, help_text='True only for demo rows created by common.packs.applier._apply_sample_data. Server-set exclusively, never expose this as a writable field on any serializer. It is the sole key common.packs.applier.clear_sample_data uses to decide what to delete, so a client-writable path here would let a user mark an arbitrary real record as sample and have it deleted.'),
         ),
     ]

backend/cases/models.py

@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ class Case(AssignableMixin, BaseModel):
         """Auto-set SLA values based on priority for new cases."""
         from .workflow import DEFAULT_FIRST_RESPONSE_SLA, DEFAULT_RESOLUTION_SLA
 
-        # Use `_state.adding` rather than `not self.pk` — BaseModel populates
+        # Use `_state.adding` rather than `not self.pk`, BaseModel populates
         # `id` with a UUID default at __init__, so `self.pk` is truthy long
         # before the first INSERT.
         if self._state.adding:
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ class Case(AssignableMixin, BaseModel):
             return None
         deadline = add_business_hours(self.created_at, hours, self._sla_calendar())
         # Customer wait time accumulated while Pending shifts the deadline
-        # forward verbatim — we don't try to walk this through business hours
+        # forward verbatim. We don't try to walk this through business hours
         # again because it represents real elapsed time the agent had to wait,
         # not a target that respects the calendar.
         paused = self.sla_paused_seconds or 0
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ class CaseWatcher(BaseModel):
     """A profile subscribed to updates on a case.
 
     Per `docs/cases/COORDINATION_DECISIONS.md` D2 we inherit BaseModel and
-    declare our own org FK rather than using BaseOrgModel — RLS still
+    declare our own org FK rather than using BaseOrgModel. RLS still
     applies via the migration that adds the `case_watcher` table.
     """
 
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ class TimeEntry(BaseModel):
     Per `docs/cases/COORDINATION_DECISIONS.md` D2 we inherit BaseModel and
     declare our own org FK; RLS is enforced via the migration policy. The
     `one_active_timer_per_profile` partial unique index guarantees a profile
-    cannot have two running timers concurrently — the start endpoint relies
+    cannot have two running timers concurrently. The start endpoint relies
     on this constraint as a race-defense in addition to its own existence
     check.
     """

backend/cases/notifications.py

@@ -42,14 +42,14 @@ def case_link(case_id) -> str:
 
     The model and this app call them cases; every client calls them tickets
     and routes them at `/tickets/<id>`. This used to emit `/cases/<id>`, which
-    no client has ever served — the SvelteKit app has no `/cases` route at
+    no client has ever served. The SvelteKit app has no `/cases` route at
     all, and its notification panel assigns `link` straight to
     `window.location.href`, so every notification ever sent landed on a 404.
 
     It lives in one function because the fix belongs here rather than in the
     readers: the same rows are consumed by the web panel, the notifications
     page and the Flutter client, and a rewrite in each of them is three places
-    to forget. `Notification.link` is a client path, not an API path — do not
+    to forget. `Notification.link` is a client path, not an API path. Do not
     prefix it with `/api/`.
     """
     return f"/tickets/{case_id}"
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ def dispatch_for_comment(comment, case, actor: Profile | None = None) -> dict:
         )
         mentioned.append(p)
 
-    # Fan out `case.commented` to remaining watchers — exclude actor and
+    # Fan out `case.commented` to remaining watchers, exclude actor and
     # anyone who just got `case.mentioned` (they don't need both for the
     # same comment).
     skip_ids = {p.id for p in mentioned}

backend/cases/parent_views.py

@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ Parent/child case endpoints (Tier 3 parent-child).
 
 Three endpoints over and above what `CaseDetailView` already exposes:
 
-* ``GET  /api/cases/<pk>/tree/``                   — descendant tree, max depth 3.
+* ``GET  /api/cases/<pk>/tree/``: descendant tree, max depth 3.
-* ``POST /api/cases/<pk>/link/``                   — set/clear parent with explicit audit row.
+* ``POST /api/cases/<pk>/link/``: set/clear parent with explicit audit row.
-* ``POST /api/cases/<pk>/close-with-children/``    — close parent and (optionally) cascade-close descendants.
+* ``POST /api/cases/<pk>/close-with-children/``: close parent and (optionally) cascade-close descendants.
 
 The link endpoint takes a row lock on both rows so two concurrent agents cannot
 build a cycle. Cascade close honours ``Org.auto_close_children_on_parent_close``

backend/cases/routing.py

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ creates a Case. It runs inside the caller's transaction, so the assignment is
 committed atomically with the Case row.
 
 `dry_run=True` runs the same matching/strategy logic but does NOT mutate
-state — used by the `test/` API endpoint to preview which agent a sample Case
+state, used by the `test/` API endpoint to preview which agent a sample Case
 would route to.
 """
 
@@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ def _match_condition(case_data: dict, condition: dict) -> bool:
     op = condition.get("op", "eq")
     value = condition.get("value")
     if op not in SUPPORTED_OPS:
-        logger.warning("RoutingRule unknown op %r — skipping condition", op)
+        logger.warning("RoutingRule unknown op %r. Skipping condition", op)
         return False
     if not (f in SUPPORTED_FIELDS or f.startswith("custom_fields.")):
-        logger.warning("RoutingRule unknown field %r — skipping condition", f)
+        logger.warning("RoutingRule unknown field %r. Skipping condition", f)
         return False
     actual = _resolve_field(case_data, f)
 
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ def _round_robin(rule: RoutingRule, pool: list[Profile], dry_run: bool) -> Profi
 
 
 def _case_to_dict(case) -> dict:
-    """Snapshot the fields the engine reads — keeps real Case + synthetic
+    """Snapshot the fields the engine reads. Keeps real Case + synthetic
     dicts behind the same shape.
 
     The inbound pipeline attaches `_routing_mailbox_id` and

backend/cases/routing_views.py

@@ -30,12 +30,12 @@ def _routing_analytics(org):
     """Per-rule match counts + the org's unrouted count over the last 30 days.
 
     Both read from the ``ROUTED`` Activity log the engine writes on every match
-    (``cases.routing._apply``) — one row per rule that fired on a case, written
+    (``cases.routing._apply``), one row per rule that fired on a case, written
     even when the matched rule had an empty pool or a missing team. That log
     records the whole population the page needs (unlike escalation's ESCALATED
     log), so there is no fork: ``matched_last_30d`` is a straight count per
     ``rule_id`` and ``unrouted_last_30d`` is the cases that got no ROUTED row at
-    all — i.e. literally no rule matched, which is what "nobody was assigned"
+    all, i.e. literally no rule matched, which is what "nobody was assigned"
     on the page means. A rule that matched but could not assign is NOT unrouted.
 
     Anchored on ``created_at`` (routing runs once, at case creation, so a case's

backend/cases/serializer.py

@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ class CaseSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
             "custom_fields",
             "escalation_count",
             "last_escalation_fired_at",
-            # SLA — Tier 2 business-hours-sla
+            # SLA: Tier 2 business-hours-sla
             "sla_first_response_hours",
             "sla_resolution_hours",
             "first_response_at",
@@ -153,8 +153,8 @@ class CaseCreateSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
 
         `account` is a plain model FK, so DRF built it with a queryset of
         *every* Account row. Posting a stranger's account UUID stored the
-        link and — because the create response echoes `cases_obj` through
+        link and, because the create response echoes `cases_obj` through
-        `CaseSerializer`, which nests `AccountSerializer` — handed the caller
+        `CaseSerializer`, which nests `AccountSerializer`: handed the caller
         that account's name, email, phone and website back. So the same hole
         was both a cross-tenant write and a cross-tenant read. `validate_parent`
         below already guarded the other FK on this serializer; this one had
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ class CaseCreateSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
         API, because DRF does not call `Model.clean()` and nothing on the save
         path calls `full_clean()`. Proven live: with a matching rule armed,
         `PATCH {"status": "Closed"}` returned 200, closed the case and
-        recorded zero approvals — the whole approval feature, its inbox and
+        recorded zero approvals, the whole approval feature, its inbox and
         its settings page were decoration.
 
         Validating the *transition* rather than the target matters here: a
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ class CaseCreateSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
         if self.instance is not None:
             from cases.approvals import Approval, find_matching_rule
 
-            # A rule matches on priority, case_type and team — so evaluate it
+            # A rule matches on priority, case_type and team, so evaluate it
             # against the values this request is setting, not the stored ones,
             # or a caller could re-target the case out of the rule and close it
             # in the same PATCH. The instance is restored either way; nothing
@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ class InboundMailboxSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
         return value
 
     def to_representation(self, instance):
-        """`webhook_secret` is a per-org shared secret — the credential a sender
+        """`webhook_secret` is a per-org shared secret, the credential a sender
         signs with. It is settable/rotatable by an admin, but it must never be
         read back by a regular member, or every agent in the org can forge
         inbound mail. `topic_arn` is the webhook's TopicArn pin and embeds the
@@ -830,7 +830,7 @@ class TimeEntryUpdateSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
 
     Lets the owner (or an admin) revise the start/end window, description,
     billable flag, and hourly rate. `case`, `profile`, and `invoice` stay
-    read-only — moving an entry between cases or stealing someone else's
+    read-only, moving an entry between cases or stealing someone else's
     timer is intentionally not supported.
     """
 
@@ -955,7 +955,7 @@ class ApprovalRuleSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
         if org is None:
             org = self.context.get("org") if hasattr(self, "context") else None
         if org is not None:
-            # Scope the relational querysets to the caller's org — the same
+            # Scope the relational querysets to the caller's org, the same
             # __init__ scoping RoutingRule/Escalation serializers do. Without it
             # approver_ids/match_team_id accept ANY org's rows, so a PUT (whose
             # view does not re-run the POST's manual org check) could attach a
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ class ApprovalSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
 
     ``can_act`` and ``is_own_request`` are viewer-relative and need the request
     in serializer context; without it (e.g. the single-object action responses)
-    they default to False, which is safe — the queue re-reads the list after any
+    they default to False, which is safe. The queue re-reads the list after any
     action, and that read carries the context.
     """
 

backend/cases/services/billing.py

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 draft :class:`invoices.models.InvoiceLineItem` shapes.
 
 Kept in ``cases/services/`` so the cross-app glue lives on the cases side
-of the boundary — the invoices app only consumes these dicts. Reach over
+of the boundary, the invoices app only consumes these dicts. Reach over
 to ``invoices/api_views.py`` :class:`InvoiceFromTimeEntriesView` for the
 actual endpoint that calls this helper.
 """
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ def build_invoice_lines_from_entries(entries) -> Tuple[str, List[dict]]:
     Rejects (raising :class:`TimeEntryInvoicingError`):
 
     * Empty input.
-    * Mixed currencies — single invoices stay single-currency.
+    * Mixed currencies: single invoices stay single-currency.
     * Already-invoiced entries.
     * Unstopped (running) entries.
     * Non-billable entries.
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ def build_invoice_lines_from_entries(entries) -> Tuple[str, List[dict]]:
         rate = entry.hourly_rate if entry.hourly_rate is not None else Decimal("0")
         case_name = entry.case.name if getattr(entry, "case", None) else "Time entry"
         body = entry.description.strip() if entry.description else ""
-        full = f"{case_name} — {body}" if body else case_name
+        full = f"{case_name}, {body}" if body else case_name
         lines.append(
             {
                 "name": full[:255],

backend/cases/services/csv_import.py

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ reported as row errors rather than silently dropped. Tags are auto-created at
 commit if not present.
 
 All reference lookups are bulk-prefetched once per call (one SELECT per
-reference type), not per-row — a 5000-row file with five reference columns
+reference type), not per-row, a 5000-row file with five reference columns
 runs ~6 queries during validation instead of ~25k.
 """
 

backend/cases/signals.py

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 Audit-log signal handlers for the Cases app.
 
 Replaces the generic Case CREATE/UPDATE/DELETE handlers in `common/signals.py`
-with finer-grained Activity rows — see `docs/cases/COORDINATION_DECISIONS.md` D1.
+with finer-grained Activity rows. See `docs/cases/COORDINATION_DECISIONS.md` D1.
 
 Verbs emitted from here: CREATE, UPDATE, DELETE, ASSIGN, STATUS_CHANGED,
 PRIORITY_CHANGED, COMMENT, LINKED_SOLUTION, UNLINKED_SOLUTION.
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ def case_pre_save_stamp_resolved_at(sender, instance, **kwargs):
     `resolved_at` drives `is_sla_resolution_breached`, the MTTR dashboard and
     the resolution half of the escalation scan. The only code in the repo that
     ever wrote it was `parent_views.close_with_children`; a case closed the
-    ordinary way — the API, the v1 UI, a bulk update, a kanban drag — kept
+    ordinary way (the API, the v1 UI, a bulk update, a kanban drag) kept
     `resolved_at = NULL` forever. Both seeded Closed cases show it.
 
     The consequences ran one way: a resolved case stayed permanently
@@ -219,8 +219,8 @@ def case_pre_save_stamp_resolved_at(sender, instance, **kwargs):
 def _maybe_stamp_first_response(case, comment):
     """Stamp `first_response_at` on the first agent reply to a ticket.
 
-    Nothing wrote this field either — not the API, not the v1 UI, not the
+    Nothing wrote this field either, not the API, not the v1 UI, not the
-    inbound-email path — while four things read it: the breach property, the
+    inbound-email path, while four things read it: the breach property, the
     "first reply" column, the escalation scan and the FRT dashboard. So every
     case in every org was permanently first-response-breached, the escalation
     task re-fired on tickets that had been answered hours ago, and no ticket
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ def _maybe_stamp_first_response(case, comment):
 
     "First response" is the first *public* comment from somebody on our side.
     An internal note is not a reply to the customer, and a comment with no
-    `commented_by` is the customer themselves — the same test
+    `commented_by` is the customer themselves. The same test
     `_evaluate_reopen` already uses to tell the two apart.
     """
     if case.first_response_at is not None:
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ def _maybe_schedule_csat(case, old_status):
 
     Uses a delayed Celery task so a near-immediate reopen short-circuits
     inside the task body (status re-check). The task itself is also
-    idempotent — a second STATUS_CHANGED → Closed on the same case won't
+    idempotent, a second STATUS_CHANGED → Closed on the same case won't
     create a second survey because of the `OneToOneField` on Case.
     """
     if case.status != "Closed" or old_status == "Closed":
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ def _maybe_schedule_csat(case, old_status):
             args=[str(case.id), str(case.org_id)],
             countdown=CSAT_SEND_DELAY_MINUTES * 60,
         )
-    except Exception:  # pragma: no cover — broker outage shouldn't block close
+    except Exception:  # pragma: no cover. Broker outage shouldn't block close
         logger.exception("Failed to enqueue CSAT survey for case=%s", case.pk)
 
 
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ def _evaluate_reopen(case, comment):
     case.closed_on = None
     # `.update()` skips signals, so the resolved_at reset that
     # `case_pre_save_stamp_resolved_at` does on a normal save has to be
-    # written out by hand here — a reopened ticket is not a resolved one.
+    # written out by hand here. A reopened ticket is not a resolved one.
     case.resolved_at = None
     Case.objects.filter(pk=case.pk).update(
         status=case.status, closed_on=None, resolved_at=None
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ def maybe_reopen_for_inbound_email(case, email_message):
     case.closed_on = None
     # `.update()` skips signals, so the resolved_at reset that
     # `case_pre_save_stamp_resolved_at` does on a normal save has to be
-    # written out by hand here — a reopened ticket is not a resolved one.
+    # written out by hand here. A reopened ticket is not a resolved one.
     case.resolved_at = None
     Case.objects.filter(pk=case.pk).update(
         status=case.status, closed_on=None, resolved_at=None

backend/cases/solution_serializers.py

@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ from common.serializer import OrganizationSerializer
 def _author_name(obj):
     """A name to print, not a foreign key to resolve.
 
-    `created_by` serialized as a bare `User` UUID, which no client can render
+    `created_by` serialized as a bare `User` UUID, which no client can render.
-    — the list page has an Author column and the only honest thing it could
+    The list page has an Author column and the only honest thing it could
     have shown was a UUID. `User.name` falls back to the email local part on
     first save, so it is populated for every real account.
     """
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ class SolutionSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
         """Get number of cases using this solution"""
         # `SolutionListView` annotates this so a list of N articles costs one
         # query rather than N. The fallback keeps the serializer usable on a
-        # single un-annotated instance — the create and publish responses.
+        # single un-annotated instance: the create and publish responses.
         annotated = getattr(obj, "linked_case_count", None)
         if annotated is not None:
             return annotated
@@ -91,13 +91,13 @@ class SolutionCreateUpdateSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
         only half did:
 
         * `validate_is_published` was guarded by `if value and self.instance`,
-          so on **create** — where `self.instance` is None — it did not run at
+          so on **create**, where `self.instance` is None, it did not run at
           all. `POST {"status": "draft", "is_published": true}` returned 201
           with a published draft: the review workflow skipped in one request.
           Proven against the running server.
         * On update it read the **stored** status, never the incoming one, and
           it only ran when `is_published` was in the body. So the demotion was
-          free — `PATCH {"status": "draft"}` on an approved, published article
+          free, `PATCH {"status": "draft"}` on an approved, published article
           left `is_published` true. Proven the same way. That is the CLAUDE.md
           rule about validating the *source* state of a transition rather than
           only its target, in miniature.
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ class SolutionCreateUpdateSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
         # Absent means unchanged, for validation as much as for saving. An
         # article created *before* this rule existed can already be a
         # published draft, and judging the stored combination on a request
-        # that touches neither field would make those rows uneditable — a
+        # that touches neither field would make those rows uneditable: a
         # `PATCH {"description": ...}` refused with an error about
         # `is_published`, which is both baffling and the opposite of helpful,
         # since editing is how somebody would fix it. Any request that does
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ class SolutionDetailSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
     def get_linked_cases(self, obj):
         """Linked tickets the *requester* is allowed to open.
 
-        This used to be `CaseSerializer(obj.cases.all()[:10], many=True)` —
+        This used to be `CaseSerializer(obj.cases.all()[:10], many=True)`,
         the full 33-field case payload, with no access check of any kind. A
         member of the org refused a case with a 403 could link an article to
         that very case (the link endpoint checked org and nothing else) and
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ class SolutionDetailSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
         `case_count` stays the *total*. It is the honest usage figure for an
         article and is already public on the list endpoint, so a reader seeing
         fewer rows than the count is being told plainly that some of those
-        tickets are not theirs — rather than shown a number that quietly means
+        tickets are not theirs, rather than shown a number that quietly means
         something different for each reader.
         """
         from cases.access import visible_cases_qs

backend/cases/solution_views.py

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ def _wants_release(data, instance=None):
     """True when this payload would approve or publish the article.
 
     Both are admin-only acts (see `cases.kb_access`), and both can arrive as
-    ordinary fields on an ordinary create or update — which is exactly how
+    ordinary fields on an ordinary create or update, which is exactly how
     they were being performed. Read as a transition, not as a value: a PATCH
     that repeats the `approved` an article already has is not an approval, so
     an author fixing a typo on their own approved draft is not stopped by a
@@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ class SolutionListView(APIView, LimitOffsetPagination):
             queryset = queryset.filter(status=status_filter)
 
         if is_published is not None:
-            # `is_published.lower() == "true"` meant every other spelling —
+            # `is_published.lower() == "true"` meant every other spelling:
-            # `1`, `yes`, `on` — silently filtered to *unpublished*, which is
+            # `1`, `yes`, `on`: silently filtered to *unpublished*, which is
             # the opposite of what the caller asked for.
             queryset = queryset.filter(is_published=_as_bool(is_published))
 
@@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ class SolutionListView(APIView, LimitOffsetPagination):
             )
 
         # Counted over the whole knowledge base, not over the filtered page.
-        # These four are a partition of the KB — "12 total, 3 of them drafts"
+        # These four are a partition of the KB, "12 total, 3 of them drafts"
-        # — so recomputing them inside a `?status=draft` filter would leave
+        #, so recomputing them inside a `?status=draft` filter would leave
         # the other three cards reading zero and say nothing.
         counts = base.aggregate(
             count=Count("id"),
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ class SolutionDetailView(APIView):
     def get(self, request, pk):
         """Get solution details"""
         solution = get_solution_or_404(request.profile, pk)
-        # The requester's profile decides which linked cases come back — see
+        # The requester's profile decides which linked cases come back. See
         # `SolutionDetailSerializer.get_linked_cases`.
         serializer = SolutionDetailSerializer(
             solution, context={"profile": request.profile}

backend/cases/tasks.py

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ CSAT_SEND_DELAY_MINUTES = 30
 # elsewhere in the codebase.
 CSAT_SIGNER_SALT = "cases.csat_survey"
 
-# Cap a single case at 3 escalations total — past that, a human needs to step in.
+# Cap a single case at 3 escalations total. Past that, a human needs to step in.
 ESCALATION_COUNT_CAP = 3
 # Minimum gap between escalation attempts on the same case (prevents storming).
 ESCALATION_COOLDOWN_MINUTES = 60
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ def _dispatch_breach(case, action, target_profile, team, org_id):
                 send_email_to_assigned_user.delay(recipients, str(case.id), str(org_id))
             except (
                 Exception
-            ):  # pragma: no cover — broker glitches shouldn't lose the escalation
+            ):  # pragma: no cover. Broker glitches shouldn't lose the escalation
                 logger.exception(
                     "Failed to enqueue escalation email for case=%s", case.pk
                 )
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ def csat_signer() -> TimestampSigner:
 
 
 def hash_csat_token(token: str) -> str:
-    """SHA-256 hex digest. We never store raw tokens — only their hash."""
+    """SHA-256 hex digest. We never store raw tokens, only their hash."""
     return hashlib.sha256(token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
 
 
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ def send_csat_survey(case_id, org_id):
       - The org has flipped `csat_enabled` off.
       - The case has no contact with an email (logged, not raised).
       - The case has been reopened in the meantime (status no longer
-        Closed) — the spec's reopen-protection clause.
+        Closed): the spec's reopen-protection clause.
       - A survey row already exists for this case (don't double-send).
     """
     set_rls_context(org_id)
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ def send_csat_survey(case_id, org_id):
         return None
     if case.status != "Closed":
         logger.info(
-            "send_csat_survey: case=%s status=%s — likely reopened, skipping",
+            "send_csat_survey: case=%s status=%s, likely reopened, skipping",
             case_id,
             case.status,
         )
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ def send_csat_survey(case_id, org_id):
     try:
         html = render_to_string("csat/survey_email.html", context=context)
     except Exception:
-        # Template missing in dev — fall back to a plain link so the task
+        # Template missing in dev: fall back to a plain link so the task
         # still records the survey row + token. Production has the template.
         html = (
             f'<p>Hi {contact.first_name or "there"},</p>'
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ def send_csat_survey(case_id, org_id):
         )
 
     msg = EmailMessage(
-        subject=f"How did we do? — {case.name}",
+        subject=f"How did we do?, {case.name}",
         body=html,
         to=[contact.email],
     )
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ def send_csat_survey(case_id, org_id):
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Tier 3 time-tracking — auto-stop forgotten timers.
+# Tier 3 time-tracking: auto-stop forgotten timers.
 
 # A running timer this old gets killed by the Celery beat. Hand-tuned: 12h
 # covers an overnight forgotten timer without clobbering a mid-day session

backend/cases/tests/test_analytics_service.py

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ from django.utils import timezone
 from cases.models import Case
 
 # A single reference instant for the whole fixture. Anchoring every timestamp
-# to one `now` keeps the FRT deltas exact — deriving each from its own
+# to one `now` keeps the FRT deltas exact, deriving each from its own
 # timezone.now() call drifts by microseconds, which would nudge a case that
 # meets its SLA exactly (1h against a 1h target) just over the line.
 _BASE = timezone.now()
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ def service_cases(org_a, admin_profile):
 
 
 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Authorization — the admin-only gate (both directions)
+# Authorization: the admin-only gate (both directions)
 
 
 class TestServiceAuthorization:
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ class TestServiceAuthorization:
         assert resp.status_code in (401, 403)
 
     def test_non_admin_forbidden(self, user_client, service_cases):
-        """A USER-role member gets 403 — never a personal slice."""
+        """A USER-role member gets 403, never a personal slice."""
         resp = user_client.get("/api/cases/analytics/service/")
         assert resp.status_code == 403
 
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ class TestServiceByAgent:
 
 
 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Empty org — the shape holds so the SSR page never divides by an absent array
+# Empty org: the shape holds so the SSR page never divides by an absent array
 
 
 class TestServiceEmpty:

backend/cases/tests/test_approvals.py

@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ class TestStateTransitions:
     def test_approve_records_activity(
         self, admin_client, admin_profile, user_profile, regular_user, org_a
     ):
-        # Requested by the USER, approved by the admin — a requester and an
+        # Requested by the USER, approved by the admin. A requester and an
         # approver who are different people, which the rule now requires.
         case, rule, approval = self._setup(org_a, user_profile, regular_user)
         res = admin_client.post(
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ class TestRuleCRUD:
         assert rule.match_team_id is None
 
     def test_put_accepts_same_org_approver(self, admin_client, org_a, user_profile):
-        """The allowed side — a same-org approver PUTs fine, proving the two
+        """The allowed side, a same-org approver PUTs fine, proving the two
         rejections above are org-scoping and not a blanket block on the field."""
         rule = _make_rule(org_a, match_priority="Urgent")
         res = admin_client.put(
@@ -560,7 +560,7 @@ class TestRuleCRUD:
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Rule-list analytics — pending_count per rule + org totals, read from the
+# Rule-list analytics: pending_count per rule + org totals, read from the
 # Approval log (state="pending").
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 

backend/cases/tests/test_case_access_and_sla.py

@@ -12,25 +12,25 @@ answered the wrong thing. What was broken, in the order the classes appear:
 2.  The watcher allowance was half-built. `CaseListView` and
     `watcher_views` granted it with a citation; the detail view dropped it.
     A watcher's queue showed the ticket and opening it answered 403.
-3.  The verbs disagreed by accident — read, write and delete each had a
+3.  The verbs disagreed by accident: read, write and delete each had a
     different idea of who was allowed, spread over five copies.
 4.  A missing case was a **500** on PUT / PATCH / DELETE (only GET checked
     for `None`), and a malformed id was a 500 on all four plus the comment
     and attachment endpoints, because a UUID column raises rather than
     returning nothing.
 5.  `CaseAttachmentView.delete` looked its row up by pk with **no org
-    filter** — one endpoint that deleted any attachment in the database —
+    filter**, one endpoint that deleted any attachment in the database,
     and its permission branch compared a `Profile` to a `User` FK, so the
     person who uploaded a file could not delete it.
 6.  `account` accepted **another org's account** on create, stored the link,
     and echoed that account's name, email, phone and website back through the
     nested serializer.
 7.  The close gate did not exist in practice. `Case.clean()` requires a
-    `closed_on` and, where an active rule matches, a recorded approval — but
+    `closed_on` and, where an active rule matches, a recorded approval, but
     DRF never calls `Model.clean()`. With a matching rule armed,
     `PATCH {"status": "Closed"}` returned 200 and recorded zero approvals.
 8.  `resolved_at` was written by exactly one code path in the repo
-    (`close_with_children`), so an ordinarily-closed case stayed NULL — and
+    (`close_with_children`), so an ordinarily-closed case stayed NULL, and
     the property reads NULL as *not resolved*, leaving it permanently
     "resolution breached" and invisible to MTTR.
 9.  `first_response_at` was written by **no** code path at all, while four
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ def _created_by(instance, user):
     """Set `created_by` after the fact.
 
     `BaseModel.save()` takes `created_by` from the crum thread-local and sets
-    it to **None** when there is no request in flight — so passing it to
+    it to **None** when there is no request in flight, so passing it to
     `objects.create()` inside a test silently stores nothing. `.update()`
     writes the column directly and skips that.
     """
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ def assigned_case(case_a, user_profile):
 
 @pytest.fixture
 def watched_case(case_a, user_profile, org_a):
-    """A case the non-admin only watches — not creator, not assignee."""
+    """A case the non-admin only watches, not creator, not assignee."""
     CaseWatcher.objects.create(
         case=case_a, profile=user_profile, org=org_a, subscribed_via="manual"
     )
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ class TestWhoMayOpenACase:
         assert response.json()["cases_obj"]["id"] == str(case_a.id)
 
     def test_assignee_opens_a_case_they_did_not_raise(self, user_client, assigned_case):
-        """Also a 500 — every non-admin hit the same line."""
+        """Also a 500. Every non-admin hit the same line."""
         response = user_client.get(_detail(assigned_case.id))
         assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK
 
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ class TestWhoMayOpenACase:
         assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN
 
     def test_another_org_gets_404_not_403(self, org_b_client, case_a):
-        """404, not 403 — confirming a record exists is itself a disclosure."""
+        """404, not 403. Confirming a record exists is itself a disclosure."""
         response = org_b_client.get(_detail(case_a.id))
         assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND
 
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ class TestClosingACase:
         self, admin_client, case_a, org_a
     ):
         """The rule matches on priority, so it is evaluated against the
-        incoming values — not the stored ones a caller is about to replace."""
+        incoming values, not the stored ones a caller is about to replace."""
         case_a.priority = "High"
         case_a.save()
         ApprovalRule.objects.create(
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ class TestFirstResponseIsRecorded:
 @pytest.mark.django_db
 class TestListOrderAndMentions:
     def test_newest_first(self, admin_client, case_a, case_b_same_org):
-        """Ordering was `-id` — a random UUID — under a header that said
+        """Ordering was `-id`, a random UUID, under a header that said
         the newest were on top."""
         Case.objects.filter(pk=case_a.id).update(
             created_at=timezone.now() - timezone.timedelta(days=3)

backend/cases/tests/test_case_merge.py

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ def _make_case(
     """Create a Case with `created_by` set deterministically.
 
     `BaseModel.save()` reads `crum.get_current_user()` to populate
-    `created_by` — outside a request that's None, which would break the
+    `created_by`: outside a request that's None, which would break the
     permission tests. Set the current user explicitly for the duration of
     the create.
     """
@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ class TestCaseMergePermissions:
     def test_creator_of_only_one_forbidden(
         self, user_client, regular_user, admin_user, org_a
     ):
-        a = _make_case(org_a, regular_user, name="A — user-created")
+        a = _make_case(org_a, regular_user, name="A. User-created")
-        b = _make_case(org_a, admin_user, name="B — admin-created")
+        b = _make_case(org_a, admin_user, name="B, admin-created")
         response = user_client.post(f"/api/cases/{a.id}/merge/{b.id}/")
         assert response.status_code == 403
 

backend/cases/tests/test_cases_api.py

@@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ class TestCaseListView:
 
     def test_create_case_unauthenticated(self, unauthenticated_client):
         """Asserted `pytest.raises(PermissionDenied)`, which can never hold
-        through an APIClient — DRF renders an APIException as a response
+        through an APIClient, DRF renders an APIException as a response
-        rather than letting it escape — so this had always failed. It now
+        rather than letting it escape, so this had always failed. It now
         checks the response the client actually receives."""
         response = unauthenticated_client.post(
             CASES_LIST_URL,
@@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ class TestCaseModelMethods:
     def test_save_applies_priority_specific_sla_defaults(self, admin_user, org_a):
         """New case picks up the priority-specific SLA defaults via save().
 
-        See cases/workflow.py — Urgent gets 1h first-response / 4h resolution.
+        See cases/workflow.py: Urgent gets 1h first-response / 4h resolution.
         Previously this logic was guarded by `not self.pk`, which never fired
         because BaseModel populates pk via uuid4 default; we now use
         _state.adding so the auto-set actually applies.

backend/cases/tests/test_csat.py

@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ class TestPublicCsatPost:
 
     def test_edit_after_24h_locked(self, client, closed_case):
         survey, token = self._seed(closed_case)
-        # First submit — rewind responded_at past the edit window.
+        # First submit: rewind responded_at past the edit window.
         client.post(
             f"/api/public/csat/{token}/",
             data={"rating": 3},
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ class TestCsatAggregate:
                 rating=rating,
                 responded_at=timezone.now(),
             )
-        # One un-responded survey — must not count.
+        # One un-responded survey, must not count.
         case = Case.objects.create(
             org=org_a, name="Cx", status="Closed", priority="Normal",
             closed_on=timezone.now().date(),

backend/cases/tests/test_escalation.py

@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ class TestEscalationPolicyAPI:
     def test_cross_org_isolation(self, admin_client, org_a, org_b):
         target_b = _make_target_profile(org_b, "b@x.com")
         _make_policy(org_b, target_b, priority="Urgent")
-        # admin_client has org_a — should see no policies
+        # admin_client has org_a, should see no policies
         assert admin_client.get(POLICIES_URL).json()["policies"] == []
 
 
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ class TestScanForBreachedCases:
         _create_breached_case(admin_user, org_a)
 
         scan_for_breached_cases()
-        # Second pass within cooldown — no new activity
+        # Second pass within cooldown, no new activity
         assert scan_for_breached_cases() == 0
         assert Activity.objects.filter(action="ESCALATED").count() == 1
 
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ class TestScanForBreachedCases:
         )
         _create_breached_case(admin_user, org_a)
         scan_for_breached_cases()
-        # Look at any of the .delay calls — recipients should include both ids
+        # Look at any of the .delay calls. Recipients should include both ids
         called_recipients = []
         for call in mock_email.delay.call_args_list:
             called_recipients.extend(call.args[0])
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ class TestScanForBreachedCases:
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# breaches_last_30d — the analytics the escalation page reads (Urgent SLAs:
+# breaches_last_30d. The analytics the escalation page reads (Urgent SLAs:
 # 1h first response, 4h resolution).
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ class TestEscalationBreachCounts:
 
     def test_dead_policy_still_reports_breaches(self, admin_client, admin_user, org_a):
         """A disabled policy fires no ESCALATED activity, but its breaches must
-        still surface — that is the whole reason the page exists."""
+        still surface. That is the whole reason the page exists."""
         target = _make_target_profile(org_a)
         _make_policy(org_a, target, priority="Urgent", is_active=False)
         _case_with_sla(admin_user, org_a, created_ago=timedelta(hours=5))

backend/cases/tests/test_import.py

@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ class TestImportPreview:
     def test_cross_org_account_rejected(
         self, admin_client, admin_profile, org_b, user_b
     ):
-        # Account belongs to org_b but admin is in org_a — must not resolve.
+        # Account belongs to org_b but admin is in org_a, must not resolve.
         Account.objects.create(name="Secret Co", org=org_b, created_by=user_b)
         csv_file = _csv(
             ["name", "status", "priority", "account_name"],
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ class TestImportCommit:
         assert case.tags.filter(name="auth").exists()
 
     def test_rolls_back_on_any_error(self, admin_client, org_a, admin_profile):
-        # Mix one good row with one invalid row — neither should be created.
+        # Mix one good row with one invalid row. Neither should be created.
         csv_file = _csv(
             ["name", "status", "priority"],
             [

backend/cases/tests/test_inbound_email.py

@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ class TestThreading:
             org=org_a,
             created_by=admin_user,
         )
-        # Subject identical but no `[Case #...]` marker — must not match.
+        # Subject identical but no `[Case #...]` marker, must not match.
         parsed = parse_raw_email(_raw_email(message_id="<reply@x>", subject="Help"))
         assert find_existing_case(parsed, org_a) is None
 
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ class TestMailboxAPI:
         assert response.status_code == 403
 
     def test_non_admin_cannot_read_webhook_secret(self, user_client, org_a):
-        """webhook_secret is the credential a sender signs with — a non-admin
+        """webhook_secret is the credential a sender signs with. A non-admin
         member may see the mailbox config but never the secret (list + detail)."""
         mailbox = _make_mailbox(org_a, webhook_secret="s3cr3t-value")
 
@@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ class TestWebhook:
 # TopicArn pinning
 #
 # A valid SNS signature only proves a message came from *some* SNS topic in
-# *some* AWS account — anyone who learns a mailbox UUID could otherwise point
+# *some* AWS account: anyone who learns a mailbox UUID could otherwise point
 # their own topic at the webhook and have AWS sign forged mail for them. The
 # webhook therefore also pins the TopicArn to the mailbox.
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ class TestTopicArnPinning:
         self, admin_client, org_a
     ):
         """Once pinned, a confirmation from another topic must not steal the
-        mailbox — otherwise the pin is trivially resettable by an attacker."""
+        mailbox. Otherwise the pin is trivially resettable by an attacker."""
         mailbox = _make_mailbox(org_a, topic_arn=SNS_TOPIC)
         with (
             patch("cases.inbound_views.verify_sns_message"),
@@ -841,7 +841,7 @@ class TestTopicArnPinning:
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Mailbox list analytics — cases_last_30d / last_received_at, attributed to a
+# Mailbox list analytics: cases_last_30d / last_received_at, attributed to a
 # mailbox via the EmailMessage.mailbox FK (set at ingest). Driven through the
 # real pipeline so the FK is populated the way production populates it.
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

backend/cases/tests/test_inbound_sns.py

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
 Covers the three controls added after CodeQL alerts #27/#28 (`py/full-ssrf`)
 on `cases/inbound/sns.py`:
 
-1. Neither outbound fetch (SigningCertURL, SubscribeURL) follows redirects —
+1. Neither outbound fetch (SigningCertURL, SubscribeURL) follows redirects.
-   the host allow-list is applied to the URL we are *about* to fetch, so a 3xx
+   The host allow-list is applied to the URL we are *about* to fetch, so a 3xx
    would otherwise land us on an unvalidated host.
 2. The signing certificate is validated (validity window + subject CN pinned
    to the AWS SNS host family) instead of being trusted blindly.
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ from cases.inbound.sns import SNSVerificationError, verify_sns_message
 
 @pytest.fixture(scope="module")
 def signing_key():
-    """One RSA key for the whole module — keygen is the slow part."""
+    """One RSA key for the whole module. Keygen is the slow part."""
     return rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)
 
 
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ def _signed_payload(key, *, topic_arn="arn:aws:sns:us-east-1:1:t", **overrides):
 
 class TestSigningCertValidation:
     def test_valid_cert_and_signature_verifies(self, signing_key):
-        """Happy path — proves the new checks can return True, not just False."""
+        """Happy path. Proves the new checks can return True, not just False."""
         cert = _make_cert(signing_key)
         payload = _signed_payload(signing_key)
 
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ class _RedirectHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
 
     paths_seen: list = []
 
-    def do_GET(self):  # noqa: N802 — BaseHTTPRequestHandler API
+    def do_GET(self):  # noqa: N802. BaseHTTPRequestHandler API
         type(self).paths_seen.append(self.path)
         if self.path == "/start":
             self.send_response(302)

backend/cases/tests/test_kb_suggestions.py

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ def published_solutions(org_a):
     s3 = Solution.objects.create(
         org=org_a,
         title="Internal draft about passwords",
-        description="Don't show me — I'm a draft.",
+        description="Don't show me: I'm a draft.",
         status="draft",
         is_published=False,
     )
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ class TestSolutionSuggestionsSeed:
     def test_empty_q_falls_back_to_recent_when_no_seed_match(
         self, admin_client, case_a, org_a
     ):
-        # No matches against "Bug in login page" terms — endpoint falls back
+        # No matches against "Bug in login page" terms, endpoint falls back
         # to the most-recent published solutions.
         Solution.objects.create(
             org=org_a,

backend/cases/tests/test_reopen.py

@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ class TestReopenPolicyAPI:
 
 @pytest.mark.django_db
 class TestReopenAnalytics:
-    """The three settings-page metrics returned alongside the policy — all built
+    """The three settings-page metrics returned alongside the policy, all built
     from the real reopen path (create a comment, let the signal fire)."""
 
     URL = "/api/cases/reopen-policy/"

backend/cases/tests/test_routing.py

@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ class TestRoutingRuleAPI:
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# List analytics — matched_last_30d / unrouted_last_30d / round_robin state.
+# List analytics: matched_last_30d / unrouted_last_30d / round_robin state.
 # Driven through the real create-signal path so counts come from the ROUTED
 # activity log the engine writes.
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ class TestRoutingAnalytics:
         self, admin_client, admin_profile, org_a
     ):
         """A rule that matches but has nobody to assign still logs a ROUTED
-        row, so its case counts as matched, NOT unrouted — 'nobody assigned'
+        row, so its case counts as matched, NOT unrouted; 'nobody assigned'
         is not the same as 'no rule matched'."""
         _rule(org_a, "Empty pool", strategy="direct", target_assignees=[])
         _case(org_a, name="c1")

backend/cases/tests/test_sla_pause.py

@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ class TestSLADeadlineWithCalendar:
         assert deadline == datetime(2026, 5, 11, 14, 0, tzinfo=_UTC)
 
     def test_currently_pending_extends_deadline(self, case_a, calendar_a):
-        # Case is currently pending — paused_at set 30 minutes ago.
+        # Case is currently pending; paused_at set 30 minutes ago.
         case_a.created_at = datetime(2026, 5, 11, 9, 0, tzinfo=_UTC)
         case_a.sla_first_response_hours = 4
         case_a.status = "Pending"

backend/cases/tests/test_solution_access.py

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 Every case below was driven against the running API before the fix and
 answered the wrong thing. What was broken:
 
-1.  The Solution endpoints had **no authorization at all** — `IsAuthenticated`
+1.  The Solution endpoints had **no authorization at all**; `IsAuthenticated`
     was the whole of it. A plain `USER` could rewrite an admin's article
     (200), publish it to customers (200) and hard-delete it (204). The
     draft → reviewed → approved workflow, the publish and unpublish
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ answered the wrong thing. What was broken:
     **create** it did not run. `POST {"status": "draft", "is_published":
     true}` returned 201 with a published draft.
 3.  On update the same check read the **stored** status, never the incoming
-    one, and only ran when `is_published` was in the body — so
+    one, and only ran when `is_published` was in the body, so
     `PATCH {"status": "draft"}` on an approved, published article left it
     published. The invariant the model asserts ("published implies approved")
     held on one path in three.
@@ -22,15 +22,15 @@ answered the wrong thing. What was broken:
     `CaseSolutionLinkView` checked org and nothing else. So a member refused
     a case with a 403 could link an article to that very case and read its
     name, description, account and contacts back out of the article.
-5.  A malformed id was a **500** on every verb — read, update, delete,
+5.  A malformed id was a **500** on every verb. Read, update, delete,
-    publish, unpublish — because a UUID column raises `ValidationError`
+    publish, unpublish, because a UUID column raises `ValidationError`
     rather than returning nothing, and the views caught only
     `Solution.DoesNotExist`.
 6.  `?is_published=1` silently meant *unpublished*: the parse was
     `value.lower() == "true"`, so every other spelling of true inverted the
     filter.
 7.  The list served `case_count` and a nested `org` per row without fetching
-    either — 13 articles cost 27 queries — and `created_by` came back as a
+    either, 13 articles cost 27 queries, and `created_by` came back as a
     bare `User` UUID, so no client could name the author.
 """
 
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ def member_article(org_a, regular_user):
 
 @pytest.mark.django_db
 class TestWhoMayEditAnArticle:
-    """`write` — author or admin. Proven both ways, per rule."""
+    """`write`, author or admin. Proven both ways, per rule."""
 
     def test_author_may_edit_their_own(self, user_client, member_article):
         response = user_client.patch(
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ class TestWhoMayEditAnArticle:
         assert Solution.objects.filter(pk=admin_article.pk).exists()
 
     def test_every_member_may_read_every_article(self, user_client, admin_article):
-        """`read` is deliberately not restricted — see `cases.kb_access`."""
+        """`read` is deliberately not restricted. See `cases.kb_access`."""
         response = user_client.get(_detail(admin_article.pk))
         assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_200_OK
         assert response.data["title"] == "Admin's article"
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ class TestPublishedImpliesApproved:
     ):
         """Rows written before the rule existed can be published drafts.
         Judging the stored combination on a request that touches neither
-        field would make them uneditable — and editing is how somebody fixes
+        field would make them uneditable, and editing is how somebody fixes
         one."""
         article = _article(org_a, regular_user, status="draft", is_published=True)
         response = user_client.patch(
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ class TestLinkedCasesIsNotAWayIntoCases:
 
     def test_the_count_stays_honest(self, user_client, hidden_case, member_article):
         """Zero rows and a count of one is the page saying "there is a ticket
-        here and it is not yours" — better than a number that quietly means
+        here and it is not yours". Better than a number that quietly means
         something different for each reader."""
         hidden_case.solutions.add(member_article)
         response = user_client.get(_detail(member_article.pk))
@@ -507,8 +507,8 @@ class TestTheListPayload:
         self, admin_client, org_a, admin_user, django_assert_max_num_queries
     ):
         """`case_count` and the nested `org` were both computed per row: 13
-        articles, 27 queries. The ceiling here is the page's fixed cost —
+        articles, 27 queries. The ceiling here is the page's fixed cost.
-        auth, the count, the page — and does not move with the row count."""
+        Auth, the count, the page, and does not move with the row count."""
         for index in range(12):
             _article(org_a, admin_user, title=f"Article {index}")
 

backend/cases/tests/test_time_tracking.py

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ class TestModelConstraints:
         TimeEntry.objects.create(
             org=org_a, case=case, profile=admin_profile, started_at=timezone.now()
         )
-        # Different profile — should NOT collide.
+        # Different profile, should NOT collide.
         TimeEntry.objects.create(
             org=org_a, case=case, profile=user_profile, started_at=timezone.now()
         )
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ class TestTimesheetEndpoint:
         entries = [e for d in body["days"] for e in d["entries"]]
         assert len(entries) == 1
         entry = entries[0]
-        # case is expanded to {id, name} — not the bare id the serializer emits —
+        # case is expanded to {id, name}, not the bare id the serializer emits,
         # so the page can show the ticket name and link to it.
         assert entry["case"] == {"id": str(case.id), "name": "SSO login loop"}
         # An unbilled entry carries invoice: null, so the page never links to an

backend/cases/tests/test_watchers.py

@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ class TestWatchAPI:
         assert r.status_code == 204
 
     def test_cross_org_case_returns_404(self, admin_client, case_b):
-        # admin_client is in org_a; case_b is in org_b — should never be visible
+        # admin_client is in org_a; case_b is in org_b, should never be visible
         r = admin_client.post(f"/api/cases/{case_b.id}/watch/")
         assert r.status_code == 404
 
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ class TestWatchingListAPI:
         CaseWatcher.objects.create(
             case=case_a, profile=admin_profile, org=case_a.org
         )
-        # Another user watches a different case — must not leak.
+        # Another user watches a different case, must not leak.
         CaseWatcher.objects.create(
             case=case_b_same_org,
             profile=user_profile,

backend/cases/tests/test_watchers_mentions.py

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ class TestParseMentions:
         assert out == ["bob", "alice"]
 
     def test_does_not_match_email_addresses(self):
-        # The @ in 'foo@bar.com' is preceded by an alphanumeric — should be skipped.
+        # The @ in 'foo@bar.com' is preceded by an alphanumeric, should be skipped.
         assert parse_mentions("send mail to alice@example.com") == []
 
     def test_punctuation_chars_in_username(self):
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ class TestParseMentions:
         ]
 
     def test_no_match_inside_word(self):
-        # `\u`@x` — preceded by alphanumeric, skip
+        # `\u`@x`. Preceded by alphanumeric, skip
         assert parse_mentions("u@x") == []
 
     def test_empty_body(self):
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ class TestDispatchForComment:
         _comment(
             case_a, "Sent to bob@org.com about this", by=admin_profile
         )
-        # @ preceded by alphanumeric — must NOT be parsed as a mention.
+        # @ preceded by alphanumeric, must NOT be parsed as a mention.
         assert not Notification.objects.filter(
             recipient=bob, verb="case.mentioned"
         ).exists()
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ class TestDispatchForComment:
     def test_actor_does_not_get_their_own_comment_notification(
         self, case_a, admin_profile, org_a
     ):
-        # Actor is also a watcher — should still NOT receive case.commented.
+        # Actor is also a watcher, should still NOT receive case.commented.
         CaseWatcher.objects.create(
             case=case_a, profile=admin_profile, org=org_a
         )
@@ -200,8 +200,8 @@ class TestNotificationLinkIsReachable:
     """`Notification.link` is a client path, and it has to be one a client serves.
 
     The producer wrote `/cases/<id>` for the entire life of the feature. No
-    client has ever had a `/cases` route — the SvelteKit app serves tickets at
+    client has ever had a `/cases` route, the SvelteKit app serves tickets at
-    `/tickets/<id>` — and its notification panel assigns `link` straight to
+    `/tickets/<id>`, and its notification panel assigns `link` straight to
     `window.location.href`, so every notification ever sent landed on a 404.
     """
 

backend/cases/time_views.py

@@ -3,17 +3,17 @@ Time-tracking endpoints (Tier 3 time-tracking).
 
 Case-scoped:
 
-* ``GET  /api/cases/<pk>/time-entries/``        — list (visible to actor)
+* ``GET  /api/cases/<pk>/time-entries/``: list (visible to actor)
-* ``POST /api/cases/<pk>/time-entries/``        — manual entry
+* ``POST /api/cases/<pk>/time-entries/``: manual entry
-* ``POST /api/cases/<pk>/time-entries/start/``  — start a running timer (409 if one active)
+* ``POST /api/cases/<pk>/time-entries/start/``: start a running timer (409 if one active)
-* ``GET  /api/cases/<pk>/time-summary/``        — totals + by-profile breakdown
+* ``GET  /api/cases/<pk>/time-summary/``: totals + by-profile breakdown
 
 Entry-scoped (registered at the project root under ``/api/time-entries/``):
 
-* ``POST   /api/time-entries/<pk>/stop/``       — stop a running timer
+* ``POST   /api/time-entries/<pk>/stop/``: stop a running timer
-* ``PUT    /api/time-entries/<pk>/``            — owner or admin
+* ``PUT    /api/time-entries/<pk>/``: owner or admin
-* ``DELETE /api/time-entries/<pk>/``            — owner or admin
+* ``DELETE /api/time-entries/<pk>/``: owner or admin
-* ``GET    /api/time-entries/timesheet/``       — week view, grouped by day
+* ``GET    /api/time-entries/timesheet/``: week view, grouped by day
 """
 
 from collections import OrderedDict
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ class TimeEntryStartView(APIView):
 
 
 class TimeSummaryView(APIView):
-    """``GET /api/cases/<pk>/time-summary/`` — totals + per-profile breakdown.
+    """``GET /api/cases/<pk>/time-summary/``, totals + per-profile breakdown.
 
     Same shape as ``CaseSerializer.time_summary`` for clients that don't
     want to refetch the full case envelope.
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ class TimeEntryDetailView(APIView):
 
 
 class TimeEntryStopView(APIView):
-    """``POST /api/time-entries/<pk>/stop/`` — stop a running timer."""
+    """``POST /api/time-entries/<pk>/stop/``. Stop a running timer."""
 
     permission_classes = (IsAuthenticated, HasOrgContext)
 
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ class TimeEntryStopView(APIView):
 
 
 class UnbilledEntriesView(APIView):
-    """``GET /api/time-entries/unbilled/?account=<uuid>`` — list billable,
+    """``GET /api/time-entries/unbilled/?account=<uuid>``: list billable,
     stopped, not-yet-invoiced entries for an account so the invoice picker
     can show them. Org-scoped; admins see all entries, agents only their own.
     """

backend/cases/urls.py

@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ urlpatterns = [
         routing_views.RoutingRuleTestView.as_view(),
         name="routing_rule_test",
     ),
-    # Inbound email — public webhook (SNS-signed) + admin mailbox CRUD.
+    # Inbound email: public webhook (SNS-signed) + admin mailbox CRUD.
     path(
         "inbound/<str:mailbox_id>/",
         inbound_views.InboundMailboxWebhookView.as_view(),
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ urlpatterns = [
         import_views.CaseImportCommitView.as_view(),
         name="cases_import_commit",
     ),
-    # Case ↔ Solution linking (M2M endpoints — must be before <str:pk>/ patterns)
+    # Case ↔ Solution linking (M2M endpoints, must be before <str:pk>/ patterns)
     path(
         "<str:pk>/solutions/",
         views.CaseSolutionLinkView.as_view(),
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ urlpatterns = [
         time_views.TimeSummaryView.as_view(),
         name="case_time_summary",
     ),
-    # Approval workflows (must be before <str:pk>/ catchall) — Tier 3 approvals.
+    # Approval workflows (must be before <str:pk>/ catchall), Tier 3 approvals.
     path(
         "approval-rules/",
         approval_views.ApprovalRuleListCreateView.as_view(),

backend/cases/views.py

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ from contacts.models import Contact
 from contacts.serializer import ContactSerializer
 
 # A ticket is "open" while somebody still owes the customer something. The
-# other three values in STATUS_CHOICE — Closed, Rejected, Duplicate — are all
+# other three values in STATUS_CHOICE (Closed, Rejected, Duplicate) are all
 # ways of being finished with it.
 OPEN_STATUSES = ("New", "Assigned", "Pending")
 
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ def apply_case_list_filters(queryset, params):
 
     Shared between CaseListView and WatchingListView so both endpoints accept
     the same filter chips from the mobile client. Caller is responsible for
-    the base scope (org membership, watcher allowance, etc.) — this only
+    the base scope (org membership, watcher allowance, etc.). This only
     layers in user-supplied filters.
     """
     if not params:
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ def apply_case_list_filters(queryset, params):
         queryset = queryset.filter(created_at__lte=params.get("created_at__lte"))
     if params.get("sla_breached") == "true":
         # Wall-clock approximation matching the mobile card's
-        # `isFirstResponseSlaBreached` getter — `Case.is_sla_*_breached` uses
+        # `isFirstResponseSlaBreached` getter; `Case.is_sla_*_breached` uses
         # business hours, but the badges on both clients compute from
         # created_at + hours, so this filter mirrors what the user actually
         # sees on the row. Postgres-specific (INTERVAL).
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ def apply_case_list_filters(queryset, params):
             cf_key = raw_key[3:]
             if cf_key:
                 queryset = queryset.filter(custom_fields__contains={cf_key: raw_value})
-    # Ordering — whitelisted so callers can't sort on arbitrary cols.
+    # Ordering: whitelisted so callers can't sort on arbitrary cols.
     ordering = params.get("ordering")
     if ordering in _ALLOWED_CASE_ORDERINGS:
         queryset = queryset.order_by(ordering, "-id")
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ class CaseListView(APIView, LimitOffsetPagination):
     def get_context_data(self, **kwargs):
         params = self.request.query_params
         # `-id` is a random UUID, so the default "newest first" was in fact no
-        # order at all — the queue came back shuffled and the page still said
+        # order at all, the queue came back shuffled and the page still said
         # it was sorted. `-created_at` is the order the header promises;
         # `-id` stays as a tiebreak so pagination is stable when a batch of
         # cases shares a timestamp (which the seeded data does exactly).
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ class CaseListView(APIView, LimitOffsetPagination):
         if not is_org_admin(self.request.profile):
             # Watcher allowance: a non-admin who is a watcher must still be
             # able to see the case even when un-assigned. The rule now lives
-            # in `cases.access` so the detail view enforces the same one — it
+            # in `cases.access` so the detail view enforces the same one. It
             # used to drop the watcher clause, which meant this list handed
             # somebody a ticket that answered 403 when they clicked it.
             queryset = queryset.filter(
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ class CaseListView(APIView, LimitOffsetPagination):
         context["priority"] = PRIORITY_CHOICE
         context["type_of_case"] = CASE_TYPE
         # The account and contact catalogues exist for the case *form*, but
-        # they were serialized in full on every list call — 190 KB of response
+        # they were serialized in full on every list call, 190 KB of response
         # for a queue of five tickets in the seeded org, and it grows with the
         # org rather than with the page. `?slim=true` omits them for callers
         # that only want the queue. The default is unchanged, so v1 and the
@@ -254,8 +254,8 @@ class CaseListView(APIView, LimitOffsetPagination):
         if params.get("slim") != "true":
             context["accounts_list"] = AccountSerializer(accounts, many=True).data
             context["contacts_list"] = ContactSerializer(contacts, many=True).data
-        # `profiles` was computed a few lines up — narrowed to admins for
+        # `profiles` was computed a few lines up, narrowed to admins for
-        # non-admins, even — and then dropped on the floor. So a ticket form
+        # non-admins, even, and then dropped on the floor. So a ticket form
         # had no way to populate an assignee picker from the endpoint that
         # already knew the answer. Same `id` / `user__email` shape the
         # contacts and accounts lists publish.
@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ class CaseDetailView(APIView):
         elif self.request.profile.user_id != self.cases.created_by_id:
             # `created_by` is a `User`; `Profile.user` is the FK pointing at
             # one, so `User.user` does not exist and this line raised
-            # AttributeError — a 500 for *every* non-admin on *every* ticket
+            # AttributeError, a 500 for *every* non-admin on *every* ticket
             # they were entitled to open. The guard above it compared a
             # Profile to a User and was always true, so nothing shielded it.
             # The admin branch above emits `user__email` keys, so this one does
@@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ class CaseDetailView(APIView):
     )
     def post(self, request, pk, **kwargs):
         params = request.data
-        # `.get()` raised DoesNotExist — a 500 — when the case was missing or
+        # `.get()` raised DoesNotExist, a 500, when the case was missing or
         # belonged to another org. Replying to a ticket that is not there is a
         # 404, not a crash.
         self.cases_obj = self.get_object(pk)
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ class CaseCommentView(APIView):
     permission_classes = (IsAuthenticated, HasOrgContext)
 
     def get_object(self, pk):
-        """Org-scoped already; `.get()` was the problem — a comment id that
+        """Org-scoped already; `.get()` was the problem. A comment id that
         does not exist raised DoesNotExist and answered 500 instead of 404."""
         try:
             comment = self.model.objects.filter(
@@ -1104,7 +1104,7 @@ class CaseAttachmentView(APIView):
            generic table shared by leads, accounts, contacts, deals, cases and
            tasks, so this endpoint deleted any attachment in the database
            belonging to any organisation, given only its UUID. RLS blocks that
-           in a correctly-configured deployment — but per CLAUDE.md the ORM
+           in a correctly-configured deployment, but per CLAUDE.md the ORM
            filter is the contract and RLS is the safety net, and the dev role
            here is a superuser, so the probe went through.
         2. `request.profile == self.object.created_by` compares a `Profile` to
@@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ class CaseSolutionLinkView(APIView):
         # Attaching an article to a ticket changes the ticket, so it takes the
         # same permission as any other change to it. Org alone was the whole
         # check, which meant somebody refused the case with a 403 could still
-        # link to it — and then read the case straight back out of the
+        # link to it, and then read the case straight back out of the
         # article's `linked_cases`. Closing that read-around at the serializer
         # is not enough on its own: writing to a ticket you cannot open is a
         # defect whichever way the data comes back.
@@ -1255,15 +1255,15 @@ def _reopen_analytics(org):
     persists:
     - `reopened_last_30d`: one REOPENED Activity is written per reopen.
     - `replies_after_window_30d`: when an external reply lands too late the
-      signal flags the COMMENT Activity `out_of_reopen_window=True` — the
+      signal flags the COMMENT Activity `out_of_reopen_window=True`, the
       authoritative "reopened nothing" record, judged against the window in
       force at the time (which a recompute here could not reproduce).
     - `median_days_to_reply`: days-from-close-to-reply across every post-close
       external reply we can date. A reply that reopened nulled `closed_on`, so
       its delta survives only in the REOPENED Activity's `days_since_close`; a
       reply that did not reopen left its case Closed, so its delta is
-      `commented_on − closed_on`. The median unions both, with no double count —
+      `commented_on − closed_on`. The median unions both, with no double count.
-      a reopened case is no longer Closed, so it drops out of the comment side.
+      A reopened case is no longer Closed, so it drops out of the comment side.
 
     Every query is `org=`-scoped explicitly (RLS is inert for the app's DB role
     in dev/test), so another org's cases, comments and activities cannot leak in.

backend/cases/watcher_views.py

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 """Watch / unwatch / list-watchers REST endpoints.
 
 URL surface (mounted under /api/cases/):
-    POST   /<id>/watch/      — subscribe the requesting profile (idempotent)
+    POST   /<id>/watch/: subscribe the requesting profile (idempotent)
-    DELETE /<id>/watch/      — unsubscribe
+    DELETE /<id>/watch/: unsubscribe
-    GET    /<id>/watchers/   — list everyone watching the case
+    GET    /<id>/watchers/: list everyone watching the case
-    GET    /watching/        — cases the current profile watches
+    GET    /watching/: cases the current profile watches
 
 Authorisation: a user who can see the case can also watch it, using the one
-rule in `cases.access.visible_cases_qs` — admins see everything; non-admins
+rule in `cases.access.visible_cases_qs`, admins see everything; non-admins
 see cases they created OR are assigned to OR already watch (so a watcher who
 was un-assigned can still unsubscribe). This module used to keep its own copy
 of that query, which is how the case detail view came to disagree with it.

backend/common/app_urls/__init__.py

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ urlpatterns = [
         include("business_hours.urls", namespace="api_business_hours"),
     ),
     path("macros/", include("macros.urls", namespace="api_macros")),
-    # Public CSAT (Tier 2 csat) — anonymous, token-scoped. Lives outside
+    # Public CSAT (Tier 2 csat): anonymous, token-scoped. Lives outside
     # any app namespace because the customer reaches it from an emailed
     # link with no auth context.
     path(

backend/common/audit_log.py

@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ class AuditLogger:
         """Log a vertical-pack sample-data clear.
 
         This is the only destructive operation in the vertical-packs
-        feature — apply_pack only ever creates and records itself via
+        feature; apply_pack only ever creates and records itself via
         PackApplication, but clear_sample_data deletes rows and, before
         this, recorded nothing. Any org admin can trigger it, so an audit
         trail of who cleared what, and how many rows, matters for incident

backend/common/base.py

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ from common.mixins import AuditModel
 # sixth copy from quietly dropping the warning.
 SAMPLE_DATA_HELP_TEXT = (
     "True only for demo rows created by common.packs.applier._apply_sample_data. "
-    "Server-set exclusively — never expose this as a writable field on any "
+    "Server-set exclusively, never expose this as a writable field on any "
     "serializer. It is the sole key common.packs.applier.clear_sample_data uses "
     "to decide what to delete, so a client-writable path here would let a user "
     "mark an arbitrary real record as sample and have it deleted."

backend/common/custom_fields.py

@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ def validate_payload(
 
     Returns (cleaned_dict, errors_dict). Non-empty errors -> caller should 400.
     Unknown keys are dropped silently and logged. `existing` is the value
-    currently stored on the entity — required fields already set on the entity
+    currently stored on the entity. Required fields already set on the entity
     are preserved across PATCHes that omit them.
 
     Values tied to soft-deleted (is_active=False) definitions are carried
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ def validate_payload(
 
     # Carry forward existing recognized values (active OR soft-deleted) that
     # the caller didn't touch. Values whose definition was hard-deleted are
-    # dropped — the schema is gone.
+    # dropped. The schema is gone.
     for key, value in existing.items():
         if key in all_keys and key not in value_dict:
             cleaned[key] = value

backend/common/management/commands/create_default_admin.py

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ class Command(BaseCommand):
 
     def handle(self, *args, **options):
         if User.objects.filter(is_superuser=True).exists():
-            self.stdout.write(self.style.SUCCESS("Superuser already exists — skipping."))
+            self.stdout.write(self.style.SUCCESS("Superuser already exists; skipping."))
             return
 
         email = os.environ.get("ADMIN_EMAIL", "admin@localhost")
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ class Command(BaseCommand):
         if not password:
             self.stdout.write(
                 self.style.WARNING(
-                    "WARNING: ADMIN_PASSWORD not set — using default 'admin'. "
+                    "WARNING: ADMIN_PASSWORD not set, using default 'admin'. "
                     "Change it immediately in production!"
                 )
             )

backend/common/management/commands/devlogin.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-"""Mint a JWT for a given user — local-dev only.
+"""Mint a JWT for a given user. Local-dev only.
 
 Refuses to run unless DEBUG is true so this can never produce a token in
 a production environment.
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ class Command(BaseCommand):
             self.stdout.write(f"bound to org:  {org.name} ({org.id})")
         else:
             self.stdout.write(
-                "bound to org:  (none — call /api/auth/orgswitch/ from the UI)"
+                "bound to org:  (none. Call /api/auth/orgswitch/ from the UI)"
             )
         self.stdout.write("")
         self.stdout.write(self.style.SUCCESS("=== Paste into browser devtools ==="))

backend/common/management/commands/seed_data.py

@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ class Command(BaseCommand):
         local-dev workflows have a known name to log into via `manage.py devlogin`.
 
         Uses get_or_create on name so repeated seed runs reuse the same org rather
-        than piling up duplicates — duplicate names break `devlogin --org NAME`
+        than piling up duplicates. Duplicate names break `devlogin --org NAME`
         because it can't disambiguate.
         """
         name = "MicroPyramid" if index == 0 else self._demo_company()

backend/common/middleware/get_company.py

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ class GetProfileAndOrg:
         request.profile = None
         request.org = None
 
-        # Personal Access Token (agent / MCP) — resolve here so org context is
+        # Personal Access Token (agent / MCP). Resolve here so org context is
         # set before RequireOrgContext runs (DRF auth runs too late for that).
         # MUST come before the JWT branch so a PAT bearer is never handed to
         # the JWT decoder.
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ class GetProfileAndOrg:
 
             if not profile:
                 logger.error("No active admin profile found for org %s", organization.id)
-                # Let DRF authentication reject this — raising AuthenticationFailed
+                # Let DRF authentication reject this, raising AuthenticationFailed
                 # here escapes the middleware stack as a 500 instead of a 401.
                 return
 

backend/common/middleware/rls_context.py

@@ -118,10 +118,10 @@ class RequireOrgContext:
         "/admin/",
         "/swagger-ui/",
         "/api/schema/",
-        # Public CSAT survey link (Tier 2 csat) — anonymous, sets RLS
+        # Public CSAT survey link (Tier 2 csat). Anonymous, sets RLS
         # context manually inside the view from the survey's own org_id.
         "/api/public/csat/",
-        # Client portal — the invoice and estimate links emailed to customers.
+        # Client portal: the invoice and estimate links emailed to customers.
         # Anonymous by design: the view authorises on `public_token` alone
         # (see invoices/public_views.py) and never reads request.user or
         # request.org, so requiring org context here rejected every customer
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ class RequireOrgContext:
         #
         # NOTE: this restores reachability, not readability. `_set_org_context`
         # returns early when request.org is None, so these requests run with
-        # `app.current_org` empty — and the isolation policy from
+        # `app.current_org` empty, and the isolation policy from
         # `get_enable_policy_sql` is `org_id::text = NULLIF(current_setting(
         # 'app.current_org', true), '')`, which matches nothing when empty.
         # Verified as `crm_user` (non-superuser, no BYPASSRLS): invoice,
@@ -143,12 +143,12 @@ class RequireOrgContext:
         "/api/public/estimate/",
     ]
 
-    # Paths exempt on an EXACT match only — never prefix-matched like
+    # Paths exempt on an EXACT match only, never prefix-matched like
     # EXEMPT_PATHS above. Mirrors the exact-match pattern already used in
     # common.middleware.get_company.GetProfileAndOrg.process_request
     # (`if request.path in auth_skip_paths`).
     #
-    # GET /api/packs/ is static content read from JSON files in the repo —
+    # GET /api/packs/ is static content read from JSON files in the repo,
     # byte-identical for every tenant, no tenant data whatsoever. It backs
     # the pack chooser on the org-creation page, where a user creating their
     # *first* org has no org_id claim yet, so RequireOrgContext would 403 the

backend/common/migrations/0019_activity_analytics_idx.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Composite index used by the cases analytics aggregation queries — see
+# Composite index used by the cases analytics aggregation queries. See
 # docs/cases/tier2/reporting.md "Data model changes". Lets us scan
 # `Case` Activity rows by (entity_type, action, created_at) inside a single
 # org without re-walking the whole table.

backend/common/migrations/0029_delete_sessiontoken.py

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 """Drop the unused `session_token` table.
 
 `SessionToken` was added as "Phase 3: JWT Token Tracking" but was never wired
-up — nothing in any view, middleware, serializer, or task ever created, read,
+up, nothing in any view, middleware, serializer, or task ever created, read,
 or revoked a row. Its only consumer was a Django admin page listing a
 permanently empty table, which read as a working session-revocation feature
 that did not exist.

backend/common/migrations/0031_backfill_portal_tokens.py

@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ the strategy only decides *which rows are visible*:
 
 * If an empty context still exposes rows (a superuser / RLS-disabled dev DB,
   where one deployment can have thousands of orgs), a single unscoped pass sees
-  everything — O(rows), not O(orgs × rows).
+  everything, O(rows), not O(orgs × rows).
 * If an empty context hides rows (a correctly-configured non-superuser prod
   role), the pass sees nothing, so it falls back to iterating orgs and setting
-  ``app.current_org`` for each — O(orgs) cheap lookups, each seeing only its own
+  ``app.current_org`` for each: O(orgs) cheap lookups, each seeing only its own
   rows.
 """
 

backend/common/migrations/0034_rls_pipeline_tables.py

@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@
 # task_stage all carry org_id directly, but they were absent from
 # ORG_SCOPED_TABLES and no migration ever created their policies. The apps that
 # created the tables (leads/0012, cases/0009, tasks/0009) contain no RLS SQL,
-# and common/0028 only iterates RLS_CONFIG["tables"] — which did not list them.
+# and common/0028 only iterates RLS_CONFIG["tables"], which did not list them.
 #
 # Deployed databases had the policies from an out-of-band step, so the gap was
-# invisible there. A database built purely from migrations — CI, and any fresh
+# invisible there. A database built purely from migrations: CI, and any fresh
-# deploy — got none, leaving these tables with no safety net beneath the ORM's
+# deploy, got none, leaving these tables with no safety net beneath the ORM's
 # org filters. Vertical packs write to all six on every apply, which is what
 # made the gap load-bearing rather than theoretical.
 #

backend/common/models.py

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ class User(AbstractBaseUser, PermissionsMixin):
 
     def save(self, *args, **kwargs):
         # On first save only, fall back to the email local-part when no name
-        # was supplied — keeps `name` non-empty without overwriting later
+        # was supplied. Keeps `name` non-empty without overwriting later
         # edits (PATCHing name to "" leaves it empty by user intent).
         if self._state.adding and not self.name and self.email:
             self.name = self.email.split("@", 1)[0][:255]
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ class Org(BaseModel):
         max_length=2, choices=COUNTRIES, blank=True, null=True
     )
 
-    # CSAT (Tier 2 csat). Org-level kill switch — when False, the
+    # CSAT (Tier 2 csat). Org-level kill switch, when False, the
     # post-close signal short-circuits before any survey email is sent.
     csat_enabled = models.BooleanField(default=True)
 
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ class Org(BaseModel):
     # explicit confirmation; this flag only controls the default state.
     auto_close_children_on_parent_close = models.BooleanField(default=False)
 
-    # Vertical packs. Descriptive only — records which pack was applied at
+    # Vertical packs. Descriptive only: records which pack was applied at
     # signup. NEVER used in a permission check or a queryset filter.
     vertical = models.CharField(
         max_length=64,
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ class Activity(BaseModel):
         ("VIEW", "Viewed"),
         ("COMMENT", "Commented"),
         ("ASSIGN", "Assigned"),
-        # Cases roadmap verb registry — see docs/cases/COORDINATION_DECISIONS.md D1.
+        # Cases roadmap verb registry: see docs/cases/COORDINATION_DECISIONS.md D1.
         ("STATUS_CHANGED", "Status Changed"),
         ("PRIORITY_CHANGED", "Priority Changed"),
         ("ROUTED", "Routed"),
@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ class Notification(BaseModel):
     """In-app notification delivered to a single recipient.
 
     Per `docs/cases/COORDINATION_DECISIONS.md` D2 we inherit BaseModel and
-    declare our own `org` FK rather than using BaseOrgModel — RLS still
+    declare our own `org` FK rather than using BaseOrgModel. RLS still
     applies via the migration in 0018.
     """
 
@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ class PersonalAccessToken(BaseOrgModel):
     token_hash = models.CharField(max_length=64, unique=True, db_index=True)
     token_prefix = models.CharField(max_length=20)
     # NOTE: scopes are stored for forward-compatibility but are NOT enforced in
-    # Phase 1 — a token always inherits the owning profile's full role/permissions.
+    # Phase 1: a token always inherits the owning profile's full role/permissions.
     # Do not treat `scopes` as a trust boundary until enforcement lands.
     scopes = models.JSONField(default=list, blank=True)
     expires_at = models.DateTimeField(null=True, blank=True)
@@ -910,15 +910,15 @@ class PersonalAccessToken(BaseOrgModel):
 class PortalAccessToken(models.Model):
     """Unscoped ``token_hash → org`` lookup for anonymous portal requests.
 
-    The public portal endpoints — the invoice and estimate links emailed to
+    The public portal endpoints: the invoice and estimate links emailed to
-    customers, and the CSAT survey link — arrive with no auth and no org
+    customers, and the CSAT survey link, arrive with no auth and no org
     context. RLS is keyed on ``app.current_org``, so with an empty context the
     isolation policy hides the very row (invoice / estimate / csat_survey) that
     would tell us which org the token belongs to. That is a chicken-and-egg:
     you cannot set the context until you know the org, and you cannot read the
     org until the context is set.
 
-    This table breaks it. It is deliberately **not** org-scoped — it is absent
+    This table breaks it. It is deliberately **not** org-scoped. It is absent
     from ``common.rls.ORG_SCOPED_TABLES`` and carries no RLS policy, so it is
     readable with an empty context. A public view hashes the URL token, looks
     up the org here, calls ``set_rls_context(org_id)``, and only then reads the
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ class PortalAccessToken(models.Model):
 
     The key is ``sha256(url_token)``. For invoices and estimates the URL token
     is the raw ``public_token``; for CSAT it is the signed token whose SHA-256
-    is already the stored ``csat_survey.token_hash`` — so a single hash resolves
+    is already the stored ``csat_survey.token_hash``, so a single hash resolves
     all three. The row leaks only the *existence* of a token to somebody who
     already holds it; the resource contents stay behind RLS, and a disabled or
     deleted resource still 404s because the view's own scoped query re-checks

backend/common/notifications.py

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ future apps). Writes a `Notification` row, then best-effort publishes the
 new row's id on a Redis pub/sub channel so the SSE consumer can fan it out
 to any open browser tabs for that recipient.
 
-Channel naming: ``notif:<org_id>:<profile_id>`` — see
+Channel naming: ``notif:<org_id>:<profile_id>``. See
 ``docs/cases/tier2/in-app-notifications.md`` "Cross-org leak".
 """
 
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ _redis_lock = threading.Lock()
 def _get_redis():
     """Lazy redis-py client keyed off CELERY_BROKER_URL.
 
-    Returns None if redis is unavailable (e.g. test environments) — callers
+    Returns None if redis is unavailable (e.g. test environments). Callers
     must treat publish as best-effort.
     """
     global _redis_client
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ def _publish(channel: str, payload: str) -> None:
     try:
         client.publish(channel, payload)
     except Exception as exc:
-        # Publish failure must never break the originating request — the
+        # Publish failure must never break the originating request. The
         # row is already persisted and the user sees it on next poll/load.
         logger.warning("notifications publish failed on %s: %s", channel, exc)
 

backend/common/packs/applier.py

@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ def _apply_tags(org, pack: dict, report: _Report) -> None:
 
 def _apply_products(org, pack: dict, report: _Report) -> None:
     for product in pack.get("products") or []:
-        # sku is mandatory in a manifest — see schema._validate_product.
+        # sku is mandatory in a manifest. See schema._validate_product.
         if Product.objects.filter(org=org, sku=product["sku"]).exists():
             report.add_skipped("product", product["name"])
             continue
@@ -147,12 +147,12 @@ def _apply_products(org, pack: dict, report: _Report) -> None:
 
 def _apply_terminology(org, pack: dict, report: _Report) -> None:
     # `org` is the caller's in-memory object, loaded before apply_pack opened
-    # its transaction — it can already be stale (e.g. a second apply of a
+    # its transaction. It can already be stale (e.g. a second apply of a
     # different pack applied via the same object, or genuine concurrency).
     # Deciding "already set?" from that snapshot and then saving it back
     # would overwrite whatever the DB row actually holds. Re-read the row
     # under a lock, INSIDE this transaction, and decide from the locked row
-    # instead — that is the only copy of the truth we write from.
+    # instead. That is the only copy of the truth we write from.
     locked = Org.objects.select_for_update().get(pk=org.pk)
 
     terminology = pack.get("terminology") or {}
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ def _apply_terminology(org, pack: dict, report: _Report) -> None:
         current.update(added)
         locked.terminology = current
         changed_fields.append("terminology")
-    # Set regardless of whether this pack carries any terminology — a
+    # Set regardless of whether this pack carries any terminology, a
     # pipeline-only or products-only pack still applied, and vertical is the
     # field that records that.
     if not locked.vertical:
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ def _sample_models():
     Ordered as the applier creates them and, reversed, as clear_sample_data
     deletes them: a referenced row exists before the row referencing it, and is
     removed after. Defined once so the apply guard, the applier and the clear
-    can never disagree about what "sample data" covers — a seventh entity added
+    can never disagree about what "sample data" covers, a seventh entity added
     to one list but not the others is the failure mode this shape prevents.
     """
     from accounts.models import Account
@@ -219,12 +219,12 @@ def _create_sample(report, type_: str, name: str, build):
 
     The except covers *only* `build()`. It used to wrap the tags.add() /
     assigned_to.add() follow-up too, and blamed every IntegrityError on a
-    duplicate email — which was wrong, and silent, for the one it actually
+    duplicate email, which was wrong, and silent, for the one it actually
     produced: assigned_to.add(None) when actor is None. Keeping the M2M work
     outside is what stops this clause from misreporting an unrelated integrity
     error as a collision. ValidationError is caught alongside because Task.save
     calls full_clean, so a bad sample task raises Django's ValidationError
-    rather than an IntegrityError — uncaught, that is a 500 out of an endpoint
+    rather than an IntegrityError. Uncaught, that is a 500 out of an endpoint
     whose whole contract is "additive, never fatal".
     """
     from django.core.exceptions import ValidationError
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ def _apply_sample_data(org, pack: dict, actor, report: _Report) -> None:
     if not any(sample.get(key) for key in SAMPLE_ENTITY_KEYS):
         return
 
-    # is_sample, not the tag, is the re-apply guard — a tag is just a label a
+    # is_sample, not the tag, is the re-apply guard. A tag is just a label a
     # user can freely rename/delete/attach, so it must never gate anything this
     # module decides from. See clear_sample_data for the matching deletion-side
     # rule. The guard spans every sample model, not just Lead: a pack whose
@@ -264,9 +264,9 @@ def _apply_sample_data(org, pack: dict, actor, report: _Report) -> None:
             report.add_skipped("sample_data", pack["id"])
             return
 
-    # The tag is attached purely for visibility/filtering in the UI — it
+    # The tag is attached purely for visibility/filtering in the UI. It
     # carries no authority over what apply/clear do. Adopting this tag onto a
-    # real record (or renaming another tag onto this slug) is harmless —
+    # real record (or renaming another tag onto this slug) is harmless,
     # nothing destructive keys off it.
     sample_tag, _ = Tags.objects.get_or_create(
         org=org, slug=SAMPLE_TAG_SLUG, defaults={"name": SAMPLE_TAG_NAME, "color": "gray"}
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ def _apply_sample_data(org, pack: dict, actor, report: _Report) -> None:
             return
         obj.tags.add(sample_tag)
         # actor is optional (PackApplication.applied_by is nullable for the
-        # same reason — a caller may apply without an assigning admin, e.g. a
+        # same reason. A caller may apply without an assigning admin, e.g. a
         # future management command). Without an assignee the admin who applied
         # the pack has no ordinary "my records" query that reaches these rows,
         # but that is a lesser loss than silently mis-skipping every sample row,
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ def _apply_sample_data(org, pack: dict, actor, report: _Report) -> None:
         if actor is not None:
             obj.assigned_to.add(actor)
 
-    # Every reference below resolves against these maps alone — rows this apply
+    # Every reference below resolves against these maps alone. Rows this apply
     # just created. Never against a queryset of the org's existing records: a
     # sample contact that latched onto a tenant's real "Acme Corp" would put demo
     # rows inside real customer data, and would then make that real account a
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ def _apply_sample_data(org, pack: dict, actor, report: _Report) -> None:
             finish(obj)
             # Account.contacts is the M2M the account page actually reads; the
             # Contact.account FK alone leaves the account's contact list empty.
-            # See the "two account links on Contact" split — both are populated
+            # See the "two account links on Contact" split. Both are populated
             # here so the demo looks right from either side.
             if obj.account_id:
                 obj.account.contacts.add(obj)
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ def _apply_sample_data(org, pack: dict, actor, report: _Report) -> None:
                 due_date=s.get("due_date"),
                 description=s.get("description"),
                 stage=task_stages.get(s.get("stage")),
-                # At most one of these is set — schema._validate_sample_data
+                # At most one of these is set; schema._validate_sample_data
                 # rejects a pack that names more, matching Task.clean.
                 account=accounts.get(s.get("account")),
                 opportunity=deals.get(s.get("deal")),
@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ def _ids_with_foreign_children(model, ids: list, retained_pks: set) -> set:
 
     `retained_pks` is the exception, and it is what makes retention hold. A
     sample ticket kept because it carries billable time is no longer going
-    anywhere — so its sample account must be kept too, or deleting the account
+    anywhere, so its sample account must be kept too, or deleting the account
     would cascade the ticket away and take that billable time with it, which is
     exactly the loss the retention rule exists to prevent. Because the loop runs
     children first, every retained child is already known by the time its parent
@@ -507,8 +507,8 @@ def _ids_with_foreign_children(model, ids: list, retained_pks: set) -> set:
 def clear_sample_data(org, actor=None) -> dict:
     """Delete the demo records the applier created for THIS org, and nothing else.
 
-    Keyed on `is_sample` alone — a server-set, non-serializer-writable boolean on
+    Keyed on `is_sample` alone. A server-set, non-serializer-writable boolean on
-    all six models — never on the "Sample data" tag. `Tags.save()` recomputes its
+    all six models, never on the "Sample data" tag. `Tags.save()` recomputes its
     slug on every save and the tag CRUD endpoints have no reserved-slug guard, so
     the tag can be renamed onto this slug, adopted from an existing tag, or
     attached to any real record through the ordinary tag picker. None of that is
@@ -525,23 +525,23 @@ def clear_sample_data(org, actor=None) -> dict:
 
     2. **Never take real data with it, and never fail because of it.** A user who
        logs a real deal against a demo account, bills hours against a demo
-       ticket, or raises a real invoice on a demo account must lose none of it —
+       ticket, or raises a real invoice on a demo account must lose none of it,
        and in the invoice case a naive delete would not merely lose data, it
        would raise ProtectedError and abort the entire clear. Any sample row
        still referenced by a non-sample row is kept and reported as retained.
 
-    Returns {"deleted": {type: n}, "retained": {type: n}} — retained is a normal
+    Returns {"deleted": {type: n}, "retained": {type: n}}. Retained is a normal
     outcome, not an error, and the UI is expected to say so.
 
     `actor` is optional (mirrors apply_pack's PackApplication.applied_by) and is
-    used only to attribute the audit record — it plays no part in the delete,
+    used only to attribute the audit record. It plays no part in the delete,
     which is already org-scoped.
     """
     from common.audit_log import audit_log
 
     deleted: dict[str, int] = {}
     retained: dict[str, int] = {}
-    # Accumulated across models so a kept child keeps its parent — see
+    # Accumulated across models so a kept child keeps its parent. See
     # _ids_with_foreign_children.
     retained_pks: set = set()
 
@@ -561,14 +561,14 @@ def clear_sample_data(org, actor=None) -> dict:
 
             # `_total` sums every row the collector removed, including the M2M
             # through-table rows (tags/contacts/assigned_to/teams) cascaded off
-            # each deleted record — not the number of records deleted. Pull the
+            # each deleted record, not the number of records deleted. Pull the
             # model-specific count from the per-model breakdown instead of a
             # second, racy count() query.
             count = by_model.get(model._meta.label, 0)
             if count:
                 deleted[type_] = count
 
-    # This is the only destructive operation in the feature — apply_pack records
+    # This is the only destructive operation in the feature; apply_pack records
     # itself via PackApplication, so a delete leaving no trace at all would be
     # the odd one out. See AuditLogger.sample_data_cleared.
     audit_log.sample_data_cleared(
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ def apply_pack(org, pack: dict, actor) -> dict:
     # actor must belong to org. _apply_sample_data does
     # lead.assigned_to.add(actor) with no further org check of its own, so
     # without this guard a caller that passes a mismatched (org, actor) pair
-    # — e.g. an org-B apply given an org-A profile — creates cross-org
+    #; e.g. an org-B apply given an org-A profile: creates cross-org
     # assignments: an org-A profile ends up assigned to org-B's leads, and
     # that profile can then read those leads through an ordinary "my leads"
     # query, which is a tenant-isolation break. This is enforced here, not
@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ def apply_pack(org, pack: dict, actor) -> dict:
     if actor is not None and actor.org_id != org.id:
         raise ValueError("actor must belong to the org the pack is being applied to")
 
-    # Serialize concurrent applies to the same org — keyed on org alone, not
+    # Serialize concurrent applies to the same org, keyed on org alone, not
     # org+pack. Two of our match keys (pipeline name, invoice template name)
     # are conventions rather than DB constraints, so without this two racing
     # applies of the same pack could both pass the existence check and both
@@ -605,13 +605,13 @@ def apply_pack(org, pack: dict, actor) -> dict:
     # both cases.
     #
     # pg_advisory_xact_lock is Postgres-only. Production and every real
-    # deployment run Postgres (RLS requires it — see RLS_SETUP.md), but the
+    # deployment run Postgres (RLS requires it: see RLS_SETUP.md), but the
     # test suite runs on SQLite (crm/test_settings.py), which has no such
     # function and would raise OperationalError. Guard on connection.vendor,
     # matching the existing pattern in common/tasks.py's set_rls_context and
     # common/management/commands/manage_rls.py: skip the Postgres-only
     # statement on other backends instead of trying to emulate it. This is a
-    # real no-op only on SQLite, which is test-only in this codebase — on
+    # real no-op only on SQLite, which is test-only in this codebase. On
     # every backend that ships to production, the lock is taken.
     from django.db import connection
 

backend/common/packs/loader.py

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 """Registry of vertical packs, built once from backend/packs/*.json.
 
-Pack ids are dict keys, never filesystem paths — a caller-supplied id can only
+Pack ids are dict keys, never filesystem paths. A caller-supplied id can only
 hit or miss this dict, so there is no traversal or SSRF surface.
 """
 
@@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ def get_registry() -> dict[str, dict]:
 
 
 def get_pack(pack_id: str) -> dict | None:
-    """Look up a pack by id. Unknown ids — including anything path-shaped — return None."""
+    """Look up a pack by id. Unknown ids, including anything path-shaped, return None."""
     return get_registry().get(pack_id)

backend/common/packs/schema.py

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 """Strict validation for vertical-pack manifests.
 
-Unknown keys are errors, not ignored — a typo in a pack file must fail in CI,
+Unknown keys are errors, not ignored. A typo in a pack file must fail in CI,
 not silently drop a stage. See docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-01-vertical-packs-design.md §6.
 """
 
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ TOP_LEVEL_KEYS = {
     "custom_fields", "tags", "products", "sample_data",
 }
 
-#  is_default is a recognised key on both — not a typo — but is rejected by
+#  is_default is a recognised key on both, not a typo, but is rejected by
 # _reject_is_default with a specific message rather than lumped in with
 # genuinely unknown keys. See _reject_is_default for why this matters.
 PIPELINE_KEYS = {"name", "description", "stages", "is_default"}
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ SAMPLE_TASK_KEYS = {
 }
 
 # Every entity `sample_data` understands, in the order the applier creates them
-# — a later entity may reference an earlier one by name, never the reverse.
+#. A later entity may reference an earlier one by name, never the reverse.
 # Tasks are last because a task is the only row that can point at any of the
 # other five. common.packs.applier imports this rather than restating it.
 SAMPLE_ENTITY_KEYS = ("accounts", "contacts", "deals", "tickets", "leads", "tasks")
@@ -96,14 +96,14 @@ def _reject_is_default(where: str, obj: dict) -> None:
     # containing is_default gets this specific, actionable message instead of
     # a generic unknown-key error. is_default is deliberately INCLUDED in
     # PIPELINE_KEYS/STAGE_KEYS (a recognised key, not a typo) precisely so
-    # _reject_unknown does not also flag it — this guard must be the sole
+    # _reject_unknown does not also flag it. This guard must be the sole
     # gatekeeper, or a stub-to-no-op could hide behind _reject_unknown's
     # "unknown key(s) [...]" message, which also contains the substring
     # "is_default" and would let a loose regex match pass for the wrong
     # reason.
     if isinstance(obj, dict) and "is_default" in obj:
         raise PackValidationError(
-            f"{where}: is_default is not allowed in a pack — the admin promotes a default"
+            f"{where}: is_default is not allowed in a pack, the admin promotes a default"
         )
 
 
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ def _stage_type_choices(pipeline_key: str) -> set[str]:
     CaseStage = open/closed/rejected (cases/models.py:531),
     TaskStage = open/in_progress/completed (tasks/models.py:240).
     Lazy-imported so schema.py stays importable before the Django app
-    registry is configured — same reasoning as _validate_tag's lazy import
+    registry is configured, same reasoning as _validate_tag's lazy import
     of Tags.
     """
     from cases.models import CaseStage
@@ -131,10 +131,10 @@ def _stage_type_choices(pipeline_key: str) -> set[str]:
 def _maps_to_status_choices(pipeline_key: str) -> set[str] | None:
     """maps_to_status choices also differ per pipeline model. LeadStage maps
     to LEAD_STATUS and CaseStage maps to STATUS_CHOICE (leads/models.py:293,
-    cases/models.py:551) — both plain tuples in common/utils.py, lazy-imported
+    cases/models.py:551), both plain tuples in common/utils.py, lazy-imported
     for consistency with _stage_type_choices even though they don't touch the
     app registry. TaskStage.maps_to_status has no `choices` at all
-    (tasks/models.py:257 — a freeform CharField), so there is no vocabulary to
+    (tasks/models.py:257. A freeform CharField), so there is no vocabulary to
     validate task-pipeline stages against: this returns None and the caller
     skips the check rather than inventing a restriction the model doesn't
     have.
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ def _require(where: str, obj: dict, *keys: str) -> None:
 def _validate_choice(where: str, value, field: str, allowed: set[str]) -> None:
     """Reject a value the model's `choices` would reject.
 
-    Django does not enforce `choices` on .create() — only full_clean() does, and
+    Django does not enforce `choices` on .create(), only full_clean() does, and
     of the six sample models only Task calls it. So without this check a pack
     could write a stage or status no UI can render and no filter can find, and
     the row would look fine in the DB. Skips None/absent: every one of these
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ def _reference_index(where: str, rows: list, key_of, label: str) -> set[str]:
     """Build the set of names later entities may reference, rejecting duplicates.
 
     A reference is resolved by name, so two sample accounts called "Northwind"
-    would make `"account": "Northwind"` ambiguous — and the applier would pick
+    would make `"account": "Northwind"` ambiguous, and the applier would pick
     one arbitrarily. Catching it here keeps the reference scheme honest.
     """
     seen: set[str] = set()
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ def _reference_index(where: str, rows: list, key_of, label: str) -> set[str]:
         name = key_of(row)
         if name in seen:
             raise PackValidationError(
-                f"{where}[{i}]: duplicate {label} {name!r} — sample references are by name, "
+                f"{where}[{i}]: duplicate {label} {name!r}. Sample references are by name, "
                 "so each must be unique within the pack"
             )
         seen.add(name)
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ def _validate_sample_data(where: str, sample: dict, raw: dict) -> None:
     """Validate sample_data, including every cross-entity name reference.
 
     References are checked against the pack's own lists, not the database,
-    because that is the only thing true at authoring time — and because the
+    because that is the only thing true at authoring time, and because the
     applier deliberately resolves them the same way. A sample contact must
     never attach itself to a tenant's real account (see _apply_sample_data),
     so "resolvable" here means "declared in this pack" and nothing wider.
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ def _validate_sample_data(where: str, sample: dict, raw: dict) -> None:
         _validate_choice(at, row.get("stage"), "stage", lead_stages)
         # Lead.source and Lead.status carry `choices` the applier never checks.
         # Both were unvalidated here until three shipped packs were found writing
-        # source="website" — a value LEAD_SOURCE does not contain, so the demo row
+        # source="website". A value LEAD_SOURCE does not contain, so the demo row
         # rendered as a blank dropdown and no source filter could reach it. The
         # row looked fine in the database, which is precisely why this needs a
         # schema check rather than trust.

backend/common/pat_auth.py

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ class PATAuthentication(BaseAuthentication):
     def authenticate(self, request):
         raw = _extract_raw(request)
         if not raw:
-            return None  # Not a PAT — let JWT / org-key auth handle it.
+            return None  # Not a PAT. Let JWT / org-key auth handle it.
 
         # The GetProfileAndOrg middleware resolves the PAT first (so org
         # context is set before RequireOrgContext runs) and stashes it on the

backend/common/permissions.py

@@ -65,12 +65,12 @@ class IsSuperAdmin(permissions.BasePermission):
 
     Super admin is an explicit, deliberately granted flag on the user record
     (``User.is_superuser``), never inferred from the email address. Deriving it
-    from an email domain would hand platform-wide access — every org, every
+    from an email domain would hand platform-wide access: every org, every
-    user — to anyone who can obtain an account at that domain, turning an
+    user. To anyone who can obtain an account at that domain, turning an
     ordinary signup into vertical privilege escalation.
 
     Grant it with ``manage.py createsuperuser``, the Django admin, or another
-    audited path — not by handing out an email address.
+    audited path, not by handing out an email address.
     """
 
     message = "Super admin access required."

backend/common/portal_tokens.py

@@ -9,13 +9,13 @@ it.
 
 The lookup key is always ``sha256(url_token)``:
 
-* invoice / estimate — the URL token is the raw ``public_token``;
+* invoice / estimate. The URL token is the raw ``public_token``;
-* CSAT — the URL token is the signed token, and ``cases.tasks.hash_csat_token``
+* CSAT: the URL token is the signed token, and ``cases.tasks.hash_csat_token``
   already stores its SHA-256 as ``csat_survey.token_hash``.
 
 Registration is called from the same place each token is minted, so the lookup
 never drifts from the source of truth. Resolution is deliberately side-effect
-free apart from returning the org id — the caller sets the RLS context.
+free apart from returning the org id. The caller sets the RLS context.
 """
 
 import hashlib
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ from common.models import PortalAccessToken
 
 
 def portal_token_hash(url_token: str) -> str:
-    """SHA-256 hex digest of a raw URL token — the lookup key."""
+    """SHA-256 hex digest of a raw URL token. The lookup key."""
     return hashlib.sha256(url_token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
 
 
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ def register_portal_token(url_token, org_id, resource_type, resource_id) -> None
 
 
 def register_portal_token_hash(token_hash, org_id, resource_type, resource_id) -> None:
-    """Upsert by pre-computed hash — for callers that only store the hash (CSAT)."""
+    """Upsert by pre-computed hash, for callers that only store the hash (CSAT)."""
     if not token_hash or not org_id:
         return
     PortalAccessToken.objects.update_or_create(
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ def register_portal_token_hash(token_hash, org_id, resource_type, resource_id) -
 def resolve_portal_org(url_token, resource_type=None):
     """Resolve the org id for a raw URL token, or ``None`` if unknown.
 
-    Reads the unscoped lookup only — no org-scoped table is touched, so it works
+    Reads the unscoped lookup only, no org-scoped table is touched, so it works
     with an empty RLS context. When ``resource_type`` is given it must match,
     so an estimate token cannot resolve on the invoice endpoint. The caller is
     responsible for ``set_rls_context`` and for the resource query that

backend/common/rls/__init__.py

@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ ORG_SCOPED_TABLES = [
     "accounts",  # Note: plural
     "contacts",  # Note: plural
     "opportunity",
-    "sales_goal",  # SalesGoal quota/target — org-scoped, see opportunity/0012
+    "sales_goal",  # SalesGoal quota/target: org-scoped, see opportunity/0012
-    # Both org-scoped opportunity children were live but unregistered — the
+    # Both org-scoped opportunity children were live but unregistered, the
     # policy tooling (manage_rls --status, audits) could not see them. RLS is
     # stamped from source by common/0011 (line items) and opportunity/0013
     # (stage aging); these entries put them back under central governance.
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ ORG_SCOPED_TABLES = [
     # Business hours (Tier 2 business-hours-sla)
     "business_calendar",
     "business_holiday",
-    # Macros / canned responses (Tier 2 macros) — RLS is enabled by the
+    # Macros / canned responses (Tier 2 macros). RLS is enabled by the
     # migration; this entry registers the table with the central status
     # tooling (manage_rls --status, audit verifications).
     "macro",
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ ORG_SCOPED_TABLES = [
     "approval_rule",
     "approval",
     # MCP / programmatic access
-    # NOTE: personal_access_token is intentionally NOT RLS-protected — it is an
+    # NOTE: personal_access_token is intentionally NOT RLS-protected. It is an
     # auth-bootstrap table (looked up by token_hash before any tenant context
     # exists), mirroring the Org table. Isolation for token management is enforced
     # by explicit org+profile filters in common/views/pat_views.py.

backend/common/search_views.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-"""Org-scoped global search behind ``GET /api/search/?q=`` — the ⌘K palette.
+"""Org-scoped global search behind ``GET /api/search/?q=``, the ⌘K palette.
 
 ONE endpoint, deliberately. The org comes from the JWT (`request.profile.org`)
 exactly once and every queryset is filtered by it; a per-model fan-out from the
@@ -7,13 +7,13 @@ browser would be as many chances to read another tenant's rows.
 Each type also honours the SAME read visibility as its own list view, so search
 can never surface a record the caller could not open from the list:
 
-* leads / opportunities / invoices — admin (role ``ADMIN`` or a Django
+* leads / opportunities / invoices, admin (role ``ADMIN`` or a Django
   superuser) sees the whole org; everyone else sees only what they created or
   were assigned.
-* accounts / contacts — admin (role ``ADMIN`` or the org-admin flag) sees the
+* accounts / contacts, admin (role ``ADMIN`` or the org-admin flag) sees the
   whole org; everyone else sees created-or-assigned.
-* tickets — reuse ``visible_cases_qs`` (adds the watcher clause).
+* tickets. Reuse ``visible_cases_qs`` (adds the watcher clause).
-* knowledge-base articles — org-wide, every member reads them.
+* knowledge-base articles. Org-wide, every member reads them.
 
 Matching stays on the server; the whole record set never reaches the browser.
 """
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ from invoices.models import Invoice
 from leads.models import Lead
 from opportunity.models import Opportunity
 
-# Rows per type. Small on purpose — the palette shows a handful per group and
+# Rows per type. Small on purpose. The palette shows a handful per group and
 # the point is the fastest match, not an exhaustive report.
 PER_TYPE = 6
 # One-character queries match almost everything; wait for a second character.
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ def _own_filter(profile):
     """The created-or-assigned clause every assignable list view uses.
 
     ``created_by`` is a FK to ``User`` (not Profile), so it is compared against
-    ``profile.user`` — comparing it to the Profile is the silent always-False
+    ``profile.user``: comparing it to the Profile is the silent always-False
     bug this codebase has hit before.
     """
     return Q(created_by=profile.user) | Q(assigned_to=profile)
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ def _scope_superuser(qs, profile, user):
 
 
 class GlobalSearchView(APIView):
-    """``GET /api/search/?q=<query>`` — a handful of matches per record type."""
+    """``GET /api/search/?q=<query>``. A handful of matches per record type."""
 
     permission_classes = (IsAuthenticated, HasOrgContext)
 
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ class GlobalSearchView(APIView):
                 }
             )
 
-        # Tickets (Case) — the module's own read-visibility helper
+        # Tickets (Case): the module's own read-visibility helper
         cases = (
             visible_cases_qs(profile)
             .select_related("account")
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ class GlobalSearchView(APIView):
                 }
             )
 
-        # Knowledge base (Solution) — org-wide, every member reads
+        # Knowledge base (Solution): org-wide, every member reads
         solutions = Solution.objects.filter(org=org).filter(
             Q(title__icontains=q) | Q(description__icontains=q)
         )[:PER_TYPE]

backend/common/serializer.py

@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ class CommentCreateSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
 
 
 class NotificationSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
-    """In-app notification — list/feed shape returned by GET and SSE."""
+    """In-app notification. List/feed shape returned by GET and SSE."""
 
     actor = CommentUserSerializer(read_only=True)
 
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ class LeadCommentSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
 
 class CustomFieldDefinitionSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
     """Per-org custom-field definition. key/target_model/field_type are immutable
-    after creation — admins must create a new definition to change shape."""
+    after creation. Admins must create a new definition to change shape."""
 
     class Meta:
         model = CustomFieldDefinition
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ class CreateProfileSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
         # a caller that forgets to pass it fails closed: the worst outcome of a
         # missing flag is that a privileged field is ignored, never that an
         # unprivileged caller gets to set one. A plain member editing their own
-        # profile could otherwise PATCH themselves to role="ADMIN" — a live
+        # profile could otherwise PATCH themselves to role="ADMIN". A live
         # privilege escalation this closes by making these fields read_only
         # (so they are silently ignored) when the caller may not grant them.
         can_grant = kwargs.pop("can_grant_privileges", False)
@@ -602,13 +602,13 @@ class ProfileSelfUpdateSerializer(serializers.Serializer):
     and the ``has_*_access`` / ``is_organization_admin`` flags are NOT here:
     those decide permissions and are an admin's to set. Leaving them out is what
     keeps this self-edit endpoint from becoming the same self-serve privilege
-    escalation ``CreateProfileSerializer`` once was — a field the serializer does
+    escalation ``CreateProfileSerializer`` once was. A field the serializer does
     not name cannot be written, no matter what the request body contains.
 
     ``phone`` is validated (not written raw as the view used to), so a bad value
     is a clean 400 instead of an unvalidated string in the column. A blank phone
-    is allowed and clears it — ``allow_blank`` short-circuits before the regex,
+    is allowed and clears it, ``allow_blank`` short-circuits before the regex,
-    which requires 7–25 characters.
+    which requires 7-25 characters.
     """
 
     name = serializers.CharField(required=False, allow_blank=True, max_length=255)
@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ class DocumentSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):
 
     @extend_schema_field(list)
     def get_teams(self, obj):
-        # `member_count` is what a reader needs to understand a team share —
+        # `member_count` is what a reader needs to understand a team share;
         # "Support (3)" says how many people the pick actually reaches, which a
         # bare team name does not. Naming the team rather than flattening it to
         # its members keeps the share meaning what was chosen as people join and

backend/common/signals.py

@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ def opportunity_post_delete(sender, instance, **kwargs):
     create_activity(instance, "DELETE", "Opportunity")
 
 
-# Cases use a richer signal handler module — see cases/signals.py for
+# Cases use a richer signal handler module. See cases/signals.py for
 # STATUS_CHANGED / PRIORITY_CHANGED / ASSIGN / COMMENT / LINKED_SOLUTION etc.
 
 

backend/common/tasks.py

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ def set_rls_context(org_id):
     Args:
         org_id: Organization UUID (string or UUID object)
     """
-    # SQLite (test backend) has no set_config() — RLS is a Postgres feature.
+    # SQLite (test backend) has no set_config(). RLS is a Postgres feature.
     if connection.vendor != "postgresql":
         return
     if org_id:
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ def send_magic_link_email(token_id, raw_code=None):
     """Send a magic-link or OTP-code email for passwordless authentication.
 
     For `delivery == "code"` rows, the caller passes `raw_code` (the plaintext
-    OTP) — only the hash is stored on the token row, so the plaintext can't be
+    OTP), only the hash is stored on the token row, so the plaintext can't be
     recovered from the DB by this task.
     """
     magic_token = MagicLinkToken.objects.filter(id=token_id).first()
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ def purge_read_notifications(days=NOTIFICATION_PURGE_DAYS):
     """Delete already-read notifications older than ``days`` days.
 
     Schedule via celery-beat (recommended cadence: nightly). Runs once across
-    all orgs — RLS does not need a per-org context here because the query
+    all orgs. RLS does not need a per-org context here because the query
     targets `read_at`, which is intrinsic to the row, not org-scoped logic.
     """
     cutoff = timezone.now() - timedelta(days=days)
@@ -405,12 +405,12 @@ def flush_expired_refresh_tokens():
     `OutstandingToken` row per token minted and one `BlacklistedToken` row per
     rotation. An expired token is rejected on its `exp` claim regardless of
     blacklist state, so those rows stop carrying security value once
-    `expires_at` passes — and would otherwise grow unbounded, one row per login
+    `expires_at` passes, and would otherwise grow unbounded, one row per login
     and per refresh. Deleting the outstanding row cascades to its blacklist
     entry.
 
     Equivalent to simplejwt's `manage.py flushexpiredtokens`; schedule via
-    celery-beat (nightly is plenty). Not org-scoped — `expires_at` is intrinsic
+    celery-beat (nightly is plenty). Not org-scoped; `expires_at` is intrinsic
     to the row, so no RLS context is needed.
 
     Returns the number of outstanding-token rows removed.

backend/common/tests/test_custom_fields.py

@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ class TestValidatePayload:
 
     def test_inactive_definition_preserves_existing_value(self, org_a):
         """Soft-deleting a definition must NOT wipe historical values on
-        the next save — admins can deactivate a field without data loss."""
+        the next save. Admins can deactivate a field without data loss."""
         self._defn(org_a, is_active=False)
         cleaned, errors = validate_payload(
             "Case", {}, org_a, existing={"severity": "S1"}
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ class TestCustomFieldDefinitionAPI:
 
 @pytest.mark.django_db
 class TestCustomFieldAnalytics:
-    """records_missing_value + totals — the settings/custom-fields stat cards."""
+    """records_missing_value + totals, the settings/custom-fields stat cards."""
 
     URL = "/api/custom-fields/"
 
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ class TestCustomFieldAnalytics:
         }
 
     def test_records_missing_value_is_org_scoped(self, admin_client, org_a, org_b):
-        """The record count must not include another org's rows — proven on
+        """The record count must not include another org's rows. Proven on
         SQLite where RLS is inert, so only the explicit org filter scopes it."""
         CustomFieldDefinition.objects.create(
             org=org_a,

backend/common/tests/test_docs_api_endpoints.py

@@ -79,10 +79,10 @@ def _find_missing(
         if f"{method} {path}" in allowlist:
             continue
         if path not in operations:
-            missing.append(f"{filename}: {method} {path} — no such path in the API")
+            missing.append(f"{filename}: {method} {path}, no such path in the API")
         elif method not in operations[path]:
             missing.append(
-                f"{filename}: {method} {path} — path exists but does not accept "
+                f"{filename}: {method} {path}. Path exists but does not accept "
                 f"{method} (accepts {', '.join(sorted(operations[path]))})"
             )
     return missing

backend/common/tests/test_documents_access.py

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ defects survived in it: the list crashed for non-admins on an AttributeError,
 the object-level checks compared a `Profile` to a `User` FK and were therefore
 always False, and `Document.teams` was written but never read.
 
-Every check below asserts BOTH directions — a permission test that only ever
+Every check below asserts BOTH directions, a permission test that only ever
 sees one answer cannot tell a working check from a constant.
 """
 
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ class TestDocumentDetailAccess:
         assert user_client.get(_detail_url(doc.id)).status_code == 200
 
     def test_stranger_is_forbidden(self, user_client, admin_user, org_a):
-        """The other direction — the check must still be able to say no."""
+        """The other direction. The check must still be able to say no."""
         doc = _doc(org_a, admin_user)
         assert user_client.get(_detail_url(doc.id)).status_code == 403
 

backend/common/tests/test_magic_link.py

@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ class TestMagicLinkVerifyCode:
         )
         assert response.status_code == status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST
         # Also confirm that even a code that hashes to *something* on a link
-        # token can't be used — there's no code_hash on a link row.
+        # token can't be used. There's no code_hash on a link row.
         # (Defensive: ensure the lookup filters by delivery="code".)
         assert not MagicLinkToken.objects.filter(
             email="linktok@example.com", is_used=True

backend/common/tests/test_notification_sse.py

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ class _StubPubSub:
 
 class TestStreamEvents(TransactionTestCase):
     """Uses TransactionTestCase because the SSE generator's `sync_to_async`
-    DB hit opens a separate SQLite connection — incompatible with the
+    DB hit opens a separate SQLite connection, incompatible with the
     transaction-wrapped TestCase isolation."""
 
     def setUp(self):

backend/common/tests/test_notifications.py

@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ class TestDispatcher(NotificationModelBase):
                 (),
                 {"publish": lambda self, *a, **kw: (_ for _ in ()).throw(RuntimeError("boom"))},
             )()
-            # Should NOT raise — publish is best-effort.
+            # Should NOT raise. Publish is best-effort.
             n = notifications.create(self.profile_a, "case.commented")
         assert n is not None
         assert Notification.objects.filter(pk=n.pk).exists()
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ class TestPurgeTask(NotificationModelBase):
     def test_purge_respects_custom_days_arg(self):
         from common.tasks import purge_read_notifications
 
-        # Read 5 days ago — survives default 90, but not when days=1
+        # Read 5 days ago, survives default 90, but not when days=1
         n = Notification.objects.create(
             org=self.org_a,
             recipient=self.profile_a,